Summary
rejecting a similar argument by a plaintiff because the plaintiff failed to "suggest that he did not actually sign the paper" himself
Summary of this case from Conway ex rel. Conway v. Done Rite Recovery Servs., Inc.Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:00-CV-0742-R
January 18, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant ASI Corporation's ("ASI") Motion to Compel Arbitration (filed December 19, 2000). For the reasons stated below, the Motion is GRANTED.
I. Factual Background
From September 1997 until his termination on May 15, 1998, the Plaintiff, Jimmie Singleton, Jr. ("Singleton"), worked as a "packer and order puller" at ASI's Richardson, TX facility. On April 7, 2000, Singleton filed this action, alleging Title VII and section 1981 claims. Specifically, Singleton claimed that he suffered a hostile work environment and was terminated based on race and in retaliation for reporting the hostile work environment.
By virtue of signing his application to work at ASI, Singleton simultaneously signed an arbitration agreement, which read in part: "I . . . agree, in the event that I am hired by the company, that all disputes that cannot be resolved by informal internal resolution which might arise out of my employment with the company, whether during or after my employment, will be submitted to binding arbitration."
Since the case was filed, ASI has sought minimal discovery and has sought no relief which would have a dispositive effect on Singleton's claims.
II. Analysis
Singleton raises several arguments to explain why the mandatory arbitration agreement should not be enforced in this case. First, he argues that mandatory arbitration is inconsistent with the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the right to bring Title VII claims. Second, he claims that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") excludes employment contracts from its coverage. Finally, he argues that ASI has failed to prove that he knowingly and voluntarily signed the arbitration agreement.
A. Mandatory Arbitration of Title VII Claims
The Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have answered the question of whether Title VII claims can be subject to mandatory arbitration in the affirmative. See Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 747 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that when the Fifth Circuit refused to send a Title VII claim to mandatory arbitration, its judgment was vacated by the Supreme Court and remanded for consideration in light of another Supreme Court case in which a plaintiffs federal age discrimination claim was found to be subject to mandatory arbitration). In Rojas, the Fifth Circuit set out a clearly settled rule that Title VII claims may be subject to mandatory arbitration. Thus, the Court rejects Singleton's first argument.
B. Effect of the FAA
The plaintiff in Rojas similarly argued that the FAA excluded contracts of employment from the types of contracts which could be made subject to compulsory arbitration. The FAA states that it shall not apply to "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." Rojas, 87 F.3d at 747 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.). However, the court inRojas held that this exclusionary clause was meant to apply only to "workers actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce in the same way that seamen and railroad workers are." Id. at 748 (quoting Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 600-01 (6th Cir. 1995)).
In his position at ASI, Singleton was not, and has not claimed to have been, engaged in commerce in the same way that seamen and railroad workers are engaged in commerce. Thus, because the Fifth Circuit has clearly limited the scope of the FAA exclusion clause to those engaged in commerce in the same way that seamen and railroad workers are, the Court rejects Singleton's argument that the FAA excludes his employment contract from coverage.
C. Evidence that Singleton Signed the Contract
Singleton has finally argued that ASI has presented no direct evidence that he signed the contract containing the arbitration agreement. In its Motion, ASI presents the affidavit of Marilyn Say ("Say"), ASI's Human Resources Administrator. In her affidavit, Say attests to the fact that it is the policy of ASI to require all employees to sign binding arbitration agreements. Further, attached to her affidavit is the arbitration agreement signed by Singleton.
Singleton argues that Say's affidavit is insufficient because she does not attest to having personal knowledge of the fact that Singleton signed the agreement and that he did so knowingly and voluntarily. However, nowhere in his Response does Singleton suggest that he did not actually sign the paper. Thus, the Court will consider the signature on the agreement to be that of Singleton.
Thus, all that remains is Singleton's claim that there is no evidence that he signed the contract knowingly and voluntarily. However, ASI correctly points out that courts will presume that a party has knowledge of the contents of an arbitration agreement when he has a chance to read such agreement, and subsequently signs it. EZ Pawn Corp. v. Mancia, 934 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Tex. 1996).
Singleton has not alleged that he did not have the opportunity to read or understand the agreement. Instead he has relied on a rather vague argument that Say did not attest to that fact. However, this Court will presume, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that in signing the contract, Singleton was acting voluntarily and that he was aware that he was making an agreement that could be enforced. Thus, the Court rejects Singleton's final argument.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, ASI's Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED. Further, because Singleton has waived his right to bring his suit in federal court, this case is
DISMISSED.
It is so ORDERED.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the Memorandum Opinion and Order issued on this date, it is ordered that Plaintiffs claims be submitted to binding arbitration. It is further ordered that Plaintiffs claims are DISMISSED.
It is so ORDERED.