Opinion
No. 14-08-00970-CR
Opinion filed January 11, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 183rd District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 1108994.
Panel consists of Justices ANDERSON, FROST, and BROWN.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Timothy Wayne Shepherd, appeals his conviction for murder. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02 (West 2003). Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
While 16 years old, the complainant, Tynesha Stewart, met and began dating appellant, then 24 years old. The relationship grew more serious and Stewart eventually rented an apartment in which they both lived. In 2006, Stewart was accepted into Texas A M University and she started her freshman year that August. During Stewart's first semester at Texas A M, appellant called Stewart's dorm or cellular telephone several times daily. Many of Stewart's telephone conversations with appellant were unpleasant. When Stewart returned home following the end of her first semester, witnesses reported that she appeared more social and started talking to a student at another college named Mark. For a brief time, appellant's telephone calls ceased. However, by February 2007, appellant began calling Stewart again. As Stewart's spring break approached, she expressed concern about going home to Houston. Stewart stated she feared appellant would follow her around. Despite her concern over appellant's behavior, Stewart returned to Houston for her spring break. Once back in Houston, Stewart made plans with friends to attend a concert at the Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo on Thursday, March 15, 2007. In addition, Stewart made plans to travel to Padre Island for the last part of her spring break. On March 14, Stewart visited with Mark and other friends and then went to the apartment of her friend Lois Greenwood. Appellant picked Stewart up from that apartment early on the morning of March 15. Stewart left without her cellular telephone and told Greenwood she would return later that day. Stewart never returned to Greenwood's apartment. Stewart did not show up for the concert. When Stewart did not return to Greenwood's apartment, Greenwood eventually contacted Stewart's family. It was later determined that Stewart's younger sister was the last to speak with Stewart at about noon on March 15; at that time, she learned Stewart was with appellant. James Hebert was appellant's neighbor. Hebert testified during appellant's trial that he saw Stewart for the last time on March 15, when she was walking up the stairs to appellant's apartment. Herbert told the jury that he and appellant frequently barbecued together and he had loaned appellant his barbecue grill. Hebert also testified that within a day or so after he last saw Stewart, appellant began barbecuing on his patio. According to Hebert, appellant was barbecuing day and night, which was unusual for appellant. When Hebert inquired if appellant would give him some of the barbecue, appellant refused, saying the barbecue was for a wedding. Herbert testified this was unusual as appellant normally shared his barbecue. Hebert also testified that eventually the fire in appellant's barbecue grill, which was on appellant's second floor apartment patio, got out of control and Hebert's girlfriend called the fire department. Herbert further testified that he watched as the police and firefighters arrived and that appellant did not look as though he wanted them inside his apartment, but he eventually allowed them in. Robert Logan, a Ponderosa Fire Department volunteer firefighter, and Deputy Russell of the Harris County Sheriff's Department, both testified at trial about responding to the fire on appellant's patio. Logan testified that appellant was initially reluctant to let them in the apartment. He also testified that once he got inside the apartment, he did not find a fire. Both Logan and Russell testified regarding meat they observed in appellant's apartment. They found meat in appellant's bathtub. According to Logan, there were some rib bones and two other small pieces of meat about the size of his hand floating in clear water in the tub. Russell testified he saw a rack of ribs and two small chickens floating in the tub. In addition to the meat floating in the tub, Russell testified he saw three small burned chickens sitting on the stove in appellant's kitchen. According to Russell, one of the chickens was still smoking. Russell testified he did not see anything in the apartment that he considered unusual as he had "seen people do that before in the areas that [he has] worked." The following Monday, March 19, Harris County Sheriff's Deputy Wallace Wyatt, Stewart's mother, Gayle Shields, and Greenwood went to appellant's apartment. After appellant answered the door, Deputy Wyatt questioned appellant regarding