Opinion
Docket No. 015570-2013
05-06-2015
Re: Charles Simmons v. Roselle Borough
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT APPROVAL OF THE TAX COURT COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE TAX COURT COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS
Ryan Linder, Esq.
134 Evergreen Place, Suite 301
East Orange, New Jersey 07018
Catherine M. DeAppolonio, Esq.
Palumbo, Renaud & DeAppolonio, LLC
190 North Avenue East
Cranford, New Jersey 07016
Dear Mr. Linder and Ms. DeAppolonio:
This letter constitutes the court's opinion after trial in the above-referenced matter challenging the 2013 tax year assessment. For the reasons stated more fully below, the assessment is affirmed.
I. Procedural History and Factual Findings
Pursuant to R. 1:7-4, the court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the evidence and testimony adduced at trial.
Charles Simmons ("plaintiff") is the owner of the single-family home located at 400 Pine Street, in the Borough of Roselle, County of Union and State of New Jersey. The property is identified on the tax map of the Borough of Roselle as Block 5502, Lot 16 (the "subject property"). For the 2013 tax year, the subject property was assessed as follows:
| Land: | 62,800 |
| Improvements: | 56,000 |
| Total | 118,800 |
The average ratio of assessed to true value, commonly referred to as the Chapter 123 ratio, for Roselle Borough ("defendant") for the 2013 tax year is 57.61%, with a corresponding Chapter 123 common level range between 48.97% and 66.25%. See N.J.S.A. 54:1-35a(a); N.J.S.A. 54:1-35a(b). When the average ratio is applied to the assessment, the implied equalized value of the subject property for the 2013 tax year is $206,214.19.
Plaintiff filed a petition of appeal with the Union County Board of Taxation (the "Board") challenging the 2013 tax year assessment on the subject property. On August 23, 2013, the Board entered a Memorandum of Judgment (the "Judgment") dismissing plaintiff's petition of appeal under judgment code "7W" - "Withdrawn."
Thereafter, on October 8, 2013, plaintiff filed a Complaint with the Tax Court contesting the Board's Judgment. The defendant did not file a Counterclaim. The matter was tried to conclusion on February 9, 2015.
During trial, the court raised the issue of want of jurisdiction under N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(c)(1), in light of the Board's Judgment. In response, plaintiff's counsel expressed his belief "that had to be an error judge, um, I can tell you with one thousand percent certainty that all my original matters were scheduled for two days, um, one was in June, one was in August, um, the first date we had, um, one appraiser, no cases were withdrawn that date.. .and um, Mr. Frendel was the appraiser who was retained at the county board level and he, a report was provided and testimony." Plaintiff's counsel further recalled that "I can tell you one hundred percent unequivocally that all these matters were considered on the same day and I did not withdraw any of them." Accordingly, the court reserved decision on the issue of jurisdiction under N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(c)(1), and requested counsel to submit post-trial briefs addressing the issue.
However, plaintiff's counsel's post-trial brief failed to address the court's jurisdiction and plaintiff's counsel did not submit any evidence demonstrating the Board's Judgment was entered in error. Similarly, defendant's counsel did not present any evidence that plaintiff withdrew its petition during the Board hearing or prior thereto in writing. However, defendant's counsel argues in her post-trial brief that because the Board's Judgment identified plaintiff's petition as "Withdrawn", the court is deprived of subject matter jurisdiction under N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(c)(1). Accordingly, defendant maintains plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
II. Conclusions of Law
The court's analysis begins with the familiar principle that the Tax Court was "established as a court of limited jurisdiction...and is a court of record...[i]ts jurisdiction is defined by statute." McMahon v. City of Newark, 195 N.J. 526, 542 (2008). Thus, the Tax Court's "jurisdiction is constrained by the language of its enabling statutes." Prime Accounting Dept. v. Township of Carney's Point, 212 N.J. 493, 505 (2013). The statutory jurisdiction conferred on the court is expressed, in part, as the authority "to review actions or regulations with respect to a tax matter of...[a] county board of taxation..." N.J.S.A. 2B:13-2.
