Opinion
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); 9th Cir. R. 34-4.
Editorial Note:
This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA9 Rule 36-3 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Napoleon A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding.
Before SCHROEDER, TROTT and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Stanley Ezell Singleton appeals pro se the district court's summary judgment for defendant in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment, see Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam), and affirm.
Singleton contends that the district court erred by granting summary judgment because triable issues of fact existed regarding whether he violated San Diego Municipal Code § 56.55 which prohibits urinating in public. This contention lacks merit because even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Singleton, his arrest was justified by the circumstances and thus no violation of his Fourth Amendment rights occurred. See Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir.1995); Cal.Penal Code § 836(a)(1) (West Supp.1998) (stating that a peace officer may arrest a person if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense in the officer's presence).
Singleton next contends that Officer Erwin violated his constitutional rights by handcuffing him, taking him into custody and conducting a search rather than issuing a field citation and immediately releasing him. This contention lacks merit because Singleton was released on a written notice to appear in compliance with California Penal Code § 853.6. Further, Singleton had no "constitutional right to immediate liberty" after a lawful arrest. See Higbee v. City of San Diego, 911 F.2d 377, 380-81 (9th Cir.1990).
Singleton finally contends that, in a subsequent incident, Officer Erwin failed to comply with California Penal Code § 3060 which, according to Singleton, required a written order of the Board of Prison Terms before Officer Erwin could apprehend him and deliver him to the custody of the parole officer. This contention lacks merit because the language of § 3060 does not explicitly require a written order but rather states that such an order shall constitute a sufficient warrant to return to custody any paroled prisoner. See Cal.Penal Code § 3060 (West Supp.1998). Further, "[u]nder California and federal law, probable cause is not required to arrest a parolee for a violation of parole," nor is a parole officer required to personally effect the arrest of the parolee. See United States v. Butcher, 926 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir.1991).
AFFIRMED.