Stewart's whereabouts. Appellant told Deputy Wyatt that she had been there last Thursday, but they argued over her having a new boyfriend and that she had left the apartment, walking. Deputy Wyatt then asked appellant if he could look around the apartment. Appellant consented. Deputy Wyatt testified that the apartment was dirty and he noticed an area with new, white paint, but otherwise nothing stood out as indicating any criminal activity. Soon after this initial contact with appellant, a search began for Stewart. A headquarters for the search was set up at Abiding Word Church. On March 20, 2007, Sergeant Yvonne Cooper of the Harris County Sheriff's Department, was dispatched to the church, arriving about 6:10 p.m. Upon arriving, she learned appellant was on his way to the church. Sergeant Cooper wanted to interview appellant because he was the last person to see Stewart. When appellant arrived, Sergeant Cooper placed him in her patrol car for his own protection from the gathering crowd. Sergeant Cooper asked appellant if he was willing to provide a written statement and he agreed to do so. However, when asked if he would consent to a search of his apartment and vehicle, appellant refused. Before appellant was driven to the Harris County Sheriff's Department Homicide Division offices, Sergeant Cooper obtained the keys to appellant's apartment and car. Appellant arrived at the Homicide Division about 8:30 p.m., where he was interviewed by Sergeant Craig Clopton. Once he spoke with Sergeant Clopton, appellant consented to a search of his apartment and car. Sergeant Clopton then notified Sergeant Cooper and she, along with two other detectives, searched appellant's apartment. During the search, the detectives looked for any evidence suggesting that foul play had occurred in the apartment. They noted freshly painted areas in the apartment, which is an indicator that evidence may have been covered up. The detectives also conducted presumptive blood tests which returned positive results behind the bathroom light switch, the base of the toilet, and the western edge of the tub. On March 21, Quanell X Farrakhan ("Quanell X"), the leader of The New Black Panthers and The New Black Muslim Movement got involved in the search for Stewart. While meeting with Stewart's family, Quanell X received a telephone call from appellant and he agreed to meet with appellant. Quanell X met appellant at a nearby motel and instructed appellant to get into his car. They then travelled to appellant's apartment. Concerned the police might have planted listening devices, Quanell X and appellant went into the apartment bathroom. Inside the bathroom, appellant became visibly more nervous. Quanell X asked appellant, ". . . are you sure you do not know what happened to this sister?" At that point appellant said he did not want to talk in the bathroom and asked if they could leave the apartment and talk outside. Quanell X and appellant left the apartment and walked toward the apartment complex's tennis courts. As they walked, appellant stated: "[m]an they going to kill me. They going to give me the death penalty." To ease his concerns about the death penalty, Quanell X suggested appellant speak to his attorney, Stanley Schneider. After a telephone conversation with Schneider, appellant appeared more comfortable and agreed to take Quanell X to where he had placed Stewart. At that point, Quanell X contacted the Sheriff's Department and they dispatched Sergeant Miller to accompany appellant and Quanell X. When Sergeant Miller arrived and got into Quanell X's car, appellant directed them to another apartment complex. Once inside that complex, they travelled to the back toward a trash dumpster. The three men exited the car and walked up to the dumpster where Quanell X asked appellant: "Tim, is this where you put her?" Appellant answered "[y]es." Sergeant Miller then placed appellant under arrest. Appellant was taken to the Harris County Homicide Division where he was placed in an interview room. Once appellant was in the interview room, Sergeant Miller took photographs to document any injuries appellant may have had when he was brought into custody. At that point in time, appellant pointed out a small cut on one of his fingers, which Sergeant Miller photographed. After being photographed, appellant informed Sergeant Miller that he wanted to speak to his attorney, Stan Schneider. When Schneider arrived outside the Homicide Division offices, Assistant District Attorney Kelly Siegler informed Schneider that he could not consult with appellant or represent appellant because there was a conflict of interest since Schneider represented Quanell X. Despite that comment by Siegler, Schneider was allowed to briefly meet with appellant. After that meeting, appellant agreed to give his statement to the detectives. During that statement, appellant confessed to killing