Opinion
1:22-cv-04147-BHH-MGB
01-05-2023
John Singletary, Plaintiff, v. Aiken County Code Enforcement Division; Rodney Cooper; Page Bayne; Bradley Weimer; Chad Alexander; and others to be named, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff John Singletary (“Singletary” or “Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action against the Aiken County Code Enforcement Division (“Code Enforcement”); Code Enforcement Inspector, Rodney Cooper (“Cooper”); Code Enforcement Director, Page Bayne (“Bayne”); Code Enforcement Deputy Director, Bradley Wiemer (“Weimer”); Aiken County Building Official, Chad Alexander (“Alexander”); and Assistant County Administrator, Joel Duke (“Duke”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review the pleadings in this case and submit recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. This case is now before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 5); Defendants' Motion to Remand State Law Claims (Dkt. No. 6); and Singletary's Emergency Motion for Expedited Hearing and Request for Injunction (Dkt. No. 2). For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that each motion be dismissed without prejudice at this time.
BACKGROUND
On October 4, 2022, Aiken County (the “County”) filed a civil action against Singletary as the owner of a purported nuisance property consisting of a residential apartment complex located at 1051 Pine Street, Beech Island, South Carolina, 29842 (the “Property”).(Case No. 2022-CP-02-02277.) According to the County's complaint, Defendants Cooper and Alexander inspected Singletary's Property on or around June 8, 2022, in response to multiple tenant complaints regarding the conditions of their residences. Upon inspecting the Property, Defendants Cooper and Alexander noted numerous violations of the County's Code of Ordinances (the “Code”)-i.e., standing water in the hallway and kitchen areas; non-functioning smoke detectors; substandard electrical and plumbing systems, etc.-and gave Singletary a summary of the same. Defendant Cooper also issued Singletary a uniform ordinance summons pursuant to Section 15-37 of the Code (Chapter 15, Article IV, “Unfit Dwellings”).
The undersigned takes judicial notice of the records filed in Singletary's underlying state court proceedings. See Aiken County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/aiken/publicindex/ (last visited January 3, 2023); see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (explaining that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989); Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may also take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government web sites).
Section 15-37 provides that,
Whenever the county building official finds that there exist in the county, dwellings which are unfit for human habitation due to (a) dilapidation, (b) defects increasing the hazards of fire, accidents or other calamities, (c) lack of ventilation, light or sanitary facilities or (d) other conditions rendering such dwellings unsafe or unsanitary, dangerous or detrimental to the health, safety or morals or otherwise inimical to the welfare of the residents of the county, the county may exercise its police powers to repair, close or demolish any such dwelling.
The County claims that Defendant Alexander sent Singletary a follow-up letter dated June 13, 2022, reiterating that the Property's dwelling units were “unfit for human occupancy,” and explaining “the minimum steps” Singletary would need to take “to bring the property into compliance with applicable ordinances and building codes.” Specifically, the letter notified Singletary that, “[d]ue to the extensive nature of necessary repairs,” he must “retain the services of a licensed General Contractor.” After Singletary apparently failed to respond to the County's instructions, Defendant Cooper “red-tagged” all six apartment units at the Property indicating that they were unfit for habitation. On September 19, 2022, the County's legal team sent Singletary a letter warning him that if he did not make the necessary repairs to the Property within ten days, the County would file an injunction action with the circuit court to abate the purported nuisance and unsafe conditions pursuant to S.C. Code § 6-29-950 and Section 15-47 of the Code.
Section 6-29-950 governs enforcement of zoning ordinances and provides the following remedies for violations:
In case a building, structure, or land is or is proposed to be used in violation of any ordinance adopted pursuant to this chapter, the zoning administrator or other appropriate administrative officer, municipal or county attorney, or other appropriate authority of the municipality or county or an adjacent or neighboring property owner who would be specially damaged by the violation may in addition to other remedies, institute injunction, mandamus, or other appropriate action or proceeding to prevent the unlawful erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, conversion, maintenance, or use, or to correct or abate the violation, or to prevent the occupancy of the building, structure, or land. Each day the unlawful erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, conversion, maintenance, or use continues is considered a separate offense.S.C. Code § 6-29-950(A). To that end, Section 15-47 of the Code states that the County has the power “to define and declare nuisances and to cause their removal or abatement by summary proceedings, criminal proceedings or otherwise.” Chapter 15, Article IV, “Unfit Dwellings,” Section 15-47.
