Opinion
03 Civ. 6323 (LGS)
02-17-2021
THEODORE SIMPSON, Petitioner, v. GARY GREENE, Respondent.
ORDER :
WHEREAS, Petitioner Theodore Simpson, serving an aggregate prison term of sixty-six years to life in the Sullivan Correctional Facility, filed this action on June 26, 2003, seeking federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On December 18, 2003, then-District Judge Lynch denied the § 2254 habeas petition as untimely and otherwise lacking merit. On April 20, 2020, and August 18, 2020, Petitioner filed two motions in this habeas action, styled as motions to vacate judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) and 60(d), respectively. See Dkt. Nos. 15 and 17. On December 15, 2020, this action was re-assigned to me, and the Office of the Attorney General State of New York ("OAG") and the Bronx County District Attorney's Office ("DAO") were directed to respond to Petitioners' pending April and August motions. See Dkt. No. 18. Petitioner mailed a reply to the DAO's response, which is appended hereto. The motions are denied in part and construed in part as a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. Background
WHEREAS, on January 5, 1996, the Grand Jury of Bronx County indicted Petitioner on various counts in connection with a June 1993 kidnapping, robbery and murder. On October 29, 1998, Petitioner was convicted in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Bronx County. At Petitioner's trial, the State presented eyewitness testimony and called a corroborating witness, James Venson, who testified that Petitioner had confessed to the crimes. Cross-examination revealed that Venson was in fact incarcerated at the time his alleged conversation with Petitioner occurred. A stipulation was entered at trial that Venson was in prison on the relevant dates. Petitioner moved to set aside the verdict, contending in part that Venson's testimony should have been stricken. This motion was denied. Petitioner was sentenced to twenty-five years to life, to run concurrently on all counts and consecutively to his sentences for unrelated convictions.
WHEREAS, Petitioner has sought post-conviction relief multiple times since his 1998 sentencing. For example, Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence in October 2000, arguing that the eyewitness testimony was unreliable and that Venson's testimony was incredible. On June 21, 2001, the Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. See People v. Simpson, 728 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1st Dep't 2001). As stated above, in 2003, Petitioner sought habeas relief in this Court. On June 25, 2019, the Second Circuit denied Petitioner's application to file a successive habeas petition. The Instant Motions
WHEREAS, there are two pending motions here in Petitioner's 2003 habeas action. The August 2020 motion is styled as a Rule 60(d) motion and seeks reversal of his conviction and of the judgment denying his 2003 habeas petition. Petitioner argues that his conviction was premised on false and fraudulent testimony and attaches excerpts from the trial transcript. The April 2020 motion is styled as a Rule 60(b) motion and primarily presents a new claim that Petitioner is entitled to immediate release because the prison conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic and his underlying medical conditions make his incarceration unconstitutional. The April 2020 motion does not address any aspect of the prior habeas proceeding except to describe the initial petition as having sought relief from his conviction based on false testimony. Pursuant to an agreement between the OAG and the DAO, the OAG responded to Petitioner's COVID-19 arguments, and the DAO responded to Petitioner's challenges regarding the state court conviction. Legal Standards
WHEREAS, Rule 60(b) provides six grounds for relief from a federal judgment or order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(6). Rule 60(d) describes a court's other powers to grant relief from a judgment, including the power to "entertain an independent action," Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1), "to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice," see United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47 (1998); accord Pena v. United States, 859 F. Supp. 2d 693, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), and to set aside a judgment for fraud on the court, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3).
The six grounds are: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence, which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
WHEREAS, this Court has held that the law governing Rule 60(b) motions made in habeas proceedings also applies to Rule 60(d). See Erbo v. United States, No. 08 Civ. 02881, 2014 WL 6454002, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2014); accord Wright v. Poole, 81 F. Supp. 3d 280, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (collecting cases). Accordingly, the following law also applies to Petitioner's motion styled as pursuant to Rule 60(d).
WHEREAS, "relief under Rule 60(b) is available with respect to a previous habeas proceeding only when the Rule 60(b) motion attacks the integrity of the habeas proceeding and not the underlying conviction." Harris v. United States, 367 F.3d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 2004); accord United States v. Lopez-Pena, No. 05 Cr. 191, 2018 WL 4006803, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2018). A Rule 60(b) motion filed by a habeas petitioner attacks the underlying conviction -- and advances in substance habeas claims -- when it adds "a new ground for relief" from the conviction or "attacks the federal court's previous resolution of a claim on the merits." See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 531-32 (2005) (emphasis in original). In contrast, a habeas petitioner is not "making a habeas corpus claim . . . when he merely asserts that a previous ruling which precluded a merits determination was in error -- for example, a denial for such reasons as failure to exhaust, procedural default, or statute-of-limitations bar." Id. at 532 n.4.
