Opinion
570410/22
12-20-2022
Shak esque SINGLETARY, Petitioner-Respondent, v. RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT INC. and River Realty, Respondents-Appellants, and The Department of Housing Preservation and Development, Respondent.
David Berger, New York City, for appellants. Shakesque Singletary, respondent pro se. Diana Lawless, New York City, for Department of Housing Preservation and Development, respondent.
David Berger, New York City, for appellants.
Shakesque Singletary, respondent pro se.
Diana Lawless, New York City, for Department of Housing Preservation and Development, respondent.
PRESENT: Brigantti, J.P., Hagler, Tisch, JJ.
Per Curiam. Appeal from "decision/order" (Jack Stoller, J.), entered on or about November 25, 2019, deemed an appeal from the ensuing judgment (same court and Judge), entered on or about November 26, 2019, and so considered (see CPLR 5520[c] ), judgment affirmed, with $25 costs.
The determination rendered by a hearing court is entitled to great deference on appeal and will not be set aside unless such determination could not have been reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Claridge Gardens v. Menotti , 160 A.D.2d 544, 554 N.Y.S.2d 193 [1990] ). Here, respondents-landlords’ liability for civil penalties was firmly established by the hearing evidence, including petitioner-tenant's testimony, photographs, and HPD's subsequent inspections, which fully supports the trial court's finding that respondents failed to correct certain violations cited in the May 3, 2019 consent order. Nor did respondents establish their defense of lack of access by a preponderance of the evidence, since the record supports the hearing court's express conclusion that the May 2019 order "contained no less than four access dates," that "none of respondents’ witnesses testified that respondent could not get access on the scheduled dates" and that "respondents’ contractor, the manager, and respondents’ worker all testified that they did work in the subject premises, which is not consistent with respondents’ position that petitioner denied access."
Respondents’ argument that the civil penalties imposed (see Administrative Code of City of NY § 27-2115[a]) violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the Unites States Constitution is unpreserved (see Matter of People v. Orbital Publ. Group, Inc., 193 A.D.3d 661, 148 N.Y.S.3d 67 [2021] ; Matter of Franklin St. Realty Corp. v. NYC Envtl. Control Bd., 164 A.D.3d 19, 30, 83 N.Y.S.3d 41 [2018], affd 34 N.Y.3d 600, 122 N.Y.S.3d 567, 145 N.E.3d 204 [2019] ) and in any event without merit. The Excessive Fines Clause is inapplicable because the penalty serves a remedial, rather than punitive, purpose, as it is intended to coerce property owners to comply with housing maintenance standards (see generally Matter of Tiwari v. City of New York , 190 A.D.3d 442, 140 N.Y.S.3d 201 [2021] ). Even if the Excessive Fines Clause applied, the penalty schedule contained in Administrative Code § 27-2115 - which classifies violations by their seriousness and accordingly varies the time landlords are allotted to correct them - was not "grossly disproportional to the gravity of [the] offense" (see County of Nassau v. Canavan , 1 N.Y.3d 134, 140, 770 N.Y.S.2d 277, 802 N.E.2d 616 [2003] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), i.e. the fine does not "notably exceed[ ] in amount that which is reasonable, usual, proper or just" ( Matter of Prince v. City of New York , 108 A.D.3d 114, 119, 966 N.Y.S.2d 16 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Department of Hous. Preserv. & Dev. of City of N.Y. v. Deka Realty Corp., 208 A.D.2d 37, 45-46, 51, 620 N.Y.S.2d 837 [1995] ), and respondents had the ability to mitigate the accrual of the fines by immediately correcting the violations (see Matter of Franklin St. Realty Corp. v. NYC Envtl. Control Bd. , 164 A.D.3d at 30, 83 N.Y.S.3d 41 ; OTR Media Group, Inc. v. City of New York , 83 A.D.3d 451, 454, 920 N.Y.S.2d 337 [2011] ).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
All concur