The County filed the injunction action in the Aiken County Court of Common Pleas on October 4, 2022 (Case No. 2277), asserting that Singletary's Property continued to violate numerous municipal ordinances and had become a “nuisance” and “public safety hazard,” such that “its use should be enjoined pursuant to S.C. Code § 6-29-950 until . . . placed into a fit and habitable condition.” The County further alleged that Singletary was in violation of the South Carolina Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (“SCRLTA”), which requires a landlord to “comply with the requirements of applicable building and housing codes materially affecting health and safety” and “make all repairs and do whatever is reasonably necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition.” S.C. Code § 27-40-440(a)(1), (2). Based on the above, the County asked that the circuit court order Singletary to abate the nuisance within a reasonable period of time and, to the extent he failed to do so, allow the County and its agents to enter upon the Property and abate the nuisance, with damages to be awarded for any cleanup, abatement and/or remediation costs incurred by the County relative to the Property.
More specifically, the SCRLTA states that for premises containing more than four dwelling units, the landlord must “maintain in reasonably good and safe working order and condition all electrical, gas, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air conditioning, and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him.” S.C. Code § 27-40-440(a)(5).
On November 18, 2022, Singletary filed a pro se answer to the County's complaint, contending that the “entire complaint is baseless and moot based on the undeniable fact that an unconditional ‘Judicial Order' was issued, stamped, and recorded in Aiken County Magistrate Court on August 23, 2022 completely absolving [Singletary] of any and all charges whatsoever in [the County's] entire complaint.” Singletary also filed what he labeled as a “Notice of Removal,” stating that the County's case “shall proceed hereinafter in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina.” That same day, Singletary filed the instant federal Complaint alleging various claims in relation to Code Enforcement's treatment of his Property, including violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 2000e; gross negligence; forgery of a public document pursuant to S.C. Code § 16-13-10; and breach of trust with fraudulent intent pursuant to S.C. Code § 16-13-230. (Dkt. No. 1.)
Notably, in filing the instant federal action, Singletary submitted a “contemporaneous” Notice of Removal, which purports to have removed Case No. 2277 to federal court on the grounds that the “action is a civil action of which this Court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and is one which may be removed to this Court by defendant pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) in that it arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985, § 1986, 5th and 14th Amendments and other basis [sic] of federal question jurisdiction....” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 7.) In short, Singletary appears to suggest that his federal Complaint essentially encompasses the County's pending state court action by way of “pendant jurisdiction.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) Notwithstanding these statements, Singletary's federal filings do not include or incorporate the County's complaint from Case No. 2277. To the contrary, Singletary presents a totally new Complaint that largely attempts to refute the allegations upon which the pending state court action rests by raising parallel state and federal claims against Code Enforcement and its officers.
More specifically, the federal Complaint once again references, albeit vaguely, that Singletary was “completely absolved by judicial dismissal of all charges brought against him,” and claims that Code Enforcement's subsequent actions have therefore “deprive[d] [him] of his rights to invest for profit and own property in Aiken County” without due process. (Dkt. No. 1 at 8.) The Complaint further alleges that Defendants Anderson and Cooper “orchestrated” a scheme that involved entering the Property “SWAT team style” without notifying Singletary, “harassing tenants” to file “untrue complaints” against him, and “backdating a fictious list” of Code violations that was fraudulently presented to the circuit court as evidence of purported notice to Singletary. (Id. at 8-9.) Singletary claims that as a result of Defendants' alleged misconduct, he has suffered emotional distress, mental anguish, fear, anxiety, and loss of economic investment, and seeks $10 million in damages. (Id. at 7-8, 16.)
In addition to the instant Complaint, Singletary also filed an Emergency Motion for Expedited Hearing and Request for Injunction seeking an emergency hearing “to prevent irreparable harm” resulting from Defendants' “ongoing illegal actions regarding [Singletary's] protected rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” (Dkt. No. 2 at 2.) In support of this request, Singletary reiterates that despite the “judicial dismissal order” that allegedly “absolve[ed] him of claims against him relating to [the Property],” Defendants “continue to harass [his] tenants in threatening manners” and are proceeding with the pending state court proceedings in bad faith. (Id. at 2-3.) Singletary contends that without an “order of protection,” he will be subject to “loss of investment, and temporary regulatory taking and stigma attached to an apartment complex that is and has been in compliance with S.C. and Aiken County laws.” (Id. at 2.)
