Opinion
Civil Action 4:21-cv-3520-SAL-TER
07-26-2022
CLYDE DEVON SINGLETARY, Plaintiff, v. INVESTIGATOR SHIELD NO. 00232, SERGEANT OF WARRANT OF SPECIAL SUMS TASK FORCE, EMPLOYER OF EFFINGHAM SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, MAGISTRATE JUDGE CODE 7374, DEPUTY PROSECUTOR, EMPLOYER OF 12TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT SOLICITOR OF GENERAL SESSION SOLICITOR'S OFFICE, SC BRANCH OF GENERAL SESSIONS 12TH CIRCUIT CRIMINAL, DEPARTMENT OF PAROLE AND PARDON SERVICE OFFICER, and MATTHEW McKNIGHT, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS E. ROGERS, III UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, originally filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas, Florence County, South Carolina. He alleges that Defendants violated his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. He alleges claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy as well as a due process violation for failing to provide him with a preliminary hearing. He also mentions Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. as well as state law claims for gross negligence, negligent supervision, and defamation. Defendants removed the action to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 as having federal question jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1367. Presently before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (ECF No. 11) and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 18). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he was advised pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), that a failure to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment could result in the motion being granted and his case dismissed. Plaintiff timely filed a Response (ECF No. 22). All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02 (B)(2)(d), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
II. FACTS
Plaintiff's claims arise from an arrest in September of 2020. His allegations are voluminous and difficult to follow at times and he does not name any Defendants by name in the caption other than Defendant Matthew McKnight, who appears to be the alleged victim in the underlying criminal action from which this case arises. Plaintiff alleges that McKnight conspired with Defendant “Investigator Shield No. 00232" to bring false charges against Plaintiff because Plaintiff had previously filed a civil action against the same investigator. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “Magistrate Code 7374" issued warrants for his arrest based on affidavits signed by the investigator that he knew were false. Plaintiff alleges that the investigator and Defendant “Sergeant of Warrant Special Sums Task Force” arrested Plaintiff based on these false warrants and searched Leandra Singletary's vehicle without a warrant. Leandra Singletary is not a party to this action. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “Employer of Effingham Sheriff's Department” is liable for the acts of the investigator and sergeant. He alleges that Defendant “Employer of 12th Judicial Circuit Court Solicitor of General Session Solicitor's Office” is liable for gross negligence and negligent supervision of his employees. Though he does not name an individual in the caption of his complaint, later in the complaint he mentions Solicitor E.L. Clements, III. Likewise, although the caption of his complaint names only Defendant “Deputy Prosecutor,” within the complaint Plaintiff mentions Prosecutor Todd S. Tucker. Plaintiff alleges that the Prosecutor was an active participant in a scheme to falsely charge Plaintiff, falsely indicted Plaintiff, and failed to provide him with a preliminary hearing. Plaintiff also alleges that the Prosecutor's participation in the underlying case was a conflict of interest because Plaintiff had previously filed a civil action against Prosecutor. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “S.C. Branch of General Session 12th Circuit Criminal Department Parole and Pardon Service Officer” participated in this conspiracy to violate his rights.
Plaintiff attaches to his complaint three arrest warrants. Arrest Warrants (ECF No. 1-1, pp. 22-24). The affiant for each warrant is Roger Tilton. Tilton avers that on September 8, 2020, Plaintiff unlawfully entered the victim's residence during the night without consent and took the victim's property from the residence. He avers that as Plaintiff was leaving the residence, he was approached by the victim and two witnesses, and Plaintiff pulled a pistol from his pants pocket, pointed it at the victim's chest area, and then pushed the pistol into the victim's chest causing a small abrasion. The victim and one witness struggled with Plaintiff but he was able to break loose. Plaintiff entered a vehicle and as he drove away he struck the victim with the vehicle and knocked him down. Tilton avers that the victim and the two witnesses each gave statements to law enforcement. He further avers that Plaintiff was identified by the victim using a police line-up. The arrest warrants were signed by Florence County Magistrate Judge David Sharpe Kelley. See Arrest Warrants.
III. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND
Removal is proper when a “civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441. District courts have original jurisdiction of “civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff clearly alleges violations of his federal constitutional rights in his complaint. He does not argue that he has not alleged any federal claims. Rather, in his motion to remand, Plaintiff argues that this court should not interfere with the underlying state criminal proceedings from which the claims in this action arise, citing Younger v. Harris, 410 U.S. 37 (1971). The abstention doctrine set forth in Younger provides that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996).
The doctrine of abstention articulated in Younger requires a federal court to abstain from interfering in state proceedings, even if jurisdiction exists,” if there is: “(1) an ongoing state judicial proceeding, instituted prior to any substantial progress in the federal proceeding; that (2) implicates important, substantial, or vital state interests; and (3) provides an adequate opportunity for the plaintiff to raise the federal constitutional claim advanced in the federal lawsuit.Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Wilson, 519 F.3d 156, 165 (4th Cir.2008). Though a defendant in a state criminal trial can litigate constitutional claims in defense of the state prosecution, he cannot recover monetary damages in such an action. Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 241 (4th Cir.2006). Because Plaintiff seeks both injunctive relief and monetary damages in this action, remand is not appropriate based on abstention principles. See, e.g., Myles Lumber Co. v. CNA Fin. Corp., 233 F.3d 821, 823 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[A] district court may stay an action seeking damages but generally may not subject it to outright dismissal or remand [under abstention doctrines].”).
IV. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Standard of Review
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, the moving party bears the burden of showing that summary judgment is proper. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if the non-moving party fails to establish an essential element of any cause of action upon which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Id. Once the moving party has brought into question whether there is a genuine dispute for trial on a material element of the non-moving party's claims, the non-moving party bears the burden of coming forward with specific facts which show a genuine dispute for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with enough evidence, beyond a mere scintilla, upon which the fact finder could reasonably find for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Barber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992). The evidence relied on must meet “the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits.” Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4thCir. 1993).
To show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the party must present evidence supporting his or her position by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 1994); Orsi v. Kickwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1993); Local Rules 7.04, 7.05, D.S.C.
B. Discussion
As stated above, Plaintiff's allegations are voluminous and difficult to follow at times. Though he labels 52 “claims” in his complaint, many are repetitive or involve individuals who are not parties to this action. For instance, “claims” 10-11, 14, 17-20, and 23-25 involve the search of Leandra Singletary's truck. However, Leandra Singletary is not a party to this action, and Plaintiff does not have standing to assert a claim on her behalf. See United States v. Baker, 719 F.3d 313, 320 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)). In addition, claims 31 and 34-49 are missing from the complaint. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants McKnight, Investigator, Seargant, and Magistrate Judge conspired to violate his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He alleges that McKnight provided false information to Investigator and Investigator knew the information was false but used it in his affidavits to seek false arrest warrants for Plaintiff's arrest. He alleges that the Magistrate Judge knew the information was false but issued the warrants anyway. He appears to allege that Sergeant knew the arrest warrants were false but arrested him anyway. Plaintiff alleges these Defendants engaged in this conspiracy in retaliation for a previous lawsuit Plaintiff filed against Investigator. Plaintiff also asserts that these Defendants are liable for negligence, gross, negligence, and defamation based upon these actions. Plaintiff alleges that Employer of Effingham Sheriff's Department is liable for negligence and negligent supervision based upon the actions of Investigator and Sergeant. He alleges that Deputy Prosecutor violated his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by engaging in prosecutorial misconduct and obtaining a false indictment. He also mentions RICO with respect to Deputy Prosecutor. Plaintiff also alleges that Employer of 12th Judicial Circuit Court Solicitor of General Session Solicitor's Office is liable for gross negligence and negligent supervision with respect to Deputy Prosecutor's actions.
No pages are missing from the Complaint.
Plaintiff repeatedly states throughout his response to Defendants' motion that he has not asserted any claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, a civil action for violation of constitutional rights is properly raised pursuant to § 1983. A legal action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707, 119 S.Ct. 1624, 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999).
