Opinion
No. 4-199 / 03-0834.
June 23, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Darrell J. Goodhue, Judge.
Kenneth Simons appeals the decision of the district court which upheld the ruling of the Board of Trustees Disability Appeals Board to award him ordinary disability benefits, instead of accidental disability benefits. AFFIRMED.
Matthew Cunningham of Walter Law Office, L.L.P., Ottumwa, for appellant.
Alice E. Helle and Douglas E. Gross of Brown, Winick, Graves, Gross, Baskerville Shoenebaum, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Joseph T. Walsh of Hedberg, Owens Hedberg, Des Moines, and Thomas A. Woodley, General Counsel, Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae International Association of Fire Fighters.
Heard by Mahan, P.J., and Zimmer and Eisenhauer, JJ.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
Kenneth Simons, a native of Fairfield, began employment with the Fairfield Police Department in 1985. In 1987 Simons issued a traffic citation to a person, and within a few days that person committed suicide. Also, Simons discovered the body of a woman he had known all his life, who had committed suicide by "blowing her head off." As a police officer, Simons was exposed to other incidents of violent death.
On February 11, 1999, Simons had hallucinations regarding the woman who had committed suicide. This was his last day of work. A medical board determined Simons was incapacitated from performing his duty as a police officer as a result of post-traumatic stress disorder. Simons applied for accidental disability pension benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 411.6(5) (1999).
The City of Fairfield did not dispute Simons's entitlement to ordinary disability benefits under section 411.6(3), but challenged whether he was entitled to accidental disability benefits under section 411.6(5). The Municipal Fire and Police Retirement System of Iowa (MFPRS) awarded Simons ordinary disability benefits. Simons appealed, and a hearing was held before the disability appeals committee. The committee rejected Simons's claim, finding Simons failed to show his mental injury was caused by the performance of duty at some definite time and place. The committee also found Simons failed to show he had been subjected to more than usual stress for a police officer. The committee's decision was ratified by the Board of Trustees of the MFPRS.
Simons filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the district court. He claimed the Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. He also claimed section 411.6(5) was unconstitutional under equal protection principles because the statute did not include post-traumatic stress disorder as a listed disease. The district court affirmed the decision of the Board. Simons appeals.
There was a previous interlocutory appeal on the issue of which county was the proper venue for Simons's certiorari action. See Simons v. Municipal Fire Police Ret. Sys., 645 N.W.2d 630, 632 (Iowa 2002).
II. Standard of Review
Because chapter 411 does not provide any appeal procedure, a certiorari action is the proper procedure for challenging the decision of a pension board. Chiafos v. Municipal Fire Police Ret. Sys., 591 N.W.2d 199, 201 (Iowa 1999). For a writ of certiorari to be successful, a plaintiff must show the board acted illegally, in that it "failed to act in accordance with a statute or that its decision was not supported by substantial evidence." Id. Evidence is substantial when a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach the same findings. Branson v. Municipal Fire Police Ret. Sys., 591 N.W.2d 193, 196 (Iowa 1999). Evidence is substantial even if it would have supported contrary inferences. Id. III. Equal Protection
Simons contends section 411.6(5) in unconstitutional. Simons claims that section 411.6(5) denies him equal protection of the law because it creates an exception for the "at some definite time and place" requirement for diseases of the heart, lung, or respiratory tract, but not for mental diseases, such as post-traumatic stress disorder. In section 411.6(5), "disease" means "heart disease or any disease of the lungs or respiratory tract and shall be presumed to have been contracted while on active duty as a result of strain or the inhalation of noxious fumes, poison or gases." Iowa Code § 411.6(5)(c). This list of exempted diseases is exclusive. Moon v. Board of Trs., 548 N.W.2d 565, 569 (Iowa 1996); Benson v. Ft. Dodge Police Pension Bd., 312 N.W.2d 548, 551 (Iowa 1981).
We review constitutional issues de novo. Bowers v. Polk County Bd. of Supervisors, 638 N.W.2d 682, 688 (Iowa 2002). Statutes are cloaked with a strong presumption of constitutionality, and the party challenging the statute carries a heavy burden of rebutting this presumption. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2004).
Equal protection clauses ensure that similarly situated persons are treated the same. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Iowa Const. art. I, § 6. "If people are not similarly situated, their dissimilar treatment does not violate equal protection." In re Detention of Morrow, 616 N.W.2d 544, 548 (Iowa 2000).
A classification made by the legislature need only have a rational basis, unless a suspect class or fundamental right is involved. Master Builders of Iowa, Inc. v. Polk County, 653 N.W.2d 382, 398 (Iowa 2002). If a case involves a suspect class or a fundamental right we apply a strict scrutiny analysis. Suckow v. Neowa NS, Inc., 445 N.W.2d 776, 778 (Iowa 1989). Simons has failed to cite any authority indicating the United States Supreme Court has found the distinction cited in this case involves a suspect class or a fundamental right. We are not bound to apply a strict scrutiny analysis without such authority. See Gilleland v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 524 N.W.2d 404, 407 (Iowa 1994); Stracke v. City of Council Bluffs, 341 N.W.2d 731, 733 (Iowa 1983). Therefore, we will apply a rational basis test to the alleged constitutional violation in this case.
