Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1617-13T4
02-12-2015
SHERYL SIEGEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT SIEGEL, Defendant-Respondent.
Sheryl Siegel, appellant pro se. Michael E. Spinato, P.C., attorneys for respondent (Mr. Spinato, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Guadagno and Leone. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket No. FM-07-488-03. Sheryl Siegel, appellant pro se. Michael E. Spinato, P.C., attorneys for respondent (Mr. Spinato, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Sheryl Siegel appeals from a Family Part order denying her motion for additional discovery of her former husband, defendant Robert Siegel's financial status, and denying without prejudice her motion to reevaluate defendant's child support obligation pending a review of defendant's financial documents. Plaintiff also requests this court clarify the Family Part's order expounding each party's financial obligation as to the children's "extraordinary expenses." We dismiss in part, and affirm in part.
I.
The parties were married in 1990. They had a daughter in 1996 and a son in 1999. Following a five-day trial in the Family Part, the parties received a Dual Judgment of Divorce (JOD) in 2004.
Pertinent to this appeal, the JOD awarded primary residential custody of the children to plaintiff, subject to visitation rights of defendant, with shared joint legal custody. Defendant was ordered to pay $4 00 per week for child support. He was also required to pay eighty percent of their son's schooling expenses, and eighty percent of the children's summer camps, with the remainder to be paid by plaintiff.
In March 2012, plaintiff filed a motion that, among other things, demanded an increase in child support and requested defendant produce current income information and an updated Case Information Statement (CIS). In April 2012, defendant filed a cross-motion opposing plaintiff's demand, but attached an updated CIS along with his 2011 W-2 form. In June 2012, the family court increased defendant's child support obligation to $546 per week, and ordered defendant to provide his 2011 tax return to confirm his income.
In a December 2012 order, after receiving defendant's 2011 tax return, the family court verified that defendant's income was $237,512.23, and confirmed the child support obligation of $546 per week. The court's order further required the parties to share in their daughter's "college preparation costs including without limitation, SAT or ACT test fees, SAT preparation classes and college applications in the same allocation that was ordered in their [JOD] for camp and extracurricular expenses: 20% - plaintiff and 80% - defendant."
It is not clear whether defendant sent his tax return to plaintiff, or only to the court.
In July 2013, plaintiff filed a motion requesting, among other things, that defendant be required "to produce the last three years of income statements, bonus income information, Human Resource Information regarding all benefits (health, medical, dental) along with all fringe benefits including but not limited to auto, cellular, internet, entertainment and disclosure of the inheritance [he] received." She also requested that defendant be ordered "to produce all documentation that proves justification for the expenses that are in question on his newest 2012 CIS," that child support be adjusted, that "rules get established for the 80/20 Initiative and how they should be enforced," and that "rules be established for paying for the [children's] college preparation, education and living expenses."
After hearing argument, the family court issued the order under appeal on October 21, 2013. Paragraph 2 of the order stated:
Within thirty (30) days . . . , defendant shall produce to the court for its review documents related to his income for the last three (3) years including: 1) his W-2s, 1099s, federal and state tax returns, and bonus income information; 2) information from his Human Resources Department relating to health, medical and dental benefits, allowances or reimbursements for automobile expenses, telephone, and entertainment; and all documents related to any inheritance that he received.The court added that "[p]laintiff's motion for a review of defendant's child support obligation is hereby denied without prejudice and shall be addressed upon the court's review of the documents set forth in Paragraph 2 above."
Also in the October 2013 order, the court denied plaintiff's request for all documentation justifying the expenses in defendant's 2012 CIS "on the grounds that such information is not relevant to the issues before the court." The court additionally ordered the parties to continue to "share the children's camps, extracurricular activities and extraordinary expenses on the same 80/20 basis: plaintiff - 20% and defendant 80%." The court also issued nine guidelines the parties were to adhere to with respect to college expenses, including that certain expenses be shared by the parties on a pro rata basis "which the court will determine upon receipt of the documents set forth in Paragraph 2 above."
On December 3, 2013, plaintiff filed a notice to appeal the October 2013 order. She also filed motions to file an appeal out of time as to the June 4, 2012 and December 10, 2012 orders. We denied those motions, so those orders are not before us. Accordingly, we address only plaintiff's appeal of the October 2013 order.
Thus, we have no occasion to review or endorse the child support calculations in those orders.
II.
We must hew to our standard of review. "The scope of appellate review of a trial court's fact-finding function is limited. The general rule is that findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). "Appellate courts accord particular deference to the Family Part because of its 'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters." Harte v. Hand, 433 N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 413). We may reverse only if there is "a denial of justice because the family court's conclusions are [] clearly mistaken or wide of the mark." Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 48 (App. Div. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).
III.
In the October 2013 order, the family court denied without prejudice plaintiff's July 2013 motion to modify child support until the court could review the documents it ordered defendant to produce. "Thus the order appealed from lacked the attributes of a final order." Leonard & Butler, P.C. v. Harris, 279 N.J. Super. 659, 662 n.1 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 141 N.J. 98 (1995). Because the denial without prejudice was an interlocutory order, plaintiff's appeal of that denial without prejudice must be dismissed.
It is well-established that, "with very few exceptions, only an order that finally adjudicates all issues as to all parties is a final order and that an interlocutory appeal is permitted only by leave of our appellate courts." Grow Co. v. Chokshi, 403 N.J. Super. 443, 457-58 (App. Div. 2008) (citing R. 2:2-3). As we noted in Christensen v. Christensen, 376 N.J. Super. 20, 23-24 (App. Div. 2005), a trial court order requiring the parties to provide additional information to enable the court in a later order to make a final decision on the appropriate level of child support, is "interlocutory" because the court "had not yet entered a final order concerning child support." We will not disturb interim orders regarding child support motions that are still pending, particularly where a party was ordered to submit additional financial documents and "the trial judge has made no findings concerning the critical issue of [a party's] financial situation." Id. at 23-24.