All of Plaintiff's claims arise in some manner from his arrest in September of 2020. He alleges that Investigator Shield No. 00232 sought warrants for his arrest for an improper purpose based on information he knew to be false, Sergeant of Warrant Special Sums Task Force arrested him based on these improperly obtained arrest warrants, and the remaining Defendants violated his rights by participating in the arrest or subsequent prosecution. To state a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must show at least, that “defendant[s] have seized [plaintiff] pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause and that the criminal proceedings [have] terminated in [plaintiff's] favor.” Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508, 514 (4th Cir. 2005)(internal citations and quotations omitted). A termination in Plaintiff's favor is one where “the criminal prosecution ended without a conviction.” Thompson v. Clark, 142 S.Ct. 1332, 1341 (2022). The U.S. Supreme Court provided in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) that until a conviction was set aside or charges finally dismissed without the possibility of revival, a § 1983 claim could not be pursued based on allegations of unlawful circumstances surrounding the criminal prosecution. See also Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, N.C. , 85 F.3d 178 (4th Cir. 1996). The public index reveals that the charges arising from the arrest at issue herein remain pending and have not been favorably terminated. See https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Florence/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (with search parameters limited by Plaintiff's name). Accordingly, Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims are premature and dismissal is appropriate. Likewise, any other claims raised by Plaintiff under § 1983 that would impugn the legality of a criminal conviction are premature and subject to dismissal for the same reason. Further, as discussed below, many of the defendants named in this action are protected by the various immunities provided under the law.
The court may take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government websites. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, No. 05-4182, 2008 WL 4185869 at * 2 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 2008) (noting that courts may take judicial notice of governmental websites including other courts' records); Williams v. Long, No. 07-3459-PWG, 2008 WL 4848362 at *7 (D. Md. Nov. 7, 2008) (noting that some courts have found postings on government websites as inherently authentic or self-authenticating).
As stated above, Plaintiffs allegations are voluminous and difficult to follow at times. Defendants assert that Plaintiff fails to identify who did what and that Plaintiff's claims are frivolous for failure to include more than bare allegations. The Complaint contains one bare allegation that states “In handcuffed behind his back with a broke elbow intentionally & the restrain was unlawful.” Pl Compl. p. 6 of 43. To the extent this allegation could be construed as one for excessive force, it would not be barred by Heck. See, e.g., Riddick v. Lott, 202 F. App'x. 615, 616-17 (4th Cir.2006). However, Plaintiff fails to identify who handcuffed him or what injury he suffered as a result or otherwise provide any further factual support. Thus, dismissal is appropriate. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (holding that an allegation is insufficient to state a claim where it “tenders ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'”); Rizzo v. Good, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976) (a § 1983 plaintiff must show that he suffered a specific injury resulting from a specific defendant's specific conduct and must show an affirmative link between the injury and that conduct).
Plaintiff's claims against Magistrate Code 7374 are barred by absolute judicial immunity. As the Fourth Circuit has stated relevant to the reasons for the doctrine of absolute immunity for judges:
The absolute immunity from suit for alleged deprivation of rights enjoyed by judges is matchless in its protection of judicial power. It shields judges even against allegations of malice or corruption.... The rule is tolerated, not because corrupt or malicious judges should be immune from suit, but only because it is recognized that judicial officers in whom discretion is entrusted must be able to exercise discretion vigorously and effectively, without apprehension that they will be subjected to
burdensome and vexatious litigation.McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir.1972) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds, Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 77 (4th Cir.1995). The doctrine of absolute immunity for acts taken by a judge in connection with his or her judicial authority and responsibility is well established and widely recognized. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (judges are immune from civil suit for actions taken in their judicial capacity, unless “taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (“A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.”); Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir.1987) (a suit by South Carolina inmate against two Virginia magistrates); Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir.1985) (“It has long been settled that a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of his judicial actions.”). Summary judgment is appropriate as to Plaintiff's claim against this Defendant.
Similarly, Plaintiff's claims against Deputy Prosecutor and Employer of 12th Judicial Circuit Court Solicitor of General Session Solicitor's Office are also barred by absolute immunity. Prosecutors have absolute immunity for activities in or connected with judicial proceedings, such as a criminal trial, bond hearings, bail hearings, grand jury proceedings, and pretrial motions hearings. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993); Dababnah v. KellerBurnside, 208 F.3d 467 (4th Cir.2000). Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate.
