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Sicuranza v. Philip Howard Apartments Tenants Corp.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.
Oct 22, 2014
121 A.D.3d 966 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)

Opinion

2014-10-22

Kelly SICURANZA, appellant, v. PHILIP HOWARD APARTMENTS TENANTS CORP., et al., respondents.

Michael B. Palillo, P.C. (Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & De Cicco, LLP, New York, N.Y. [Brian J. Isaac and Jillian Rosen], of counsel), for appellant. Kaufman Dolowich & Voluck, LLP, Woodbury, N.Y. (Ellen R. Storch and Yale Pollack of counsel), for respondents.



Michael B. Palillo, P.C. (Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & De Cicco, LLP, New York, N.Y. [Brian J. Isaac and Jillian Rosen], of counsel), for appellant. Kaufman Dolowich & Voluck, LLP, Woodbury, N.Y. (Ellen R. Storch and Yale Pollack of counsel), for respondents.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., SANDRA L. SGROI, JEFFREY A. COHEN, and ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for sexual harassment and negligent hiring and supervision, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Baynes, J.), dated March 13, 2013, which granted the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants asserting causes of action alleging sexual harassment, battery, negligent hiring, and negligent supervision. The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action is barred by a release executed by the plaintiff as a part of a separation agreement that she entered into with her former employer, the nonparty Cooper Square Realty, Inc. (hereinafter Cooper). The Supreme Court concluded that the release barred this action and granted the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint.

Generally, a valid release constitutes a complete bar to an action on a claim which is the subject of the release ( see Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V., 17 N.Y.3d 269, 276, 929 N.Y.S.2d 3, 952 N.E.2d 995; Global Mins. & Metals Corp. v. Holme, 35 A.D.3d 93, 98, 824 N.Y.S.2d 210). A release is “governed by principles of contract law” (Mangini v. McClurg, 24 N.Y.2d 556, 562, 301 N.Y.S.2d 508, 249 N.E.2d 386; see Burnside 711 LLC v. Amerada Hess Corp., 109 A.D.3d 860, 861, 972 N.Y.S.2d 604), and one “that is complete, clear, and unambiguous on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms” (Alvarez v. Amicucci, 82 A.D.3d 687, 688, 918 N.Y.S.2d 144; see Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V., 17 N.Y.3d at 276, 929 N.Y.S.2d 3, 952 N.E.2d 995; Booth v. 3669 Delaware, Inc., 92 N.Y.2d 934, 935, 680 N.Y.S.2d 899, 703 N.E.2d 757).

The plain language of a release is controlling, “regardless of one party's claim that he [or she] intended something else” (Matter of Brooklyn Resources Recovery, Inc., 309 A.D.2d 931, 932, 766 N.Y.S.2d 121; see Chaudhry v. Garvale, 262 A.D.2d 518, 519, 692 N.Y.S.2d 447). Where the scope of the release is unambiguous, “the court may not look to extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent” (Koufakis v. Siglag, 85 A.D.3d 872, 873, 925 N.Y.S.2d 204; see Fiakpoey v. Middlesworth, 118 A.D.3d 743, 745, 987 N.Y.S.2d 201; Rodriguez v. Saal, 51 A.D.3d 449, 450, 857 N.Y.S.2d 546). “Whether or not a writing is ambiguous is a question of law to be resolved by the courts” (W.W.W. Assocs. v. Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162, 565 N.Y.S.2d 440, 566 N.E.2d 639; see Inter–Reco, Inc. v. Lake Park 175 Froehlich Farm, LLC, 106 A.D.3d 955, 956, 965 N.Y.S.2d 606).

Here, the plain language of the subject release unambiguously bars all claims that the plaintiff had against her former employer, Cooper, as well as any claims that she had against any entity for which Cooper served as an agent. Since the defendants established, as a matter of law, that they fell within the definition of “Company Releasees” as that term was defined in the subject release, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint ( see Fiakpoey v. Middlesworth, 118 A.D.3d at 745, 987 N.Y.S.2d 201; Koufakis v. Siglag, 85 A.D.3d 872, 873–874, 925 N.Y.S.2d 204; Rodriguez v. Saal, 51 A.D.3d at 450, 857 N.Y.S.2d 546).


Summaries of

Sicuranza v. Philip Howard Apartments Tenants Corp.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.
Oct 22, 2014
121 A.D.3d 966 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)
Case details for

Sicuranza v. Philip Howard Apartments Tenants Corp.

Case Details

Full title:Kelly SICURANZA, appellant, v. PHILIP HOWARD APARTMENTS TENANTS CORP., et…

Court:Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Date published: Oct 22, 2014

Citations

121 A.D.3d 966 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)
121 A.D.3d 966
2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 7143

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