Opinion
No. 99 C 0059.
February 28, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Charlotte Singleton, administrator of the estate of Antonio Lamar Singleton ("decedent"), has filed an eighteen count third amended complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against the City of Chicago, and Chicago Police Department Officers and employees Robert Matlock, Mario Keyes, Ann Moran, Joseph Joria, Garrett Dubin, Anthony Moon, George Altman, Dennis Walsh, Thomas Green, Timothy McAuliffe, Travis Armstead, and Frank Trigg (the "individual defendants").
Counts I and II allege state law claims for negligence against the City of Chicago for failure to provide needed medical treatment to decedent. Counts III and IV allege state law claims for willful and wanton conduct against the City of Chicago for failure to provide needed medical treatment to decedent. Count V alleges a civil fights claim under § 1983 against the City of Chicago for failure to provide needed medical treatment to decedent. Counts VI through XVII allege civil fights claims under § 1983 against the individual defendants for deliberate indifference to decedent's medical needs.
Defendant City of Chicago has moved to dismiss Counts I, II, III, IV, and V. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion is granted with respect to Counts I and II. Defendant's motion is denied with respect to Counts III, IV and V.
Facts
For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1428 (7th Cir. 1996). According to the third amended complaint, filed on January 20, 2000, decedent was arrested and detained in the Seventh District lock-up of the Chicago Police Department on January 24, 1998. During his incarceration, the decedent repeatedly asked for his asthma medication or for medical attention to relieve his asthmatic condition. Later that day, decedent was taken to St. Bernard's Hospital where he was prescribed, but apparently not given, asthma medication. The decedent was returned to the Seventh District lock-up, again without access to his prescribed asthma medication. On January 25, 1998, decedent was taken to Holy Cross Hospital where he was pronounced dead.
Discussion
Counts I and II
Defendant has moved to dismiss Counts I and II, arguing that under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act ( 745 ILCS 10/4-105 (1996)), the City is not responsible for acts of negligence in the failure of its employees to furnish or obtain medical care for prisoners in its custody. Plaintiff acknowledges that the negligence claims are governed by this section of the Tort Immunity Act and does not object to dismissal of these Counts. Accordingly, defendant's. motion to dismiss Counts I and II is granted.
Counts III and IV
Counts III and IV allege wrongful death and survival action claims against the City for willful and wanton conduct in its failure to provide the decedent with his prescribed asthma medication. The City has moved to dismiss Counts III and IV, arguing that the City is immune from liability for its employees' discretionary policy decisions under the Tort Immunity Act. The City seeks to characterize the actions of its employees as discretionary in nature and falling within the protection of 745 ILCS 10/2-201. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that public officials receive immunity under 745 ILCS 10/2-201 only when the official's position requires the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion, and the act or omission that caused the injury was "both a determination of policy and an exercise of discretion." Harinek v. 161 N. Clark St., Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill.2d 335, 230 Ill. Dec. 11, 692 N.E.2d 1177, 1181 (1998). The alleged refusals by the City's employees to provide decedent with his prescribed medication cannot be characterized as determinations of policy within the meaning of § 10/2-201.Hayes v. City of Des Plaines, 182 F.R.D. 546, 551-552 (N.D.Ill. 1998).
Courts have consistently found that actions similar to the alleged conduct the City falls within the scope of the exception for willful and wanton conduct contained in 745 ILCS 10/4-105 (Failure to provide medical care for prisoners). Alvarez v. Riesche, No. 98 C 5552, 1999 WL 519383 (N.D.Ill. July 21, 1999);Regaldo v. City of Chicago, 40 F. Supp.2d 1009 (N.D.Ill. 1999);Williams v. City of Chicago, No. 94 C 3350, 1995 WL 88926 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 02, 1995). Defendant cites no case law that places police failure to provide medical care for prisoners within the scope of 10/2-201. Accordingly, the City's motion to dismiss Counts III and IV is denied.
Count V
The City has moved to dismiss Count V, arguing that plaintiff fails to state a sufficient claim of implied policy or custom as required by Monell v. Department of Social Services City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Plaintiff admits that she has not sufficiently pleaded an implied policy, but argues that she had no intention of doing so. Instead, plaintiff argues that she has alleged "an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation." McTigue v. City of Chicago, 60 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 1995). A claim of express policy clearly indicates the policy that allegedly caused the constitutional deprivation. It does not, therefore, fall within the scope of the Seventh Circuit's admonitions against conclusory or "boilerplate" allegations of implied policy. Jackson v. Marion County, 66 F.3d at 153 (7th Cir. 1995).
Under notice pleading, all that is required is a short and plain statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics and Intelligence Coordination Unit, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1163 (1993). The plaintiff may plead conclusions, so long as the defendant is provided with at least minimal notice of the claim. Jackson v. Marion County, 66 F.3d at 153 (7th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff claims the City's failure to provide decedent with timely access to needed medication as the constitutional violation. Plaintiff states in her complaint that this violation and the resulting injury to decedent resulted from the systematic and gross deficiencies contained in Chicago Police Department General Order No. 88-11. This allegation meets the requirements of Monell and McTigue and provides minimal notice of the claim as required by Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 8. Accordingly, the City's motion to dismiss Count V is denied.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the City's motion to dismiss Counts I and II is granted. The City's motion to dismiss Counts III, IV and V is denied. Plaintiff is ordered to file a fourth amended complaint within 21 days of the date hereof conforming to this opinion, and the City shall file its answer thereto within 21 days thereafter.