Opinion
23-CV-2150 (LTS)
06-12-2023
SHENG-WEN CHENG, Plaintiff, v. LUKAS CASH, Defendant.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se and is currently incarcerated at the Federal Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota, brings this action invoking the Court's diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. By order dated April 4, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court dismisses the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, with 30 days' leave to replead.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings state law claims of fraudulent inducement, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, breach of implied contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duty, gross negligence, conversion, unjust enrichment, tortious interference with a contract, tortious interference with a prospective business relationship, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff states that he is a resident of New York, Defendant is a resident of Massachusetts, and the amount in controversy is $50,000.
DISCUSSION
The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth generally in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, federal jurisdiction is available only when a “federal question” is presented or when plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. “‘[I]t is common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.'” United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 919, AFL-CIO v. CenterMark Prop. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Manway Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1983)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative ....”).
Plaintiff does not allege facts demonstrating that the Court has diversity jurisdiction of this action. To establish diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must first allege that he and the defendant are citizens of different States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998) (“A case falls within the federal district court's ‘original' diversity ‘jurisdiction' only if diversity of citizenship among the parties is complete, i.e., only if there is no plaintiff and no defendant who are citizens of the same State.”). For diversity purposes, an individual is a citizen of the State where he is domiciled, which is defined as the place where a person “has his true fixed home . . . and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.” Palazzo ex rel. Delmage v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally, there is a rebuttable presumption that, when an individual is incarcerated, he retains his pre-incarceration state citizenship rather than acquiring a new state citizenship. See Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923, 925 n.5 (2d Cir. 1979); Blumatte v. Quinn, 521 F.Supp.2d 308, 312 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
In addition, the plaintiff must allege to a “reasonable probability” that the claim is in excess of the sum or value of $75,000, the statutory jurisdictional amount. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff states that he was a resident of New York before his incarceration. Accordingly, the parties are diverse for the purposes of the diversity statute. Because Plaintiff does not allege that his claim satisfies the jurisdictional amount, however, he does not satisfy the second requirement under the diversity statute. The Court therefore lacks diversity jurisdiction of his claims and cannot exercise jurisdiction of the state law claims.
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts showing that the Court may exercise diversity jurisdiction of his claims, the Court grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to file an amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3), with 30 days' leave to replead.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.