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Shore v. Suntrust Bank of Atlanta

United States District Court, S.D. New York
Mar 5, 2003
02 Civ. 6565 (HB) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2003)

Opinion

02 Civ. 6565 (HB)

March 5, 2003


OPINION ORDER


Plaintiff Philip Shore, Jr., proceeding pro se, alleges that he was a beneficiary of a trust created by his grandfather, Jacob Shore, and as a result of SunTrust Bank's misrepresentations and/or mishandling of the trust, he allegedly was deprived of proceeds to which he was entitled. Additionally, Shore appears to claim that the guardian ad litem, who represented him as a child in a settlement agreement between the estate of Jacob Shore and plaintiffs father, had failed to provide him with notice of the agreement, and that the settlement agreement wrongly terminated his contingent beneficiary interest in the trust. SunTrust moves to dismiss this complaint, or in the alternative, seeks to have this lawsuit transferred to the Southern District of Florida. For the following reasons, SunTrust's motion to transfer is GRANTED.

Although I decline to address the merits of Shore's complaint here, he would be well advised to seek the advice of counsel before proceeding further with his lawsuit. I have serious concerns whether Shore has a cognizable claim against SunTrust, much less any other defendant that could be joined, but the Southern District of Florida, with its more intimate knowledge of Florida's state law, in any event, provides the better forum to evaluate his claims.

I. BACKGROUND

Philip and Mary Shore, the plaintiffs parents, divorced around 1964 in Arizona. After the divorce, Mary purportedly moved to New York, while Philip returned to Florida. Around the same time, Philip expected a distribution from a pending lawsuit against plaintiffs grandfather, Jacob, in connection with Jacob's supermarket business. Jacob died in 1967 in Miami Beach, where he and his wife lived. Jacob's will made his wife, Pearl, income beneficiary of a trust, while the other members of his family could request payment from the principal, subject to certain limitations. See Defendant's Exh. A at § 5, ¶¶ 1, 4. During the probate proceeding, Philip instituted a second lawsuit in the state court of Florida seeking a judgment to obtain a share of the interest in Jacob's supermarket chain. Plaintiff asserts that the parties to the probate proceeding eventually stipulated in 1973 to modify the trust, making both Jacob's wife and Philip's father the income beneficiaries of the trust while revoking the rights of other family members to receive benefits from the discretionary trust. In addition, plaintiff contends that the stipulation made "it so the current trustee (SunTrust) would have no power or discretion to make payments from the trust," Plaintiff Mem. at 5, to others, including plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that he never agreed to the modification, and that he had no knowledge of the modification until 2001, when a copy of it was sent to him by mail. Plaintiff further contends that his guardian ad litem had failed to notify him of the modification, and were he notified, he would not have ratified the change.

II. DISCUSSION

SunTrust seeks, among other things, to have this lawsuit transferred to the Southern District of Florida. Plaintiff utterly fails to address this aspect of defendant's motion. Despite plaintiffs failure to raise any opposition, I will treat the motion as opposed and consider it in view of alleged facts in a light most favorable to the pro se plaintiff. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); Weinsein v. Aibright, 261 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2001).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a court may transfer a case "for the convenience of parties and witnesses" where "the interest of justice" warrants transfer to another district court where the lawsuit might have been brought originally. Plaintiffs choice of forum is entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed except when the balance of public and private interest factors clearly weighs in favor of trial in another district. Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-57 (1981). The party that seeks a transfer bears the burden of clearly establishing that the transfer is appropriate. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Palmer Corp., 798 F. Supp. 161, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).

As a threshold question, I must first determine whether this lawsuit could have been instituted in the district where the defendant now seeks to have the case transferred. Plaintiff is a New York resident and defendant is a Georgia corporation with business operations in several states, including New York and Florida. In light of plaintiffs claim for damages above $75,000 and attack on the validity of the 1973 Miami-Dade County judgment and complaint against SunTrust for the way it administered the trust in Florida, plaintiff, indisputably, could have filed his lawsuit against defendant in the Southern District of Florida based on diversity jurisdiction.

Having determined that the instant action could have been brought in the Southern District of Florida, I must next decide whether transfer is appropriate. Courts have weighed a number of factors to decide whether to transfer a case, including: "(1) place where the operative facts occurred; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the convenience of the witnesses; (4) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (5) the availability of process to compel attendance of witnesses; (6) the plaintiffs choice of forum; (7) the forum's familiarity with the governing law; and (8) trial efficiency and the interests of justice." Hernandez v. Blackbird Holdings, Inc., 2002 WL 265130, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2002) (quoting APA Excelsior III v. Premiere Techs., Inc. 49 F. Supp.2d 664, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). Although deference is ordinarily given to plaintiffs choice of venue, the choice is entitled to much less deference when the "operative facts upon which the litigation is brought bear little material connection to the chosen forum." Mastercard Intern. Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, Inc., 2002 WL 31521091, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2002) (quoting Berman v. Informix Corp., 30 F. Supp.2d 653, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)). In the instant case, most of the material operative events took place in Florida, including the probate of the will, (which plaintiff asks the Court to construe), stipulation to settle in 1973 (which plaintiff asks the Court to possibly set aside), and the administration of the trust (which plaintiff asks the Court to consider as improper).

"The convenience of both party and nonparty witnesses is probably considered the single most important factor in the analysis of whether a transfer should be granted." Hernandez, 2002 WL 265130, at *2. As far as I can tell here, except for the plaintiff, all of the witnesses, including members of plaintiffs family, and documents relating to the instant action originate from and are located in Florida. Defendant's offices, for instance, that maintained the trust are located in Florida, which is likely the residence of most of the employees that work or worked for defendant during the relevant time period in those offices. Additionally, the Southern District of Florida undoubtedly will have greater familiarity with Florida's probate laws than me. Based on the totality of circumstances, I find that the balance of convenience and justice tips in favor of transferring this case to the Southern District of Florida.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to transfer this case to the Southern District of Florida is granted. The Clerk of the Court is instructed to transfer this case to the Southern District of Florida and remove it from my docket.

SO ORDERED


Summaries of

Shore v. Suntrust Bank of Atlanta

United States District Court, S.D. New York
Mar 5, 2003
02 Civ. 6565 (HB) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2003)
Case details for

Shore v. Suntrust Bank of Atlanta

Case Details

Full title:PHILIP J. SHORE, Plaintiff, v. SUNTRUST BANK OF ATLANTA, Defendant

Court:United States District Court, S.D. New York

Date published: Mar 5, 2003

Citations

02 Civ. 6565 (HB) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2003)