Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-12525 Court of Appeals No. A-12526 No. 6687
08-22-2018
SIAOSI VAISE SILA, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Dan Lowery, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Katholyn A. Runnels, Assistant District Attorney, Anchorage, and James E. Cantor, Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law. Trial Court Nos. 3AN-13-12725 CR & 3AN-15-3334 CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Jack W. Smith, Judge. Appearances: Dan Lowery, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Katholyn A. Runnels, Assistant District Attorney, Anchorage, and James E. Cantor, Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Suddock, Superior Court Judge. Judge SUDDOCK.
Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section 16 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 24(d).
Following the commission of multiple crimes, twenty-two-year-old Siaosi Vaise Sila pleaded guilty to six felonies and a misdemeanor. Superior Court Judge Jack W. Smith imposed a composite sentence of 37 years' incarceration with 12 years suspended, 25 years to serve.
Sila now appeals this sentence on three grounds. First, he argues that the judge erroneously found Sila to be a worst offender. Second, he contends that the judge erred in concluding that a sentence greater than 20 years was required to protect the public. Third, he points to a disparity between his sentence and the sentence a different judge imposed on a co-defendant who participated in some of Sila's crimes.
We conclude that Sila's arguments are without merit, and we affirm his sentence.
Background facts and proceedings
In October 2013, Sila and two other men approached an elderly man in his driveway, purportedly seeking donations for a charity. After the man explained that he donated through United Way, he was knocked unconscious, and he sustained serious injuries. Sila and his co-defendants then robbed the man of his wallet and his diamond ring. Thus began a string of crimes committed in rapid succession.
Sila pawned the stolen ring. Then, after seeing a news report about the ring, Sila attempted to burn down the pawn shop to cover his tracks. Later that month, he participated with others in an armed robbery of persons present at a gambling house. He next burglarized a residence, stealing handguns and an expensive camera.
One week later, Sila participated in armed robberies of a Hampton Inn and a Chevron service station. He subsequently robbed a Money Mart, pointing a gun at an employee while forcing her to reveal where the business kept its cash.
The State indicted Sila for twenty-nine felonies, including five counts of first-degree robbery.
AS 11.41.500(a)(1), (3).
While awaiting trial for these charges, Sila absconded from the halfway house where he was being detained. That same day, Sila robbed the Money Mart a second time. Two weeks later, he robbed a tobacco shop in Mountain View at gunpoint. After a brief car chase, he was re-arrested.
In return for dismissal of multiple charges, Sila pleaded guilty to three class A felonies, two class B felonies, one class C felony, and one class A misdemeanor. Sila had one prior felony conviction. He did not contest aggravator AS 12.55.155(c)(20), that he was on felony probation when he committed the charged crimes.
At sentencing, Judge Smith recounted the sheer volume of Sila's offenses, his persistent violence, the attendant danger to the victims and the public, Sila's escape and his immediate resumption of criminal activity, and the fact that Sila committed these crimes while on probation. The judge found Sila to be a worst offender as to the crime of first-degree robbery.
In light of Sila's extensive criminal acts, the judge deemed Sila's rehabilitation to be a low priority. Noting that victims could have died during this violent crime spree, the judge found that the paramount sentencing consideration was the need to isolate Sila to protect the public. The judge also prioritized specific and general deterrence. Lastly, the judge stressed the need for community condemnation of Sila's extreme behavior.
For the pre-escape crimes, the judge sentenced Sila to 19 years of active jail time. The judge imposed an additional 6 years to serve for the post-escape crimes.
Why we affirm Sila's sentence
Sila contends that his sentence is excessive. He first argues that the judge erred in finding him to be a worst offender as to the crime of first-degree robbery. Sila acknowledges that the judge was not required to make a worst-offender finding in order to impose the sentence that he did, because the judge did not impose a maximum sentence. Nonetheless, Sila argues that the worst-offender finding was not supported by the record.
See Hintz v. State, 627 P.2d 207, 210 (Alaska 1981) (noting that "by 'worst offender' we mean that the defendant must be the worst type of offender within the group of persons committing the offense in question").
Because the judge's worst-offender finding was unnecessary in order to impose the sentence, Sila's appeal from that finding is moot. In any event, our review of the record leads us to conclude that it amply supports the judge's worst-offender finding.
Second, Sila argues that the judge erred in findingthat a composite sentence longer than the maximum sentence of 20 years for robbery, Sila's most serious offense, was necessary to protect the public.
Under the Neal-Mutschler rule, as originally articulated, a composite sentence longer than the maximum sentence for the defendant's most serious crime could only be justified by a finding that the defendant's dangerousness required such a sentence in order to protect the public. But in Phelps v. State, this Court held that, in light of subsequent supreme court decisions, factors other than dangerousness can reasonably justify a sentence exceeding the Neal-Mutschler ceiling.
See Neal v. State, 628 P.2d 19, 21 (Alaska 1981); Mutschler v. State, 560 P.2d 377, 381 (Alaska 1977).
Phelps v. State, 236 P.3d 381, 393 (Alaska App. 2010).
Here, the judge determined that a sentence longer than the maximum for Sila's most serious offense was necessary to protect the public. Given the violent nature of Sila's conduct, the physical and emotional harm suffered by his multiple victims, the number of offenses he committed, and the fact that he was undeterred by his earlier arrest — and committed further robberies after absconding from custody — the judge did not err in finding that a composite term of 25 years to serve was necessary to protect the public and to vindicate other applicable sentencing goals.
See Cleveland v. State, 91 P.3d 965, 982 (Alaska App. 2004) (relying on violent nature of defendant's crime to find that sentence satisfied the Neal-Mutschler rule).
Lastly, Sila argues that the judge erred in sentencing him to 25 years to serve when his co-defendant, Miracle Tulimasealii, was sentenced by a different judge to only 14 years to serve.
A discrepancy between co-defendants' sentences does not necessarily mean that one of the sentences is clearly mistaken. The "clearly mistaken" standard of review is founded on two concepts: "first, that reasonable judges, confronted with identical facts, can and will differ on what constitutes an appropriate sentence; [and] second, that society is willing to accept these sentencing discrepancies, so long as a judge's sentencing decision falls within a permissible range of reasonable sentences." In other words, the "clearly mistaken" standard is a deferential standard that "implies a permissible range of reasonable sentences which a reviewing court, after an independent review of the record, will not modify."
Erickson v. State, 950 P.2d 580, 586 (Alaska App. 1997) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813 (Alaska 1974). --------
Accordingly, even if Sila and his co-defendant were indeed similarly situated, the fact that they received differing sentences does not necessarily mean that one of the sentences is clearly mistaken.
More importantly, Sila's sentencing judge found that there were material distinctions between the two co-defendants. Only Sila escaped from custody and continued committing crimes. Tulimasealii posted bail and committed no new crimes. Tulimasealii's conduct during the series of crimes was mitigated, while Sila's conduct was aggravated. Lastly, Sila's sentence encompassed an additional robbery charge and a weapons misconduct charge.
These distinctions undermine Sila's argument that he and Tulimasealii were similarly situated for sentencing purposes. We have independently reviewed the record, and we conclude that Sila's composite sentence is not clearly mistaken.
Conclusion
We AFFIRM the sentence of the superior court.