Stewart. Following appellant's confession, the detectives obtained a search warrant and searched appellant's apartment again. During this search, the detectives seized, among other items, the drain traps and the garbage disposal. During the guilt-innocence phase of appellant's trial, DNA analyst Nikki Redmond testified. Redmond testified that she tested blood found on a pair of jeans seized from appellant's apartment. Redmond testified that the blood revealed a DNA profile consistent with appellant and that Stewart could not be excluded as a possible minor contributor to the mixture. Redmond also testified regarding several pieces of bone and enamel that had been located inside the garbage disposal. DNA testing revealed that Stewart could not be excluded as a possible contributor and appellant could be excluded as a possible contributor to the DNA obtained in relation to State's exhibit 167-A, one of the items found in appellant's garbage disposal. The State also called forensic anthropologist Dr. Jennifer Love to testify as an expert regarding bone trauma and toolmarks found on bone fragments collected below appellant's apartment patio. Dr. Love testified that she is employed by the Harris County Medical Examiner's Office. Dr. Love testified regarding her qualifications, which included master's and doctoral degrees in physical anthropology. While studying for those degrees, Dr. Love also received training in toolmark analysis. Dr. Love also testified that she had worked as a forensic anthropologist since 2003, including working for two years under Dr. Steve Sims, the most respected anthropologist in terms of toolmark analysis, at the Shelby County Medical Examiner's Office in Memphis, Tennessee. After testifying on her qualifications, Dr. Love explained that forensic anthropology is the application of physical anthropology, which is the study of the human skeleton, to medical-legal cases. Dr. Love also explained that a toolmark is a mark left on bone by an instrument such as a saw or a knife. Dr. Love explained that "toolmark analysis is a morphological study. It is not a test study such as you have with chemistry or DNA. . . . [I]t is a descriptive analysis." In addition, Dr. Love explained that it is possible to differentiate between human bones and animal bones. Dr. Love testified that it is easy to tell the difference when one examines a complete bone, however it becomes more difficult when dealing with bone fragments. When examining bone fragments, one looks for features such as the thickness of the cortical bone or the pattern of the sponginess in trabecular bones to determine whether the fragment is more likely a human or non-human bone. During her testimony, Dr. Love discussed the differences between antemortem trauma to bones versus perimortem trauma. Dr. Love went on to describe the effect burning has on bones and the differences between blunt force trauma to bones and thermal trauma to bones. Dr. Love then testified about specific bone fragment exhibits in this case, which consisted of photographs of the fragments. Dr. Love opined that the fragments had been cut with some type of saw at or near the time of death and then they had been burned. While Dr. Love could not testify to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the bone fragments were human, she did testify the fragments had characteristics that were consistent with being from a human forearm bone. At the close of the evidence, the case was submitted to the jury, which found appellant guilty. The case then proceeded to the punishment phase where appellant testified. During his testimony, appellant admitted he got into an argument with Stewart over her dating Mark and that he strangled her to death. Appellant then testified that he panicked and "decided that [he] needed to cover up [his] tracks." Initially, appellant testified that he went to a nearby hardware store where he bought an electric jigsaw. Appellant then explained he placed Stewart's body in his apartment's bathtub and then dismembered her body using the jigsaw. Using a pair of pliers, appellant pulled out all of Stewart's teeth, which he then burned in his smoker grill on his patio along with some of Stewart's body parts. Appellant placed the remaining body parts in a plastic box, which he slid down the stairs, loaded in his car, and eventually threw in an apartment dumpster. After he disposed of Stewart's body, appellant proceeded to burn the clothes and shoes he had been wearing, as well as Stewart's clothing. The jury assessed appellant's punishment at ninety-nine years' confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. This appeal followed.DISCUSSION
Appellant brings five issues on appeal. We address them in order.I. Did the trial court err when it denied appellant's motion to suppress because the State did not exhibit the search warrant to the trial court?