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Before the Court had an opportunity to complete a proper initial review of the instant Complaint, Singletary apparently attempted to serve his pleading on Defendants via email. On December 14, 2022, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that “this action should be dismissed because the Summonses were facially defective, the Summonses and Complaint were never properly served upon the Defendants, there is another action presently pending between the parties concerning the same subject matter, and the Complaint fails to adhere to the pleading requirements in Rules 8(a) and 10(b), Fed. R. Civ. P.” (See Dkt. No. 5 at 2-3; see also Dkt. No. 51.) Defendants also filed a Motion to Remand State Law Claims, arguing that Singletary's “attempted removal was improper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) because the District Court would not have had original jurisdiction over any aspects of the State Court Action based on the state of the pleadings when removal was attempted.” (Dkt. No. 6 at 2.) It is against this procedural background that the undersigned now begins the initial review process in the instant case.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court possesses the inherent authority to review a pro se complaint to ensure that the plaintiff has standing, that federal jurisdiction exists, and that the case is not frivolous, even where the plaintiff has paid the filing fee. See Hamilton v. United States, No. 2:20-cv-1666-RMG-MHC, 2020 WL 7001153, at *1 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2020) (“It is well established that a court has broad inherent power sua sponte to dismiss an action, or part of an action, which is frivolous, vexatious, or brought in bad faith.”) (internal citations omitted), adopted, 2020 WL 5939235 (D.S.C. Oct. 7, 2020); Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App'x. 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”).
DISCUSSION
All Pro se complaints filed in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina must first undergo an initial review process to ensure that the plaintiff filed “the proper paperwork to proceed with an action.” See General Order, In Re: Procedures in Civil Actions Filed by Non-Prisoner Pro Se Litigants, No. 3:07-mc-5015-JFA (D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2007). The assigned United States Magistrate Judge generally must provide a Pro se plaintiff with an opportunity to submit any items needed “to render the case into proper form within a reasonable time.” Id. Once the action is in proper form, the Court must then review the claims in the pleading and decide whether service of process should be authorized. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Local Civil Rules 73.01, 73.02 (D.S.C.). Turning to the pending motions before this Court (Dkt. Nos. 2, 5, 6), there is clearly some confusion surrounding this initial review process and the scope of Singletary's claims as currently presented. The undersigned attempts to alleviate this confusion below.
I. Singletary's Complaint Remains Under Initial Review
The undersigned has yet to authorize service of process in the instant case because Singletary's action is not in proper form. Specifically, Singletary still needs to submit the requisite service documents for each named Defendant, as well as responses to the Court's Local Civil Rule 26.01 interrogatories, before the Court can determine whether to authorize service of process. Notwithstanding these deficiencies, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss states that Singletary attempted to serve his Complaint on Defendants via email by using facially defective summons forms without the Court's approval and in violation of Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.(See Dkt. No. 5 at 2-4.) In light of this information, the undersigned clarifies here that Singletary has not properly effectuated service in this case and any attempts to do so are premature while the Court is conducting the initial review. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 5) should therefore be DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to refile in the event the Court ultimately authorizes service of process in this case.
Under Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a valid summons must be signed by the clerk of court and bear the court's seal. Rule 4(a)(1)(F), (G), Fed. R. Civ. P.
The undersigned notes that following the filing of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Clerk of Court mistakenly issued an order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Singletary of the dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion in a timely manner. These instructions were issued in error, as Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is premature and subject to dismissal while this case is in initial review. Accordingly, Singletary need not respond to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at this time.
II. Singletary's Claims Are Limited to Those Raised in the Federal Complaint
The undersigned further clarifies that while Singletary seems to contend that he removed the County's pending state proceedings (Case No. 2277) to federal court-and that the instant action somehow incorporates those proceedings-he is mistaken. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, “any civil action brought in State court” may be removed by the defendant if it is one over which federal district courts would have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The United States Supreme Court has since clarified that “the ‘civil action . . . of which the district cour[t]' must have ‘original jurisdiction' is the action as defined by the plaintiff's complaint.” See Lett v. Hawkins, 518 F.Supp.3d 891, 895 (D.S.C. 2021) (citing Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, --- U.S. ---, 139 S.Ct. 1743, 1748 (2019)). In other words, “when determining whether it has original jurisdiction over a civil action, [the district court] should evaluate whether the action could have been brought originally in federal court.” See id. (citing Home Depot, 139 S.Ct. at 1748). Once an action has been successfully removed, the state court's jurisdiction is suspended and the case proceeds as if it began in the federal district court. Limehouse v. Hulsey, 404 S.C. 93, 112-13 (2013); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1447(a), 1448; Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(c)(1).