Part of that statutory framework permits judicial or quasi-judicial review of tax assessments by a taxpayer "feeling aggrieved by the assessed valuation of the taxpayer's property....on or before April 1, or 45 days from the date the bulk mailing of notification of assessment is completed in the taxing district, whichever is later, [to] appeal to the county board of taxation by filing with it a petition of appeal." N.J.S.A. 54:3-21.
If the aggrieved taxpayer is "dissatisfied with the judgment, action or determination of the county board of taxation [it] may seek review of that judgment, action or determination in the Tax Court, pursuant to rules of court." N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1. However, if the Tax Court "shall determine that the appeal to the county board of taxation has been (1) withdrawn at the hearing, or previously thereto in writing by the appellant or his agent...there shall be no review." N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(c)(1). Thus, the withdrawal of a petition of appeal before the county board would deprive the Tax Court of subject matter jurisdiction.
The instant matter falls under the purview of N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(c)(1). However, there is an absence of decisional precedent on the court's authority to conduct a de novo review of matters under N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(c)(1) and the standard of review to be applied by the court. The provisions of N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(c)(1) and (c)(2) were enacted by the Legislature contemporaneously. L. 1983, c. 45. In enacting L. 1983, c. 45, the "Legislature made what the Senate Review, Finance and Appropriations Committee Statement described as 'numerous technical changes' and 'a more logical arrangement of the sections which are being revised.' A new Chapter 51A was added to Title 54, entitled 'Appeals to the Tax Court' [and] N.J.S.A. 54:2-39 was repealed in its entirety and was replaced by N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1...which again grants review in the Tax Court of any determination of the county tax board. except where the appeal to the county board was withdrawn, dismissed for failure to prosecute or settled by mutual consent." Powder Mill I Associates v. Hamilton, 190 N.J. Super. 63, 69 (App. Div. 1983). Hence, the court will examine the decisional precedent under the closely aligned N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(c)(2) to ascertain the court's authority to review such matters and to deduce the standard to be applied.
Under N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(c)(2) the Tax Court is vested with the authority to conduct a de novo review of dismissal of an action by a county board of taxation for failure to prosecute. Veeder v. Berkeley Township, 109 N.J. Super. 540 (App. Div. 1970). In evaluating a dismissal under the standards of N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(c)(2) the court must ascertain whether the taxpayer's failure to prosecute before the county board fell within the intendment of the statute. Id. at 545. This requires the court to engage in a fact finding mission and to examine the circumstances surrounding the county board's dismissal. "In reviewing the determination of the county board of taxation, the Tax Court must take into account the facts available to the county board at the time of its ruling." Pipquarryco, Inc. v. Borough of Hamburg, 15 N.J. Tax 413, 418 (Tax 1996). The statutory scheme of N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1 contemplates a two phase review of assessed property valuations first, in the county boards of taxation and thereafter in the Tax Court. Akin to N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(c)(2), the provisions of N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(c)(1) require the court to make a factual finding whether the taxpayer's petition of appeal was "withdrawn at the hearing" or withdrawn "in writing" prior to the hearing. Thus, the court concludes under N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(c)(1), the court is vested with the authority to conduct a de novo review of a taxpayer's appeal denoted "withdrawn" by the county board. Moreover, the court will be guided by, and will apply the standard of review utilized for matters under N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(c)(2), to the instant matter.
