Opinion
HHDCV155040191S
06-09-2016
Michelle Sims v. Eric Rogers et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (#104)
A. Susan Peck, J.
The plaintiff, Michelle Sims, commenced this action against Eric Rogers, Charles J. Lilley, the Hartford Police Department, William Pitt, and Mike O. Nuts on June 29, 2015 in small claims court. As this lawsuit was initiated on a small claims form writ and notice of suit, the allegations contained therein are minimal. The amount claimed by the plaintiff against the defendants is $5,000. The plaintiff's claim arises out of the outcome of a summary process action adjudicated between April and May 2015. On August 27, 2015, upon the motion of the defendants, the matter was transferred from the small claims docket to the regular docket of the Superior Court of the judicial district of Hartford. Pending before the court is the motion to dismiss of the defendants Pitt, and Mike O. Nuts a/k/a/ Mike Mastrony. To date, the plaintiff has not filed an objection. Oral argument was held at the short calendar on February 8 and February 29, 2016.
Pitt is the assistant clerk of the Hartford Housing Court, where he was served with process as reflected by the marshal's return of service. Although Mike O. Nuts is listed as a defendant on the continuation sheet of the small claims writ and notice of suit with the address of the Hartford Housing Court at 80 Washington Street, Hartford, there is no person with that name employed there. However, the motion to dismiss and supporting documentation includes the sworn affidavit of Temporary Assistant Clerk, Mike Mastrony, affirming his belief that the reference to " Mike O. Nuts" in the plaintiff's complaint is meant to be him. The marshal's return does not indicate that service was effectuated on a person with either name. Because this purported defendant was not properly named or identified and has never been served with process, the court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over either of them. See Exley v. Connecticut Yankee Greyhound Racing, Inc., 59 Conn.App. 224, 234-35, 755 A.2d 990, appeal dismissed, 254 Conn. 939, 761 A.2d 760 (2000). Accordingly, the claim against " Mike O. Nuts" must be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
" A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013). " When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).
" In contrast, if the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss . . . other types of undisputed evidence . . . and/or public records of which judicial notice may be taken . . . the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint . . . Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts] . . . If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant's motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits . . . or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 651-52.
In support of his motion to dismiss, Pitt argues that: (1) the plaintiff's claims are barred by sovereign immunity, because they are being sued in their official capacity, which can be characterized as an action against the state; (2) the plaintiff's claims are barred by absolute immunity or absolute quasi-judicial immunity, as the plaintiff's complaint fails to show that they acted other than in their official capacity as clerks of the Housing Court; (3) that the defendants are entitled to statutory immunity, as the plaintiff's complaint fails to show that their conduct was wanton, reckless or malicious; and, (4) that the court lacks personal jurisdiction due to insufficient service of process.
I
Sovereign Immunity
" The doctrine of sovereign immunity is a rule of common law that operates as a strong presumption in favor of the state's immunity from liability or suit." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hicks v. State, 297 Conn. 798, 801, 1 A.3d 39 (2010). " [T]he state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Braham v. Newbould, 160 Conn.App. 294, 310, 124 A.3d 977 (2015). " Our Supreme Court has recognized three exceptions to sovereign immunity: (1) when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the state's sovereign immunity . . . (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights . . . and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer's statutory authority . . . In the absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint to support the applicability of these exceptions, the granting of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds is proper." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 310-11.
When the state is not named as a defendant, the court must examine the essential nature and effect of the proceeding using the following criteria to determine whether the action is truly against the state: " (1) a state official has been sued; (2) the suit concerns some matter in which that official represents the state; (3) the state is the real party against whom relief is sought; and (4) the judgment, though nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the state or subject it to liability." Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 568, 362 A.2d 871 (1975).
In the present case, the complaint does not allege any facts or set forth any substantive claim. Thus, in order to determine the essential nature and effect of this proceeding, the court looks to the manner in which the plaintiff describes the defendant in the context of the summons pursuant to Hultman v. Blumenthal, 67 Conn.App. 613, 620, 787 A.2d 666, cert. denied, 259 Conn. 929, 793 A.2d 253 (2002). The small claims writ and notice of suit (Form JD-CV-40) is the equivalent of both a summons and a complaint. This document refers to the defendants as William Pitt, Housing Court Clerk Office; the address provided is " 80 Washington Street, Hartford, CT 06106, " which is the address of the Hartford Housing Court. According to the marshal's return, the defendants were then served with process at the Housing Court address, rather than their usual place of abode. See General Statutes § 52-57(a); Jimenez v. DeRosa, 109 Conn.App. 332, 338, 951 A.2d 632 (2008).
In support of his motion to dismiss, Pitt argues: (1) the plaintiff's claims are barred by sovereign immunity, because he is sued in his official capacity, which can be characterized as an action against the state; (2) the plaintiff's claims are barred by absolute immunity or absolute quasi-judicial immunity, as the plaintiff's complaint fails to show that Pitt acted other than in his official capacity as assistant clerk of the Housing Court; (3) that Pitt is entitled to statutory immunity, as the plaintiff's complaint fails to show that his conduct was wanton, reckless or malicious; and, (4) that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over him due to insufficient service of process.