Singletary bases his purported removal of Case No. 2277 on federal question jurisdiction, suggesting that his federal claims against Defendants bring the County's related state action within this Court's purview. (See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 7.) As indicated above, however, removal is appropriate only where the plaintiff's complaint could have been brought originally in federal court, which is plainly not the case here. The scope of the County's pleading is strictly limited to municipal violations and state law claims affecting Singletary's Property; there are no federal claims that would otherwise allow this Court to exercise original jurisdiction over the action. Consequently, Singletary cannot remove the County's pending state court action simply by consolidating it with a related, but separate, lawsuit he subsequently filed in federal district court as the plaintiff.
This is especially true where, as here, Singletary did not file a copy of the County's state court pleading as part of the record, or even name the County as a party to the federal action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (explaining that in filing a notice of removal in federal court, the defendant generally must include “a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon” him).
To be sure, even if Singletary had raised his federal causes of action as counterclaims in Case No. 2277, it is well-established that “a counterclaim-which appears as part of the defendant's answer, not part of the plaintiff's complaint-cannot serve as the basis” for invoking federal question jurisdiction in the removal context. See Lett, 518 F.Supp.3d at 894 n.2 (referencing Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831-32 (2002)). Accordingly, the undersigned clarifies that the instant federal action does not incorporate the County's pending state court action or reflect a proper removal of the same. Assuming the instant case survives initial review, the Court's review shall be limited to the facts and claims contained in the federal Complaint filed at Dkt. No. 1. The undersigned therefore recommends that Defendants' Motion to Remand State Law Claims (Dkt. No. 6) be DISMISSED without prejudice, as Singletary's claims were never removed in the first instance.
III. Singletary Is Not Entitled to a Preliminary Injunction
While the County's action remains pending in its entirety before the Aiken County Court of Common Pleas, Singletary's Emergency Motion for Expedited Hearing and Request for Injunction (Dkt. No. 2) appears to be another attempt to delay and/or terminate those proceedings. Indeed, in his proposed “Preliminary Injunction Order,” Singletary asks that the Court enjoin Defendants “from further actions against [his] property until completion of the case in court.”(Dkt. No. 1-1 at 5-6.) However, such immediate injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008); see also Collins v. Bernedette, No. 2:22-cv-1391-RMG, 2022 WL 16951738, at *1 (D.S.C. Nov. 15, 2022) (“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy involving the exercise of a very far-reaching power, which is to be applied only in the limited circumstances which clearly demand it.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Rather, a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction should issue only when the movant has established all four of the following elements: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of the equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; see also Henderson for Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Bluefield Hosp. Co., LLC, 902 F.3d 432, 439 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting that “Winter made clear that each of these four factors must be satisfied to obtain preliminary injunctive relief”).
Although not entirely clear, the undersigned assumes that “the case in court” refers to the instant federal action, meaning that Singletary is asking the Court to prohibit the County and/or Defendants from pursuing further legal action against him until the instant case is adjudicated.
Beyond referencing “irreparable harm,” Singletary does not substantively address the individual Winter factors in his motion for an injunction; nevertheless, the undersigned finds that the factors plainly weigh against granting his request at this time. As a threshold matter, it is well-established that “federal courts have no general power to compel action by state officials.” See Dais v. Huggins, No. 8:08-cv-3629-JFA-BH, 2008 WL 5062329, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 20, 2008) (referencing Davis v. Lansing, 851 F.2d 72, 74 (2nd Cir. 1988)); see also Bell v. South Carolina, No. 2:17-cv-2176-TMC-MGB, 2017 WL 6767385, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 24, 2017) (“Federal courts generally may not issue a writ of mandamus to compel state officials to perform a duty allegedly owed to a petitioner.”), adopted, 2018 WL 263817 (D.S.C. Jan. 2, 2018), aff'd, 724 Fed.Appx. 204 (4th Cir. 2018). Consequently, to the extent Singletary is asking this Court to order some sort of action in the underlying state proceedings-i.e., directing the state court to stay or dismiss the County's complaint and preclude any further actions involving the Property-such relief is simply unavailable. See, e.g., Bell v. Reynolds, No. 8:08-cv-3799-GRA-BHH, 2009 WL 152586, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 6, 2009) (explaining that relief was unavailable where plaintiff asked federal district court to order Aiken County Court of General Sessions to rule in a certain way), adopted, 2009 WL 152589 (D.S.C. Jan. 22, 2009), aff'd, 335 Fed.Appx. 318 (4th Cir. 2009); Bell v. Stirling, No. 1:22-cv-1319-TMC-MGB, 2022 WL 5236739, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2022) (finding that federal district court could not order state court “to take certain action” in response to plaintiff's requests), adopted, 2022 WL 4462951 (D.S.C. Sept. 26, 2022).