Our courts have narrowly construed the basis for dismissal for lack of prosecution, finding it appropriate only in cases where the taxpayer has failed to appear and/or present "some evidence" of true value, based upon the "view that dismissals of actions in general is a drastic remedy." Ganifas Trust v. City of Wildwood, 15 N.J. Tax 722, 728-29 (App. Div. 1996); VSH Realty, Inc. v. Township of Harding, 291 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div. 1996); Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas v. Township of Jefferson, 17 N.J. Tax 583 (Tax 1998). Dismissal of a complaint for failure to prosecute an appeal before the county board is an extreme remedy and should be granted sparingly and only in the most egregious circumstances. Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas, supra, 17 N.J. Tax at 585. The conduct of the offending party must be "deliberate and contemptuous" to justify dismissal of the appeal. S.A.I.J. Realty, Inc. v. Upper Deerfield Township, 5 N.J. Tax 292, 298 (Tax 1983). In order to avoid a dismissal for lack of prosecution, "the taxpayer's appearance must be more than a sham." Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas, supra, 17 N.J. Tax at 588. Thus, if the record reveals a taxpayer has truly failed to prosecute an appeal before the county board, dismissal is justified, and no further appeal to the Tax Court shall be heard. Veeder, supra, 109 N.J. Super. at 545. The court must similarly be alert to conduct by a taxpayer that attempts to "by-pass the county tax board procedure and, thus, effectively undercut[ting] the legislative scheme that provides for a two-tier process for review of tax assessments." VSH Realty, Inc., supra, 291 N.J. Super. at 301. When "there is an appearance but no evidence...that is the same as not appearing at all and may properly form a basis for a dismissal under N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(c)(2)." Id. at 301-02.
Here the only evidence proffered that the Board's Judgment was entered in error were the unsworn statements of plaintiff's counsel. Although the court requested plaintiff's counsel to address the court's jurisdiction in his post-trial brief, plaintiff's counsel did not do so. Moreover, plaintiff's counsel did not present the court with certifications or affidavits from any party or witness or any documents supporting his recollection that the petition of appeal in the instant matter was not withdrawn before the Board.
The court is constrained from hearing appeals from judgments of the county boards when the petition of appeal was voluntarily withdrawn. Such actions by taxpayers or taxing districts would serve to undermine the statutory scheme requiring a "two-tier process for review of tax assessments." VSH Realty, Inc., supra, 291 N.J. Super. at 301. However, the court must nevertheless be mindful that dismissal of an action is a drastic remedy and should not be invoked "unless the plaintiff's behavior is deliberate and contumacious." Id. at 300.
Here the court concludes plaintiff's behavior cannot be categorized as "deliberate and contemptuous." Although plaintiff's counsel did not address the issue of the court's jurisdiction and the alleged error in the Board's Judgment, plaintiff's counsel had a very clear recollection of the Board proceedings. During trial, plaintiff's counsel expressed that "I can tell you one hundred percent unequivocally that all these matters were considered on the same day and I did not withdraw any of them." Plaintiff's counsel further recalled that an appraisal report was produced and expert testimony was provided to the Board regarding the subject property. Thus, the court is satisfied plaintiff did not withdraw the petition of appeal during the hearing and presented some evidence of value of the subject property to the Board. Accordingly, the court concludes that the Board's Judgment reflecting plaintiff's petition as "withdrawn" was entered in error and the court possesses subject matter jurisdiction in this matter under N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1.
III. Valuation
At trial, plaintiff offered the testimony of a State of New Jersey certified general real estate appraiser who, without objection, was accepted by the court as an expert in the field of real estate valuation. The expert prepared an appraisal report dated December 22, 2014, which was admitted in evidence, also without objection.
Based upon the testimony and evidence presented at trial, the court concludes the subject property is a colonial-style single-family home, approximately 103 years old, in average condition, and situated on a 6,000 square foot lot. The home consists of a total of eight rooms, three bedrooms and two and one-half bathrooms, a finished basement with a half-bathroom, a detached two-car garage, a patio and one fireplace. The subject property has a gross living area of 1,993 square feet. The home is located in an established residential community which provides convenient access to major highways.
The expert employed the comparable sales approach to reach an opinion of the true market value of the subject property. The expert offered his opinion that the true market value of the subject property, as of the October 1, 2012 valuation date, was $190,000.
The sales comparison approach derives an opinion of market value "by comparing properties similar to the subject property that have recently sold, are listed for sale, or are under contract." Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate 377 (14 ed. 2013). The sales comparison approach involves a "comparative analysis of properties" and requires the expert to focus on the "similarities and differences that affect value.which may include variations in property rights, financing, terms, market conditions and physical characteristics." Id. at 378. "When data is available, this [approach] is the most straight forward and simple way to explain and support an opinion of market value." Greenblatt v. Englewood City, 26 N.J. Tax 41 (Tax 2011)(citing Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate 300 (13 ed. 2008)). Here the court concludes, as did the expert, the sales comparison approach is the most appropriate method to determine the true market value of the subject property.