Construing the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light, the court concludes that Pitt has been sued only in his official capacity as assistant clerk of the Housing Court, and that the action is, in effect, against the state. In Connecticut, " [i]n the absence of a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff may not bring an action against the state for monetary damages without authorization from the claims commissioner to do so." Columbia Air Services v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 351, 977 A.2d 636 (2009). " [E]xhaustion of this alternative means of relief is a prerequisite to the trial court's jurisdiction to consider any of the plaintiff's claims for monetary damages . . ." Id., 352. In the absence of a proper basis in the complaint to support the applicability of any one of the exceptions to sovereign immunity, and because the record provides no indication that the plaintiff has received permission from the claims commissioner to bring an action against the state, the plaintiff's action for money damages is barred by sovereign immunity.
II
Absolute Judicial Immunity/Quasi-Judicial Immunity
For reasons not entirely clear to the court the defendant references " quasi-judicial immunity" and " absolute quasi-judicial immunity" in his memoranda in support of the motion to dismiss. As explained in this section, the law is clear that the defendants are entitled to absolute immunity because, at all times herein, they were acting in their capacity as clerks of the Housing Court. Therefore, a discussion of quasi-judicial immunity or absolute quasi-judicial immunity is not necessary. See Traylor v. Gerratana, 148 Conn.App. 605, 613-14, 88 A.3d 552, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 902, 91 A.3d 908, 112 A.3d 778, cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 444, 190 L.Ed.2d 336 (2014); see also Gross v. Rell, 304 Conn. 234, 252, 40 A.3d 240 (2012).
Based on the small claims writ and the marshal's return of service, there is no indication that the plaintiff intended to bring suit against Pitt in his individual capacity. Further, Pitt has presented evidence and an affidavit demonstrating that he was acting in his official capacity as assistant clerk of the Housing Court. Because the complaint does not allege any facts or assert a substantive claim, the undisputed facts are, therefore, established by the exhibits and the aforementioned affidavit submitted by Pitt in support of the motion to dismiss. Among the exhibits submitted are certified copies of court documents from the underlying summary process action; Rogers v. Sims, Docket No. HDSP-177971; initiated on February 27, 2015 in Hartford Housing Court. In that matter, the plaintiff in the present case was the named defendant/tenant, and the Housing Court, Woods, J., entered judgment in favor of the landlord. As a result of the proceedings, an execution was issued by the Housing Court on June 1, 2015, at the landlord's request.
The sworn affidavit of Mark Ciarciarello, Manager of Labor Relations, State of Connecticut Judicial Branch, verifies Pitt's employment and the duties of an assistant clerk.
A housing execution may issue when a judgment of possession enters in favor of the plaintiff landowner, and the defendant remains upon the premises. The plaintiff must submit the execution to the housing court, where it must be signed by the clerk. Once signed by the clerk, the execution legally authorizes a marshal to personally move a defendant's possessions and personal effects and place them in storage if the defendant has failed to vacate the dwelling before a specified date. The marshal must utilize reasonable efforts to locate the defendant, and serve them with the execution. See Form JD-HM-2.
Defendant's exhibit eight is a certified copy of a subpoena that Pitt signed for the plaintiff in his capacity as assistant clerk on April 8, 2015. Exhibit four is a certified copy of the plaintiff's application for stay of execution dated April 28, 2015 signed by Pitt in his capacity as assistant clerk in the " Notice of Court Hearing" section. Exhibit three is a certified copy of a motion to open filed by the plaintiff on April 30, 2015, and is signed by Pitt in his capacity as assistant clerk in the " Notice of Court Hearing" section. To the extent that the plaintiff asserts a claim against Pitt in his capacity as an assistant clerk of the Superior Court, the court concludes that Pitt's performance of tasks was an integral part of the judicial process, and the claim is barred by absolute judicial immunity. Further, since no claim is asserted against Pitt in his individual capacity and he was not served with process at his usual place of abode, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-57(a), the court lacks personal jurisdiction over him. See Traylor v. Gerratana, 148 Conn.App. 605, 614, 88 A.3d 552, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 902, 91 A.3d 908, 112 A.3d 778, cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 444, 190 L.Ed.2d 336 (2014).
III
Statutory Immunity
Statutory immunity affords the same protection from liability and suit to state employees, when personally sued for damages, as the protection afforded the state through the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Manifold v. Ragaglia, 94 Conn.App. 103, 122, 891 A.2d 106 (2006), aff'd, 102 Conn.App. 315, 926 A.2d 38 (2007). General Statutes § 4-165 provides: " No state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damages or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employment. Any person having a complaint for such damage or injury shall present it as a claim against the state under the provisions of this chapter."
Considering the face of the complaint, and undisputed evidence, nothing in the record supports an inference that the defendant acted wantonly, recklessly or maliciously in the performance of his duties. Therefore, to the extent that the plaintiff asserts a claim for damages against the defendant, personally, the claim is barred by statutory immunity. See Manifold v. Ragaglia, 102 Conn.App. 315, 325, 926 A.2d 38 (2007).
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the court lacks both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Accordingly, the defendants' motion to dismiss is hereby granted.