Opinion
No. 3D19-316
02-19-2020
Zahra SHIPMAN, Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Appellee.
Neustein Law Group, P.A., and Nicole R. Moskowitz, for appellant. McGuireWoods LLP, and Sara F. Holladay-Tobias, Emily Y. Rottmann, and Kathleen D. Kilbride (Jacksonville), for appellee.
Neustein Law Group, P.A., and Nicole R. Moskowitz, for appellant.
McGuireWoods LLP, and Sara F. Holladay-Tobias, Emily Y. Rottmann, and Kathleen D. Kilbride (Jacksonville), for appellee.
Before EMAS, C.J., and LOGUE and HENDON, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Even if it would constitute an abuse of discretion for a trial court to deny a motion to set aside a foreclosure sale based on an agreement of the parties that settled the dispute, it is not an abuse of discretion to deny such a motion when the parties are only negotiating an agreement and have not contracted to it. The cases cited by the Appellant do not indicate otherwise. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Lupica, 36 So. 3d 875, 876 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) ("There was no basis for the trial court to reject Wells Fargo's counsel's representation, as an officer of the court, that an agreement had been reached between the parties—particularly where the Lupicas never disputed such representation."); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Lupica, 17 So. 3d 864, 866 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) ("Because Wells Fargo's notice of appeal was filed before the rendition of a final order, we elect to treat this matter as a premature appeal and relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court for a period of fifteen days for the rendition of a proper final order.").
Affirmed.