At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint under R. 4:37-2(b). The court concluded plaintiff produced cogent evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of validity attached to the original assessment and the county board judgment. Pantasote Co. v. City of Passaic, 100 N.J. 408, 413 (1985). Accepting such evidence as true, and according plaintiff all legitimate inferences which can be deduced therefrom, a debatable question existed as to the correctness of the 2013 tax year assessment on the subject property. MSGW Real Estate Fund, LLC v. Borough of Mountain Lakes, 18 N.J. Tax 364, 376 (Tax 1998). The expert's opinion of value was based on a comparable sales analysis, which is an accepted approach to valuing single-family homes. Plaintiff's expert relied on the sale of three single-family homes in the taxing district, examined public tax records, conferred with transaction participants and applied several adjustments to each comparable sale, in order to reach an opinion of value for the subject property. The plaintiff's evidence was "sufficient to determine the value of the property under appeal, thereby establishing the existence of a debatable question as to the correctness of the assessment." Lenal Props., Inc. v. City of Jersey City, 18 N.J. Tax 405, 408 (Tax 1999), aff'd, 18 N.J. Tax 658 (App. Div. 2004), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 488 (2000). Hence, the court denied defendant's motion.
However, concluding the presumption of validity has been overcome, does not equate to a finding that an assessment is erroneous. Once the presumption has been overcome, "the court must then turn to a consideration of the evidence adduced on behalf of both parties and conclude the matter based on a fair preponderance of the evidence." Ford Motor Co. v. Township of Edison, 127 N.J. 290, 312 (1992). The court must be mindful that "although there may have been enough evidence [presented] to overcome the presumption of correctness at the close of plaintiff's case-in-chief, the burden of proof remain[s] on the taxpayer throughout the entire case...to demonstrate that the judgment under review was incorrect." Ford Motor Co., supra, 127 N.J. at 314-15 (citing Pantasote Co., supra, 100 N.J. at 413).
Plaintiff's expert relied on the sale of three single-family homes in Roselle Borough. The unadjusted sales prices of the expert's comparable sales ranged from $160,000 to $184,000. After adjustments, the adjusted sale prices of the expert's comparable property sales ranged from $171,700 to $197,000.
Comparable sale one located at 607 Drake Avenue, Roselle Borough, New Jersey sold in October 2012, for a price of $160,000. This comparable is colonial-style single family home, approximately 60 years old, located 1.04 miles from the subject property and situated on a 4,000 square foot lot. Comparable sale one has a gross living area of 1,160 square feet, making it approximately 42% smaller than the subject property. Plaintiff's expert made the following adjustments to the sale price of comparable sale one: (i) a positive adjustment of $16,700 for gross living area, calculated at $20.00 per square foot; and (ii) a negative adjustment of $15,000, based upon the expert's opinion that the comparable "was determined to be superior condition" to the subject property; and (iii) a positive adjustment of $1,000, to account for differences in lot size, calculated at $0.50 per square foot; and (iv) a positive adjustment of $2,500, to account for the lack of an additional half bathroom; and (v) a positive adjustment of $2,000, to account for the lack of a full finished basement; and (vi) a positive adjustment of $2,500, to account for the lack of a two car garage; and (vii) a positive adjustment of $2,500, to account for the lack of a fireplace.
In total, the expert made net adjustments of -7.3% and gross adjustments of 26.1% to comparable sale one. The final adjusted sale price was $171,700.
Comparable sale two located at 577 Berlant Avenue, Roselle Borough, New Jersey sold in March 2012, for a price of $184,000. This comparable is colonial-style single family home, approximately 22 years old, located .69 miles from the subject property and situated on a 5,520 square foot lot. This comparable has a gross living area of 1,744 square feet, making it approximately 12% smaller than the subject property. Plaintiff's expert made the following adjustments to the sale price of comparable sale two: (i) a positive adjustment of $5,000 for gross living area, calculated at $20.00 per square foot; and (ii) a negative adjustment of $15,000, based upon the expert's opinion that the comparable was in "superior" condition to the subject property; and (iii) a positive adjustment of $4,500, to account for the lack of a full finished basement; and (iv) a positive adjustment of $5,000, to account for the lack of presence of an additional full bathroom; and (v) a negative adjustment of $4,000, to account for the presence of central air conditioning; and (vi) a positive adjustment of $2,500, to account for the lack of a two car garage.