Under the rational basis test, we consider whether the classifications drawn by the legislature are reasonable in light of their purpose. Racing Ass'n, 675 N.W.2d at 7. We will uphold a classification if we can reasonably conceive of any state of facts to justify it. Bowers, 638 N.W.2d at 689. A statute is unconstitutional only if it is "patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest." Id. (quoting Miller v. Iowa Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 609 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Iowa 2000)).
In considering this issue, the district court found a rational basis for the classification found in section 411.6(5), as follows:
[I]t may be assumed that the legislature felt that no accidental disability benefit would ever be available for a heart-lung-respiratory disease disability, absent the statutory provision. It may be further assumed that they felt that the disability was frequently employment-related, but that proof of proximate cause resulting from an injury or disease at "some definite time and place" was a factual impossibility because of the nature of the disease. Such proof is not impossible as to [post-traumatic stress disorder].
We concur in the district court's analysis. There is a rational basis to distinguish between heart, lung, and respiratory diseases, which may be difficult or impossible to link to a definite time and place but are frequently employment related, and post-traumatic stress syndrome, which could possibly be linked to a specific employment incident. See City of Cedar Rapids v. Board of Trs., 572 N.W.2d 919, 926 (Iowa 1998) (determining police officer was entitled to accidental disability benefits based on job-related post-traumatic stress disorder).
IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Simons contends the Board's decision that he is not entitled to accidental disability benefits is not supported by substantial evidence. Accidental disability benefits are greater than the amount paid in an award of ordinary disability benefits. City of Cedar Rapids v. Board of Trs., 572 N.W.2d 919, 922 (Iowa 1998).
Ordinary disability benefits are awarded on a finding a police officer "is mentally or physically incapacitated for further performance of duty, that the incapacity is likely to be permanent, and that the member should be retired." Iowa Code § 411.6(3). On the other hand, in order to receive accidental disability benefits, a police officer must show a permanent incapacity from duty "as the nature and proximate result of an injury or disease incurred in or aggravated by the actual performance of a duty at some definite time and place. . . ." Id. § 411.6(5)(a).
In order to receive accidental disability benefits, a claimant must show: (1) a total and permanent incapacity for duty caused by an injury; (2) the disabling injury occurred in the actual performance of duty; and (3) the injury occurred at some definite time and place. Branson v. Municipal Fire Police Ret. Sys., 591 N.W.2d 193, 197 (Iowa 1999).
Accidental disability benefits may be payable for a mental incapacity. Moon v. Board of Trs., 548 N.W.2d 565, 568 (Iowa 1996). A claimant must show the mental injury was caused (1) in fact by mental stimuli in the work environment; and (2) by workplace stress "of greater magnitude than the day-to-day mental stresses experienced by other workers employed in the same or similar jobs, regardless of their employer." Id. (quoting Dunlavey v. Economy Fire Cas. Co., 526 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Iowa 1995)).
Thus, in order to receive accidental disability benefits for a mental injury, a claimant must show that his "mental injury was caused or aggravated by the performance of duty at some definite time and place, and that his mental injury was caused by something more than the day-to-day emotional stress commonly associated with police work." City of Cedar Rapids, 572 N.W.2d at 923.
As noted above, the Board found Simons failed to show his mental injury was caused by the performance of duty at some definite time and place. The incapacitating disability must be the result of, or can be traced to, a specific event or incident. Branson, 591 N.W.2d at 198. There is substantial evidence to support the Board's findings on this issue. Simons presented a list of more than twenty-five incidents he felt were troubling which occurred while he was a police officer. Furthermore, Dr. Scott Stuart, a psychiatrist, testified Simon's post-traumatic stress disorder was not the result of one incident, but was due to the accumulation of several events.
The Board also found Simons failed to show he had been subjected to more than usual stress for a police officer. Simons and Officer Terry Patton testified Simons was exposed to more cases involving violent death than other officers. Police Chief Thomas Baker and Captain Randy Cooksey, however, both testified that Simons was not subjected to more incidents of emotional stress than other police officers in Fairfield. Moreover, we note:
As the board points out, its membership by statute includes police officers. So in addition to the usual expertise that administrative tribunals are acknowledged to have, this board is more than qualified to weigh the evidence and determine what are and what are not unusually stressful incidents for police officers. The board may capably do so because of its members' own work experience. We do not ask juries to leave their experiences and common sense behind when deliberating. We expect no more from the board.
City of Cedar Rapids, 572 N.W.2d at 926 (citation omitted). We find there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's findings that Simons had not been subjected to unusual stress.
We conclude the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the decision of the district court.