WHEREAS, when a Rule 60(b) motion attacks the underlying conviction, it is in substance an application for habeas relief subject to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Id. at 530-32. In that circumstance, a district court is "present[ed] . . . with two procedural options: (i) the court may treat the Rule 60(b) motion as a second or successive habeas petition, in which case it should be transferred to [the appropriate court of appeals] . . . for possible certification, or (ii) the court may simply deny the portion of the motion attacking the underlying conviction as beyond the scope of Rule 60(b)." Harris, 367 F.3d at 82 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted); accord Lopez-Pena, 2018 WL 4006803, at *1.
WHEREAS, because Petitioner appears pro se, the Court has liberally interpreted his submissions "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Williams v. Annucci, 895 F.3d 180, 187 (2d Cir. 2018). Nevertheless, a pro se litigant is not exempt "from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Bryant v. Capra, No. 18 Civ. 10198, 2021 WL 323263, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2021). August 2020 Motion for Relief Based on Fraudulent Testimony and Collusion
WHEREAS, it is clear from the face of the August 2020 motion that Petitioner's arguments attack his underlying conviction and the Court's previous resolution of Petitioner's habeas claim. Accordingly, the motion is denied as "beyond the scope" of Rules 60(b) and 60(d). See Harris, 367 F.3d at 82; Erbo, 2014 WL 6454002, at *3.
This denial of the 2003 petition constitutes a decision on the merits, where the Court found that the petition was untimely and that the "grounds for relief asserted in [Petitioner's] petition," which "amount[ed] to nothing more than an attack on the credibility of the witnesses against him," "lack[ed] merit." See Quezada v. Smith, 624 F.3d 514, 518 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Generally, a petition dismissed as time-barred is considered a decision on the merits."); accord Young v. Artus, No. 08 Civ. 7734, 2017 WL 5468563, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2017).
WHEREAS, Petitioner argues that his conviction rested on fraudulent testimony, and specifically, that the prosecutor and trial court colluded to mislead the jury into believing that Venson's corroborating testimony was credible. In support, Petitioner presents "newly discovered evidence," i.e., an excerpt of the trial transcript reflecting the stipulation stating that Venson was incarcerated at the time of Petitioner's alleged confession. Petitioner re-characterizes the stipulation as an agreement between the prosecutor and the Court to allow false testimony. Even were Petitioner's "new evidence" a new ground for relief, Petitioner's arguments are still in essence a habeas claim, as they seek reversal of his conviction.
Petitioner's August 2020 motion also mentions that the Court should "relax" the previous denial of the petition as time barred given the pandemic. This argument neither goes to the "integrity" of the prior habeas proceeding nor asserts that the previous ruling was in error. Instead, as Petitioner explains, this request is made because he would like the Court to exercise discretion and review his arguments that his conviction was based on fraudulent testimony and collusion. In other words, Petitioner seeks to challenge the Court's previous determination.
WHEREAS, the appropriate remedy is to deny the August 2020 motion as beyond the scope of Rule 60(b) and Rule 60(d), as the Second Circuit has cautioned district courts that conversion of a Rule 60 motion into a successive habeas petition may subject a Petitioner to prejudice. See Erbo, 2014 WL 6454002, at *3 (denying pro se petitioner's Rule 60 motion as beyond the scope of Rules 60(b) and (d), noting that "premature treatment" of the motion as a successive habeas petition "'risks subjecting the prisoner not only to summary denial of that challenge but also to summary denial of any subsequent . . . challenge as an abuse of the writ'" (quoting Gitten v. United States, 311 F.3d 529, 533 (2d Cir. 2002)). April 2020 Motion for Relief Based on COVID-19
WHEREAS, in his April 2020 motion, Petitioner seeks release based on medical concerns and circumstances presented by COVID-19. Petitioner's request for release is in the nature of a habeas claim. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) ("[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus."); accord Slater v. Keyser, 20 Civ. 3012, 2020 WL 4016759, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2020).
WHEREAS, unlike the August motion, which is denied as outside the scope of Rules 60(b) and 60(d), the April application is construed as a claim for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (the "COVID-19 claim"). The COVID-19 claim is not considered a successive challenge as Petitioner's initial habeas petition challenged his criminal judgment. See Order, Sanchez v. Portuondo, No. 99 Civ. 1911, Dkt. No. 29 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2020) (Second Circuit order denying Petitioner's motion for leave for successive habeas petition as the "proposed § 2254 petition would not be successive because the prior petition appears to have directly challenged Petitioner's criminal judgment, while the present proposed petition challenges Petitioner's post-sentencing conditions of confinement").