In total, the expert made net adjustments of -1.1%, and gross adjustments of 19.6% to comparable sale two. The final adjusted sale price was $182,000.
Comparable sale three located at 307 Sheridan Avenue, Roselle Borough, New Jersey sold in May 2012, for a price of $163,000. This comparable is colonial-style single family home, approximately 82 years old, located 1.07 miles from the subject property and situated on a 3,300 square foot lot. This comparable has a gross living area of 1,065 square feet, making it approximately 47% smaller than the subject property. Plaintiff's expert made the following adjustments to the sale price of comparable sale three: (i) a positive adjustment of $18,600 for gross living area, calculated at $20.00 per square foot; and (ii) a positive adjustment of $2,500, to account for the lack of an additional half bathroom; and (iii) a positive adjustment of $1,400, to account for differences in lot size, calculated at $0.50 per square foot; and (iv) a positive adjustment of $4,500, to account for the lack of a full finished basement; and (v) a positive adjustment of $5,000, to account for the lack of a garage; and (vi) a positive adjustment of $2,000, to account for the lack of a fireplace.
In total, the expert made net adjustments of 20.9%, and gross adjustments of 20.9% to comparable sale three. The final adjusted sale price was $197,000.
For the following reasons, the court concludes comparable sale one and comparable sale three, lack credibility as evidence of the true market value of the subject property. Comparable sale one and comparable sale three were identified by the taxing district's assessor as non-usable for purposes of the Director of the Division of Taxation's annual assessment-sales ratio study. Comparable sale one was designated non-usable code "7," which applies to "[s]ales of property substantially improved subsequent to assessment and prior to the sale thereof." N.J.A.C. 18:12-1.1(a)(7). Comparable sale three was designated non-usable code "31," which applies to the "[f]irst sale after foreclosure by a Federal- or State-chartered financial institution." N.J.A.C. 18:12-1.1(a)(31). A transaction classified as non-usable may be considered "if after full investigation it clearly appears that the transaction was a sale between a willing buyer, not compelled to buy, and a willing seller, not compelled to sell, and that it meets all other requisites of a usable sale." N.J.A.C. 18:12-1.1(b). See Pepperidge Tree Realty Corp. v. Kinnelon Borough, 21 N.J. Tax 57, 67 (Tax 2003). Thus, although the regulation does not mandate exclusion of the sale as evidence of true market value, it causes the court to pause and consider the terms and conditions of the sale. The court is obligated to evaluate the terms of sale of each property offered as evidence of market value, to ascertain if the sale was influenced by other conditions. "It is for the court to appraise the circumstances surrounding a sale to determine if there were special factors which affected the sale price without affecting the true value." Glen Wall Associates v. Township of Wall, 99 N.J. 265, 282 (1985). See Whippany Assoc. v. Hanover Township, 1 N.J. Tax 325, 330 (Tax 1980)(concluding that a property's sale price was not a true indication of market value because after the bank foreclosed on the property, it was pressured to quickly sell the property to satisfy the mortgage loan); Ewing Township v. Suburban Square Associates, 7 N.J. Tax 263, 267 (Tax 1985)(concluding that the sale of a neighborhood shopping center was "not an arms-length transaction because of the circumstances surrounding the mortgage foreclosure and sale" of the property); American Cyanamid Co. v. Wayne Township, 17 N.J. Tax 542, 580 (App. Div. 2000)(concluding that the sale of property was not indicative of true value because it was marketed for a limited period of time, in a limited manner and with no formal marketing plan); AT&T Corp. v. Township of Morris, 19 N.J. Tax 319, 324 (Tax 2000)(concluding that the purchaser was "clearly motivated by business, rather than real estate considerations," because the underlying purpose of the transaction was to afford the purchaser with an opportunity to defer capital gains tax from a previous sale).