Prior to his trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence he contends was unlawfully seized from his apartment pursuant to a tainted search warrant. In his first issue, appellant asserts the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because "the State failed to exhibit the contested search warrant and affidavit in support of said warrant to the trial judge." Appellant filed a motion to abate this appeal so the trial court could hold a hearing to determine whether the search warrant and accompanying affidavit were admitted into evidence or admitted into evidence for a limited purpose and to order that a true and correct copy of the search warrant and accompanying affidavit be admitted into evidence for a limited purpose. We then abated this appeal and ordered the trial court to hold such a hearing. That hearing was held on September 10, 2009. During the hearing, the trial court determined that the search warrant and its contents were addressed and litigated throughout the suppression hearing and the trial. The trial court also determined that the search warrant and accompanying affidavit were admitted for the purposes of the suppression hearing only. The trial court then ordered that a true and correct copy of the search warrant and accompanying affidavit be included in a supplemental clerk's record which was subsequently filed with this court. Appellant's appellate counsel was present at the abatement hearing and lodged no objection to the trial court's handling of the matter. We conclude appellant's first issue is without merit, and we overrule it.II. Did the trial court err when it denied appellant's request for a self-defense instruction in the jury charge?
In his second issue on appeal, appellant contends the trial court committed reversible error when it denied his request for a jury charge instruction on self-defense.A. The law applicable to self-defense.
A defendant is entitled to an instruction on self-defense if the issue is raised by the evidence, whether that evidence is strong or weak, regardless of what the trial court may think about the credibility of the defense. Ferrel v. State, 55 S.W.3d 586, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Granger v. State, 3 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Before a defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction, however, there must be some evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, that will support the claim. Ferrel, 55 S.W.3d at 591. A defendant need not testify in order to raise a defense. Boget v. State, 40 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Tex. App.-San Antonio), aff'd, 74 S.W.3d 23, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Entitlement to a self-defense instruction is predicated on the provision of some evidence that the defendant was authorized to utilize force against another. "[A] defense is supported (or raised) by the evidence if there is some evidence, from any source, on each element of the defense that, if believed by the jury, would support a rational inference that that element is true." Shaw v. State, 243 S.W.3d 647, 657-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Section 9.32 of the Texas Penal Code provides:(a) A person is justified in using deadly force against another:
(1) if the actor would be justified in using force against the other under Section 9.31; and
Section 9.31 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force. The actor's belief that the force was immediately necessary as described by this subsection is presumed to be reasonable if the actor:
(1) knew or had reason to believe that the person against whom the force was used:
(A) unlawfully and with force entered, or was attempting to enter unlawfully and with force, the actor's occupied habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment;
(B) unlawfully and with force removed, or was attempting to remove unlawfully and with force, the actor from the actor's habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment; or
(C) was committing or attempting to commit aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery;
(2) did not provoke the person against whom the force was used; and
(3) was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity, other than a Class C misdemeanor that is a violation of a law or ordinance regulating traffic at the time the force was used. . . .
(d) The use of deadly force is not justified under this subchapter except as provided in Sections 9.32, 9.33, and 9.34. . . .
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.31 (West Supp. 2009).
(2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary:
(A) to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force; or
(B) to prevent the other's imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery.
(b) The actor's belief under Subsection (a)(2) that the deadly force was immediately necessary as described by that subdivision is presumed to be reasonable if the actor:
(1) knew or had reason to believe that the person against whom the deadly force was used:
(A) unlawfully and with force entered, or was attempting to enter unlawfully and with force, the actor's occupied habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment;
(B) unlawfully and with force removed, or was attempting to remove unlawfully and with force, the actor from the actor's habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment; or
(C) was committing or attempting to commit an offense described by subsection (a)(2)(B);
(2) did not provoke the person against whom the force was used; and
(3) was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity, other than a Class C misdemeanor that is a violation of a law or ordinance regulating traffic at the time the force was used.