Moreover, it is not clear from the current pleadings whether Singletary can prevail on the merits of his claims against Defendants. As noted above, Singletary's motion for injunctive relief relies on the vague, unsubstantiated “Judicial Order” referenced throughout his Complaint but noticeably absent from the various exhibits filed in the instant action. (See Dkt. No. 2 at 2, challenging the County's ongoing enforcement actions in light of the “Judicial Dismissal Order on August 23, 2022, absolving [Singletary] of claims against him relating to 1051 Pine Street.”) Despite Singletary's insistence, a cursory search of the record in Case No. 2277, as well as other state court matters involving Singletary, does not reveal any such order or state action within the timeframe.Thus, there is little evidence to suggest that the County has acted-and continues to act-in bad faith as Singletary contends. See Ruiz v. NationStar Mortg. LLC, No. 8:17-cv-3434-PWG, 2018 WL 3975635, at *2 (D. Md. May 18, 2018) (explaining that a plaintiff cannot meet the “rigorous” standard under Winter by simply presenting “a mere grave or serious question for litigation,” but rather, must show that he “will likely succeed on the merits”) (emphasis in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
See Aiken County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/aiken/publicindex/ (last visited January 3, 2023).
In any event, Singletary's claims for injunctive relief are barred under the Younger abstention doctrine, which counsels federal courts to abstain from equitably interfering with ongoing state court proceedings except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). More specifically, the Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has since culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)); see also Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) (“What lies behind Younger, of course, is a broader rule of comity: namely, that federal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, whenever the federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, the first criterion is met because the County's complaint against Singletary is still pending before the Aiken County Court of Common Pleas. (See Case No. 2277.) The second criterion is also met because matters relating to “the local housing code” implicate important state interests. See Rosero v. Baltimore Co., No. 1:18-cv-713- ELH, 2018 WL 1378826, at *3-4 (D. Md. Mar. 19, 2018) (collecting cases); see also Moore v. City of Asheville, N.C. , 396 F.3d 385, 393 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding that city's efforts to enforce local property ordinance reflected an important state interest); Lancaster v. Spartanburg Cnty. Bldg. Codes Dep't, 370 F.Supp.2d 404, 407 (D.S.C. 2005) (noting important interest in state court proceedings involving violation of county's property maintenance code). And finally, the third criterion is met because Singletary has an adequate state forum to pursue his state and federal claims regarding the County's purported misconduct. See, e.g., Moore, 396 F.3d at 395 (finding that plaintiff could raise constitutional claims stemming from property citation in state court proceedings, and state court could likewise consider application of local ordinances “in the light of federal constitutional principles”); Lancaster, 370 F.Supp.2d at 408 (noting that plaintiff had “opportunity to raise his federal issues before a state tribunal” following property maintenance citation).
Because all three criteria are satisfied here, the undersigned finds that Singletary's motion to enjoin further state court proceedings against the Property must be dismissed pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine. To rule otherwise would enable Singletary to practically circumvent the state court's enforcement efforts and undermine the long-held principles of comity and federalism. See Lancaster, 370 F.Supp.2d at 407 (explaining that Younger “commands federal restraint when the federal action . . . casts aspersion on state proceedings, disrupts important state enforcement efforts, and is designed to annul a state proceeding”) (citing Moore, 396 F.3d at 39495). The undersigned therefore recommends that the Court DENY Singletary's Emergency Motion for Expedited Hearing and Request for Injunction. (Dkt. No. 2.)
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 5) and Motion to Remand (Dkt. No. 6) and DENY Singletary's Emergency Motion for Expedited Hearing and Request for Injunction (Dkt. No. 2) at this time. Singletary should refer to the order filed contemporaneously herewith for further instructions regarding how to bring this case into proper form.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).