Although the expert provided testimony that the comparable property sales were "verified through njactb.org, the realtor and the garden state mls" the expert offered no testimony or evidence detailing the length of time which comparable sale one and comparable sale three were marketed. The expert did not provide the court with any data or information supporting the exposure of comparable sale one or comparable sale three to the marketplace. The expert did not provide any information about the scope of improvements undertaken to comparable sale one subsequent to assessment and prior to its sale, causing the assessor to assign non-usable code "7" to the transaction. The expert did not provide any details about the sale transaction involving comparable sale three after the bank foreclosure action. Moreover, the expert did not furnish the court with any evidence of the conditions of sale (i.e., the motivations of the sellers or buyers), and whether any relationship existed between the purchasers and the sellers. Hence, the court is unable to gauge if comparable sale one and comparable sale three were arms-length, bona fide sales, and an indicator of true market value.
The court, having eliminated comparable sale one and comparable sale three as credible evidence of the subject property's true value, will rely on comparable sale two. However, the expert's adjustments to comparable sale two for condition and gross living area lack a proper foundation and are unsupported by adequate market data and information to be meaningful to the court. The above-referenced adjustments made by the expert to comparable property sale two are without any support in the record, other than the knowledge and experience of the expert. The expert offered no evidence to support his conclusion that comparable sale two was "superior" in condition to the subject property. Moreover, the expert provided no data or market analysis to support his $20.00 per square foot gross living area adjustment. It is well-settled that the weight to be accorded expert testimony relative to adjustments "depends upon the facts and reasoning which form the basis of the opinion. An expert's conclusion can rise no higher than the data providing the foundation." Inmar Associates v. Edison Township, 2 N.J. Tax 59, 66 (Tax 1980) (citing Passaic v. Gera Mills, 55 N.J. Super. 73 (App. Div. 1959), certif. denied, 30 N.J. 153 (1959)). Thus, if the origins of an expert's adjustments are not well-defined, the court cannot deduce value therefrom. "[T]he trial judge as the factfinder is not bound by the opinion valuation of the experts on either side. Just as a jury, a judge may adopt 'so much of it as appears sound, reject all of it, or adopt all of it.'" Riorano, Inc. v. Weymouth Township, 4 N.J. Tax 550, 564 (Tax 1982)(quoting State Highway Com. v. Dover, 109 N.J.L. 303, 307 (E. & A. 1932)).
Hence, the court accepts as reasonable the following adjustments of plaintiff's expert to comparable sale two: (i) the positive adjustment of $5,000, for the lack of an additional full bathroom; and (ii) the positive adjustment of $4,500, for the lack of a full finished basement; and (iii) the positive adjustment of $2,500, for the lack of a two car garage; and (iv) the negative adjustment of $4,000, for the presence of central air conditioning. This results in total adjustments of positive $8,000 ($5,000 + $4,500 + $2,500 - $4,000 = $8,000), and a true market value for the subject property of $192,000 ($184,000 + $8,000 = $192,000).
Having reached a conclusion of the true market value of the subject property, the court will turn its attention to a determination of the correct assessment for the 2013 tax year. Under N.J.S.A. 54:51A-6(a), commonly referred to as Chapter 123, when the court is satisfied in a non-revaluation year by the evidence presented "that the ratio of the assessed valuation of the subject property to its true value exceeds the upper limit or falls below the lower limit of the common level range, it shall enter judgment revising the taxable value of the property by applying the average ratio to the true value of the property..." N.J.S.A. 54:51A-6(a). This process involves application of the Chapter 123 common level range. N.J.S.A. 54:1-35a(b). The Chapter 123 common level range for the Borough of Roselle for the 2013 tax year has a lower limit of 48.97% and an upper limit of 66.25%. The ratio of assessment, $118,800, to true market value, $192,000, yields a ratio of 61.88%, which is squarely positioned between the lower limit and upper limit of the Chapter 123 common level range. Consequently, because the ratio does not exceed the upper limit of the common level range, plaintiff is not entitled to relief from the 2013 tax year assessment.
The court will enter judgment accordingly.
Very truly yours,
/s/
Joshua D. Novin, J.T.C.