In additional to prosecutorial immunity, Plaintiff's claims against Employer of 12th Judicial Circuit Court Solicitor of General Session Solicitor's Office, as well as the claims against Employer of Effingham Sheriff's Department are barred because § 1983 generally does not provide for supervisory liability. Plaintiff claims that these two Defendants are liable for the actions of their subordinates Vicarious liability or respondeat superior is generally not available to a § 1983 plaintiff as a method to create liability of a state-actor supervisor for the acts of his subordinate. Monell v. Dep't Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). There is a limited exception to the prohibition as long as the facts alleged meet the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal's three-part test for supervisor liability under § 1983: (1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices”; and (3) that there was an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994)(citations omitted). There is insufficient evidence in the record to show that either of these Defendants had actual or constructive knowledge that their subordinates were engaged in any conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to Plaintiff. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate as to Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants.
Also, it is not entirely clear what Plaintiff's allegations are against S.C. Branch of General Session 12th Circuit Criminal Department Parole and Pardon Service Officer. He mentions this Defendant only once in his complaint: “It a conspiracy with South Carolina Branch in Florence 12thCircuit of General Session Criminal Department Parole and Pardon Service Officer Robert Lee Caulder et al that started before and round 09-08-2021conspirer in/and after to violate Plaintiff Clyde.” Compl. p. 16 of 43. “Probation officers are also entitled to absolute immunity from suits for damages for alleged conduct performed in a quasi-judicial capacity .... A determination that a violation of a [supervisee's] conditions of supervision has occurred is a quasi-judicial function entitled to such immunity.” Young-Bey v. Jones, Civ. No. 21-771,2021 WL 1215771, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2021) (unpublished); see also Douglas v. Muncy, 570 F.2d 499, 500-01 (4th Cir. 1978) (“[P]ursuant to [Section] 1983, [the plaintiff] asked for damages for the denial of his constitutional rights from ... his parole officer, who allegedly had arbitrarily enforced the conditions of his parole .... [T]he district court was correct in its conclusion that ... [the plaintiff's] parole officer[ ] was [ ] immune from such liability.”); Pilgrim v. Delaney, No. 7:20CV2325, 2021 WL 274301, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 27, 2021) (unpublished) (“[The p]laintiff also brings claims against ... his probation officer, related to the revocation ofhis probation [The probation officer] is entitled to prosecutorial immunity with respect to her part in [the] revocation.”).
Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Matthew McKnight fail as well. Plaintiff alleges that McKnight provided a false statement against him, upon which Investigator relied in seeking arrest warrants. It is well settled that a private witness in a state court proceeding cannot be sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983); Brice v. Nkaru, 220 F.3d 233, 239 n. 6 (4th Cir.2000). Further, this absolute immunity cannot be defeated by alleging that the witness was engaged in a conspiracy with a state actor. Gethers v. Davis, No. CV 4:15-3614-BHH, 2015 WL 6746232, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 4, 2015). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against McKnight are subject to dismissal.
Plaintiff also asserts state law claims of gross negligence, negligent supervision, and defamation. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) provides, in pertinent part, “[t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction....” The Fourth Circuit has recognized that “trial courts enjoy wide latitude in determining whether or not to retain jurisdiction over state claims when all federal claims have been extinguished.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir.1995) (holding district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to retain jurisdiction over the state law claims). See also, e.g., United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 875 (4th Cir.1989). In determining whether to retain jurisdiction, courts consider “the convenience and fairness to the parties, existence of any underlying issues of federal policy, comity, and considerations of judicial economy.” Shanaghan, 58 F.3d at 110. Here, the undersigned recommends that the district judge decline to retain supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. There are no issues of federal policy underlying the remaining state law claims. In addition, comity favors remand since the remaining claims are quintessential state law questions. In United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), the Supreme Court cautioned that “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a superfooted reading of applicable law.... if the federal law claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.” Accordingly, should the district judge accept the recommendation with respect to Plaintiff's federal claims, it is recommended that the court decline to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and remand this case to the Court of Common Pleas, Florence County, South Carolina.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (ECF No. 11) be denied for the reasons argued by Plaintiff, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 18) be granted as to Plaintiff's federal claims, that the court decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims, and this case be remanded to the Court of Common Pleas, Florence County, South Carolina.