(c) A person who has a right to be present at the location where the deadly force is used, who has not provoked the person against whom the deadly force is used, and who is not engaged in criminal activity at the time the deadly force is used is not required to retreat before using deadly force as described by this section.
(d) For purposes of Subsection (a)(2), in determining whether an actor described by Subsection (c) reasonably believed that the use of deadly force was necessary, a finder of fact may not consider whether the actor failed to retreat.Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.32 (West Supp. 2009). If the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, does not establish self-defense, the defendant is not entitled to an instruction on the issue. Ferrel, 55 S.W.3d at 591.
B. Appellant did not establish all elements of the defense of self-defense.
Appellant argues there was evidence presented during the guilt-innocence phase of his trial that he acted in self-defense and, therefore, the trial court should have included his requested self-defense instruction in the charge. Appellant relies on a single exhibit, the photograph taken by Sergeant Miller when appellant was taken into custody that shows a cut on one of appellant's fingers, and Sergeant Miller's testimony regarding that photograph:[Prosecutor]: Did you notice any injuries on [appellant] March 21st when you took him into the Lockwood substation?
[Miller]: He said that he had a cut on his right finger which I took a picture of it.
. . .
[Defense Attorney]: Sergeant Miller, would you agree with me based on your training and experience that the type of cut depicted in State's Exhibit 267 would be consistent with what we call a defensive wound?
[Miller]: I would agree with that.Appellant asserts the only reasonable inference from the photograph and the testimony quoted above is that appellant sustained the cut while defending himself from Stewart's aggression. We disagree that, even when viewed in the light most favorable to appellant, that the only reasonable inference from this evidence was that Stewart attacked appellant which required him to use deadly force to protect himself. In addition, even if we were to accept appellant's invitation and infer from this evidence that Stewart cut appellant's finger, the evidence does not establish all of the elements of the defense of self-defense. For example, the mere existence of a cut on appellant's finger does not establish that appellant reasonably believed that the use of deadly force was immediately necessary to protect appellant from Stewart's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.32(a)(2). Appellant's cut finger also does not establish (1) that appellant did not provoke Stewart, or (2) that appellant was not engaged in criminal activity at that point in time. See id. § 9.32(b)(2) (3). Because the evidence cited by appellant does not establish each element of the defense, we hold the trial court did not err when it denied appellant's request for a self-defense instruction in the jury charge. See Shaw, 243 S.W.3d at 657-58; see Davis v. State, 268 S.W.3d 683, 697-98 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref'd) (holding that a doctor's testimony that a cut on the defendant's ear was not a self-inflicted wound did not entitle the defendant to a self-defense instruction because he did not present evidence on all elements of the defense). We overrule appellant's second issue.
III. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it admitted the expert testimony of forensic anthropologist Dr. Jennifer Love?
Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Evidence provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Tex. R. Evid. 702. Pursuant to Rule 702, the trial court, before admitting expert testimony, must be satisfied that three conditions are met: (1) that the witness qualifies as an expert by reason of his knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; (2) that the subject matter of the testimony is appropriate for expert testimony; and (3) that admitting the expert testimony will actually assist the fact finder in deciding the case. Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). These conditions are commonly referred to as (1) qualification, (2) reliability, and (3) relevance. Id. In his third issue, appellant challenges the trial court's decision to admit the testimony of forensic anthropologist Dr. Jennifer Love regarding the science of toolmark analysis and its application to the facts and evidence in this case. Specifically, appellant argues the State failed to meet its burden to establish that (1) Dr. Love was qualified; (2) her opinion was reliable; and (3) her opinion was relevant. In addition, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted Dr. Love to testify because the probative value of her testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice in violation of Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. We address each contention in turn.A. The standard of review.
