Opinion
No. CV 03-040 18 30 S
February 28, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Before the court is the defendant's motion to strike the first count of the plaintiff's substituted complaint on the ground that the count lacks sufficient factual allegations to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
This breach of implied contract claim arises from the defendant's November 6, 2001 discharge of the plaintiff from his position as a psychiatric technician. The plaintiff, Steve Sidiropoulos, commenced this action by service of process on April 3, 2003, and subsequently filed a five-count complaint on April 10, 2003. The defendant, Bridgeport Hospital, moved to strike counts one, four and five on the ground that the counts lacked sufficient factual allegations to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The defendant's motion was granted as to counts one and four. On January 26, 2004, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, again in five counts. On February 27, 2004, the defendant moved to strike counts one and two of the amended complaint, again on the ground that the counts lacked sufficient factual allegations to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. That motion to strike was granted as to count one, the breach of contract claim. On July 27, 2004, the plaintiff filed a substitute complaint, now the operative complaint, containing the same five counts as the previously amended complaint. In the substitute complaint the plaintiff makes additional factual allegations in count one, his breach of contract claim.
The complaint sounded in: breach of contract, gender discrimination in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60, equal pay act, invasion of privacy and defamation per se.
On January 9, 2004, the court, Wolven, J., issued a memorandum of decision, granting the defendant's motion as to counts one, breach of contract and count four, invasion of privacy.
The amended complaint sounded in: breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, gender discrimination in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60, equal pay act and defamation per se.
See footnote 5.
On August 27, 2004, the defendant filed a motion to strike the breach of contract count of the substitute complaint, once again on the ground that the count lacks sufficient factual allegations to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Each party has filed a memorandum of law. The defendant's motion to strike is currently before the court.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint . . . all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, Inc., 268 Conn. 283, 292, 842 A.2d 1124 (2004). The court "must construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Heim v. California Federal Bank, 78 Conn.App. 351, 359, 828 A.2d 129, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 911, 832 A.2d 70 (2003). "[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, 270 Conn. 133, 173, 851 A.2d 1113 (2004). "A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." Novametrix Medical Systems, Inc. v. BOC Group, Inc., 224 Conn. 210, 215, 618 A.2d 25 (1992).
The defendant moves to strike count one on the grounds that the count lacks sufficient factual allegations to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In support of the motion, the defendant argues that the plaintiff is merely drawing conclusions from sections of the defendant's policy manual and from remarks of supervisors that he was being given a contractual commitment that termination would occur only on the basis of a just cause standard. The defendant further argues that the plaintiff "does not allege that this was written, nor that anyone in authority in the hospital said it to him."
In opposition to the motion to strike, the plaintiff argues that he has alleged facts necessary to support a breach of implied contract claim. The complaint alleges that his supervisor assured him that he would not be terminated unless he was found to have committed the same infraction three times. It also provides that his supervisors informed him that, in accordance with the defendant's policies and procedures, an employee could be terminated only "for doing something very, very seriously wrong." Furthermore, the plaintiff argues that the defendant's policies, as stated in the personnel policy and procedures manual support the plaintiff's breach of implied contract claim. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the manual defines discharge as "involuntary termination by the hospital for cause" and that an employee may be terminated without notice for due cause at any time during an employee's ninety-day probationary period. The plaintiff alleges that he remained employed with the defendant based upon the defendant's promises and representation. The plaintiff argues that "taken as a whole" the allegations contained in his substitute complaint are sufficient to support a claim for breach of implied contract.
"[A]ll employer-employee relationships not governed by express contracts involve some type of implied `contract' of employment. There cannot be any serious dispute that there is a bargain of some kind; otherwise, the employee would not be working." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 13, 662 A.2d 89 (1995). "Typically, an implied contract of employment does not limit the terminability of an employee's employment but merely includes terms specifying wages, working hours, job responsibilities and the like. Thus, [a]s a general rule, contracts of permanent employment or for an indefinite term, are terminable at will . . . Pursuant to traditional contract principles, however, the default rule of employment at will can be modified by the agreement of the parties." (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 14-15.
"A contract implied in fact, like an express contract, depends on actual agreement . . . Accordingly, [the plaintiff must plead that the defendant] agreed, either by words or action or conduct, to undertake [some] form of actual contract commitment to him under which he could not be terminated without just cause." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Russack-Baker v. Billings P. Learned Mission, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 566008 (February 9, 2004, Hurley, J.T.R.).
The plaintiff alleges oral assurances made by his supervisors indicating that the plaintiff would not be terminated unless he committed the same infraction three times. He further alleges that his supervisors informed him that, pursuant to the defendant's policies and procedures, "an employee could only be terminated for doing something very, very, seriously wrong." These allegations are analogous to those made by the plaintiff in Gaudio v. Griffin Health Services Corp., 249 Conn. 523, 733 A.2d 197 (1999). In Gaudio, the plaintiff alleged that by the language of the defendant's personnel manual, the defendant promised "not to terminate employees unless they had either committed [r]epeated violations or engaged in serious misconduct." (Emphasis added.) (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 537. Our Supreme Court found that "[a] jury reasonably could have concluded that this is the very definition of just cause." (Emphasis added.) Id. Thus, "[f]rom nothing more than the language of the manual, [a] jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant intended to bind itself to a contract, pursuant to which it could not terminate employees absent just cause." (Emphasis added.) Id. In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant, by words spoken by its supervisors, agreed to undertake a commitment to him that he would not be terminated without just cause.
The defendant's argument that the plaintiff "does not allege that this was written, nor that anyone in authority in the hospital said it to him" is without merit. An "implied contract . . . [may incorporate] the terms of . . . oral statements." Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingeheim Pharmaceticals, Inc., supra, 234 Conn. 12-13. Furthermore, oral statements made to an employee by his supervisors may be sufficient to allege the terms of an implied contract. See Gaudio v. Griffin Health Services Co., supra, 249 Conn. 537-38 (oral statements made to the employee by personnel in the human resource department, and by transport and security personnel when the employee began working for those units of the hospital were sufficient evidence of implied contract terms).
The plaintiff also alleges that language in the defendant's personnel policies and procedures manual created an implied contract under which he could not be terminated except for cause. "It is firmly established that statements in an employer's personnel manual may . . . under appropriate circumstances . . . give rise to an express or implied contract between employer and employee." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 532. The plaintiff alleges, in paragraph 19 of count one, that the defendant's manual defines discharge as involuntary termination initiated by the hospital for cause. This allegation, first made in the plaintiff's amended complaint, was insufficient to withstand the defendant's February 27, 2004 motion to strike. Here, however, in the plaintiff's substitute complaint, he also alleges oral promises by his supervisors that bolster his claim that he could not be discharged except for cause. Whether the plaintiff ultimately can prove his allegations is not before this court. The only issue before this court is whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to withstand a motion to strike.
On July 1, 2004, the court, Dewey, J., granted the defendant's motion as to the amended count one, breach of contract, "[f]or the reasons noted by Judge Wolven," referring to the court's January 9, 2004 memorandum of decision. The only change between the amended version of count one and the previously stricken count was the additional allegation that "[s]ection C:9 of Defendant's Personnel Policies and Procedure Manual defines `Discharge' as `Involuntary termination initiated by the Hospital for cause.'"
CONCLUSION
The factual allegations in count one, construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and to sustaining its legal sufficiency, adequately allege a legally cognizable claim for breach of implied contract. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to strike count one is denied.
SKOLNICK, J.