WHEREAS, the OAG argues that Petitioner's COVID-19 claim would not be cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 but is properly brought in a suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "However, courts in this Circuit have considered and rejected the argument that § 1983 is the sole remedy available to a petitioner in state custody who seeks release due to conditions of confinement; instead, these courts have found that a petitioner may obtain such relief by bringing a petition for writ of habeas corpus under § 2254." Slater, 2020 WL 4016759, at *3 (collecting cases). Here, Petitioner seeks immediate release from confinement, and a § 2254 habeas petition is a cognizable vehicle for this claim. The OAG outlines several other reasons why this Court should not construe the claim as a new habeas petition. These arguments are mostly academic because, as the OAG notes, Petitioner should be provided an opportunity to withdraw the COVID-19 claim. See Cook v. N. Y. State Div. of Parole, 321 F.3d 274, 281-82 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Adams v. United States, 155 F.3d 582, 584 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam). For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
One reason is that Petitioner has already asserted the same claim in a matter pending before Judge Nathan. See Simpson v. Keyser, No. 20 Civ. 6408, 2020 WL 5946944 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2020). In that action, Petitioner was afforded the opportunity to proceed with his claims for relief under § 2254. See id. at *3. However, it appears that Petitioner did not timely file any amended petition. --------
ORDERED that Petitioner's claim challenging his state court conviction is DENIED as outside the scope of Rules 60(b) and 60(d). Petitioner's additional requests made on reply -- (1) that the Court order the DAO to produce a full copy of the trial records and (2) for an extension to reply to the OAG's opposition in further support of his COVID-19 claim -- are DENIED as moot.
As for Petitioner's is COVID-19 claim, at this point, he may choose to withdraw it or refile it as a claim for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court construes the claim as seeking habeas corpus relief under § 2254. Petitioner is advised that if he refiles the claim, the claim will be subject to the "second or successive" restrictions of § 2244.
If Petitioner does not wish to proceed with his COVID-19 claim under § 2254, Petitioner should submit a letter stating that he is withdrawing the claim.
If Petitioner does wish to proceed with the COVID-19 claim under § 2254, Petitioner is granted leave to file an amended petition, so that he can include all the necessary information, including whether he has exhausted his state remedies. At the end of this Order is an Appendix, which describes the information Petitioner should include in any amended petition. Also attached is a form to file an Amended Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which Petitioner may fill out and file as his amended petition. Petitioner is advised that if he files an amended petition, he must provide all the necessary information, even if he has already put it before the Court. The Court will understand the amended petition as Petitioner's consent to proceed with his claim for relief under § 2254, and the amended petition will completely replace his submissions filed in support of his Rule 60 motions. This means the Court will review the information included in the amended petition only, and Petitioner cannot rely on anything previously submitted.
By April 18, 2021 Petitioner shall either (1) submit a letter to this Court of withdrawal of the COVID-19 claim or (2) submit an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2254. If Petitioner fails to comply with this Order within the time allowed, and cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the Court will deny Petitioner's COVID-19 claim for habeas corpus relief without prejudice.
Because Petitioner has not at this time made a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Order and attachment to pro se Petitioner and to close the motions at Dkt. Nos. 15 and 17. Dated: February 17, 2021
New York, New York
/s/ _________
LORNA G. SCHOFIELD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Appendix
Any amended § 2254 petition must comply with the following directions:
1. Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases
A state prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief under § 2254 must submit a petition that conforms to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Rule 2(c) of those rules requires a petition to specify all the petitioner's available grounds for relief, setting forth the facts supporting each ground, and stating the relief requested.
If Petitioner files an amended petition, he should ensure that it includes his grounds for relief and the underlying facts and legal theory supporting each ground so that the issues presented may be adjudicated.
2. Exhaustion of State-Court Remedies
A state prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief under § 2254 must also show in his petition that he exhausted all available state-court remedies before filing his petition, or that his failure to exhaust those remedies was for a recognized reason. See § 2254(b)(1) ("An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that -- (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or (B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant."). This exhaustion requirement means that generally, the state courts must be given the first opportunity to review constitutional errors associated with a petitioner's confinement. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). A petitioner may satisfy the exhaustion requirement by fairly presenting his claims through a state's established appellate review process. Id. at 845. "A petitioner has 'fairly presented' his claim only if he has 'informed the state court of both the factual and legal premises of the claim he asserts in federal court.'" Dorsey v. Kelly, 112 F.3d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Daye v. Attorney General, 696 F.2d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 1982)).
If Petitioner files an amended petition, it should show that he has exhausted the available state-court remedies with regard to his grounds for federal habeas corpus relief or why his failure to exhaust those remedies should be excused. The Court understands from Petitioner's action, Simpson v. Keyser, No. 20 Civ. 6408, that he has sought relief from his immediate confinement in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the New York Supreme Court, Sullivan County, under N.Y.C.P.L.R. Art. 70, and that the state court has converted that proceeding into one for relief under N.Y.C.P.L.R. Art. 78. Petitioner should allege facts about the status of that proceeding, whether the state court has issued decisions in that proceeding, or whether he has appealed those decisions.
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