We use the abuse of discretion standard to review a trial court's decision on whether to allow expert testimony. Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 765 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Before reversing the trial court's decision, we must find the trial court's ruling was so clearly wrong as to lie outside the realm within which reasonable people might disagree. Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Green v. State, 191 S.W.3d 888, 895 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd). Absent a clear abuse of that discretion, the trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony will not be disturbed. Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Such rulings will rarely be disturbed on appeal. Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 136.B. The law applicable to expert qualifications.
Qualification is distinct from reliability and relevance and should be evaluated independently. Id. at 131. The proponent of the expert testimony bears the burden of proving that the expert is qualified. Turner v. State, 252 S.W.3d 571, 584 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref'd). The specialized knowledge which qualifies a witness to give an expert opinion may be derived from specialized education, practical experience, a study of technical works, or a varying combination of these things. Id. at 585. This specialized knowledge possessed by the expert must be beyond that possessed by the average person, "but the gap need not necessarily be monumental." Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In addition, the expert's background must be tailored to the specific area of expertise about which he intends to testify. Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 133. In other words, to determine whether an expert witness is qualified to testify, the trial court must consider whether the witness has a sufficient background in a particular field and whether that background goes to the very matter on which the witness is to give an opinion. Id. Because the possible spectrum of education, skill, and training is so wide, a trial court has great discretion in determining whether a witness possesses sufficient qualifications to assist the jury as an expert. Rodgers v. State, 205 S.W.3d 525, 527-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).C. Dr. Love was qualified to testify as an expert.
The State's evidence in qualifying Dr. Love as an expert in the area of bone trauma and toolmark analysis established that she held a master's and a doctoral degree in physical anthropology. Dr. Love also explained that physical anthropology is the study of the human skeleton. Dr. Love testified that she has worked as a forensic anthropologist since 2003 and has been employed as the forensic anthropology director at the Harris County Medical Examiner's Office since 2006. According to Dr. Love, forensic anthropology takes the methods of physical anthropology and applies them to individuals in medical-legal cases instead of to the entire population. Turning specifically to toolmark analysis, Dr. Love testified that the science of toolmark analysis is recognized by the scientific community and there have been articles published on toolmark analysis since the early 1970's. Dr. Love testified that the science of toolmark analysis has been recognized as reliable by the scientific community. Dr. Love went on to summarize what is meant by the term toolmark:Toolmark analysis is a morphological study. It is not a test study such as you have with chemistry or DNA. So, it is a descriptive analysis. There are parameters that are published that are met to show that it is, in fact, a toolmark such as what we talk about in this case. The width of the — the width of the mark, the depth of the mark, the formation of the floor of the mark also we'll see that — so we have the mark, the partial mark. Immediately to the right of the partial mark is a complete mark. And there are regular striations — or irregular striations but steps in that mark which is also characteristic of a toolmark. So, when these established characteristics are identified, then it can be considered a toolmark.Dr. Love also testified that as part of her education and training as a physical anthropologist, she received training and education in identifying toolmarks. While Dr. Love did testify that there is no recognized proficiency testing in toolmark analysis, she explained that she took coursework on that subject. In those courses, Dr. Love explained, she had to frequently present her knowledge and ability to identify toolmarks in order to pass. Dr. Love also testified that she worked for several years with Dr. Steve Sims, who was the head forensic anthropologist at the Shelby Coundy Medial Examiners Office in Memphis, Tennessee. According to Dr. Love, Dr. Sims was the leading anthropologist in the field of toolmark analysis. While she worked with Dr. Sims, he received cases from throughout the United States and Canada and she worked with him on those cases. Dr. Love explained that while she worked with Dr. Sims, he reviewed and approved all of her work, including work involving toolmark analysis. Finally, Dr. Love testified that she has appeared as an expert in court many times on the subjects of both bone trauma and toolmark analysis. Based on the above, we conclude Dr. Love established that she had specialized knowledge, training, and experience in toolmark analysis and that knowledge went to the very matter on which she was asked to render an opinion in this case. Therefore, we hold the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion when it overruled appellant's objection based on Dr. Love's qualifications.