Plaintiff includes in her appendix a December 12, 2013 letter from defendant to the family court stating that he was enclosing his W-2s, earning statements, federal and state income tax returns, information from his employer's Human Resources Department, and documentation relating to his inheritance. It is not clear in the record before this court whether the family court has reviewed those documents, or whether it ruled on plaintiff's July 2013 motion to modify child support. If the family court has yet to rule on that motion, plaintiff's request should be resolved forthwith. Any and all support calculations, particularly those that deviate from the guidelines, should be clearly supported with a Statement of Reasons by the family court.
Defendant remarked that he did not provide copies to plaintiff, and no copies of the enclosures have been supplied to us. We have "recognize[d] that individuals have a legitimate interest in the confidentiality of their income tax returns. However, without access to such reliable indicia of the supporting spouse's financial ability, the movant may be unable to prove that modification is warranted." Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157-58 (1980). Where the "financial information of other individuals," such as a current spouse, "may be necessarily involved . . . the trial judge should examine the tax return in camera and excise irrelevant matters before giving the return to the plaintiff." Id. at 158.
The October 2013 order explicitly stated that a decision on plaintiff's motion to recalculate child support would be made following a review of additional financial information. Thus, it is not yet appealable and plaintiff's appeal of the denial without prejudice is improper. We therefore dismiss that portion of the appeal.
In Christensen, we granted leave to appeal nunc pro tunc of an order which set an interim amount of child support, noting "the significant issues presented" about whether a step-parent can have a support obligation. Christensen, supra, 376 N.J. Super. at 23. Here, by contrast, the October 2013 order did not grant an interim award. Further, this appeal does not raise such a significant legal issue about a precondition for support and we cannot determine the appropriate level of child support "on the present record." Id. at 24. Moreover, if plaintiff intended to seek leave to appeal from the interlocutory order, she was required to do so within twenty days after the date of service. R. 2:5-6(a). As her appeal was filed approximately forty-four days after the October 2013 order, she was out of time under Rule 2:5-6(a). For all these reasons, leave to appeal nunc pro tunc is inappropriate here.
IV.
Plaintiff further argues that the family court erred by failing to consider inaccuracies in certain expenses defendant listed in his 2012 CIS, and by denying her request that defendant produce all documentation justifying those expenses. Plaintiff contends there were "major discrepancies" in defendant's 2012 CIS because it lists $18,000 owed to the Internal Revenue Service, daycare expenses of $2212 per month, $425 in private school expenses, $550 per month in parenting expenses, $300 per month in entertainment costs, $484 per month for sports and hobbies, $900 per month for restaurants, $150 per month for haircare, and $450 per month for clothing. The CIS denotes that these expenses are attributable to defendant and "2 children." However, plaintiff contends that their children do not need daycare and do not attend private school. Thus, it is unclear if these expenses relate to defendant's children with plaintiff, or with his child born from his second marriage.
The family court was correct that those CIS expenses were not relevant to plaintiff's motion to modify child support. In calculating support for a child, a trial court "[a]dd[s] the basic child support amount, net child-care cost, health insurance cost for the child . . . and court-approved predictable and recurring extraordinary expenses." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix IX-B to R. 5:6A at 2663 (2015). The "basic child support amount" is derived from the parents' net income and the number of their children being supported. Id. at 2661. The guideline-based calculation of child support does not take into account a parent's debts, or parenting expenses for a child born of another person. Plaintiff has not provided us with any documentation showing that defendant had or has asked the family court to consider those expenses in performing the child support guidelines calculations, in supplementing the guidelines-based award in this extreme parental income situation, or in adjusting such an award. See Pressler & Verniero, supra, Appendix IX-A at 2644-46. Thus, an investigation as to the validity of the expenses listed in the 2012 CIS was irrelevant to the 2013 child support motion before the court. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of plaintiff's demand for documentation supporting the expenses listed in defendant's 2012 CIS.
A parent of such a child may seek an other-dependent deduction, Pressler & Verniero, supra, Appendix IX-A at 2633-34, but that is based on a "theoretical support obligation" rather than actual expenses for such a child, Pressler & Verniero, supra, Appendix IX-B at 2665-66. In any event, the 2012 child support calculation did not give defendant an other-dependent deduction.
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V.
Finally, plaintiff requests this court provide her with clarification regarding the trial court's order that the parties split the children's extraordinary expenses "80/20." However, the family court did provide plaintiff with clarification. The October 2013 order stated: "Said expenses shall include prom expenses, senior activities and events, school yearbooks, school pictures, class trips, SAT/ACT tests, SAT/ACT tutoring, and college applications." The court further enumerated a set of nine guidelines detailing what constituted "college expenses" and how each expense would be shared by the parties.
Plaintiff also asked the family court to "establish . . . how [the 80/20 split] should be enforced by either penalties or [d]etermining another avenue that the defendant must comply with so that we could avoid coming to court on further motions." The family court did not address this vague request. To the extent plaintiff argues on appeal that this court should provide additional clarification, provide an alternative avenue or ratio for the parties to split extraordinary expenses, or promulgate penalties for nonpayment, we too decline to address vague requests plaintiff did not clearly make to the family court.
Affirmed in part, and dismissed in part. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION