Opinion
Civil Action 4:20-cv-3025-JD-TER
07-06-2022
BRONSON SHELLEY, #1589035, aka Bronson Shelley, # 353229, Plaintiff, v. BRYAN P. STIRLING, JAMES M. BROWN, DENNIS R. PATTERSON, and ANNIE RUMLER, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Thomas E. Rogers, III United States Magistrate Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and the South Carolina Religious Freedom Act, SC Code Ann. § 1-32-50. Presently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction & Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 45). All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
On May 16, 2013, Plaintiff first requested official recognition of the Hebrew Israelite faith group while he was a prisoner at the Broad River Correctional Institution. Compl. ¶ 1. On May 23, 2013, Plaintiff met with Chaplin James M. Brown, who presented Plaintiff's request to Associate Warden Sutton, who disapproved Plaintiff's requested recognition. Compl. ¶ 2.
On May 31, 2013, Plaintiff appealed the decision denying recognition of the Hebrew Israelite faith to Warden Robert Stevenson, III. Compl. ¶ 3. This appeal was also disapproved. Compl. ¶ 3. Plaintiff then appealed to the Chief of Pastoral Care Services Branch and Head Chaplin Lloyd Roberts through Chaplin Brown, who never forwarded the request, and, thus, Plaintiff never received a response. Compl. ¶ 4.
On February 1, 2015, Plaintiff wrote Chaplin Howser while at Kirkland Correctional Institution and requested a response to his last state of appeal for his faith recognition process. Compl. ¶ 5. On February 24, 2015, Plaintiff received a response from Bennie Coldough, the new Head Chaplin and Chief of Pastoral Care Services, who stated that he had no knowledge of Plaintiff's appeal and that Plaintiff should file a new request. Compl. ¶ 6.
In July of 2016, Plaintiff resubmitted his request for faith recognition of the Hebrew Israelite religion. Compl. ¶ 9. Plaintiff requested status updates on his request for faith recognition of the Hebrew Israelite faith group on August 18, 2016, December 21, 2016, and March 31, 2017. Compl. ¶¶ 1-12. After each request, Plaintiff received a response that no decision had yet been made. Compl. ¶¶ 10-12. On August 28, 2017, Plaintiff received a memorandum from Sherman L. Anderson, Chief of the Office of General Counsel-Inmate Grievance Branch that SCDC's General Counsel Office was reviewing his request for the Hebrew Israelites to be a recognized faith group, and that he would be notified of the outcome. Compl. ¶ 13.
In August of 2018, the Office of General Counsel contacted Dennis Patterson regarding Plaintiff's request and asked him whether official recognition of the Hebrew Israelites could pose a security issue. Compl. ¶ 15. Patterson gave his opinion that because of its alleged racist teachings, officially recognizing the Hebrew Israelites as a religious group within SCDC would generate racial animus among the prisoners and pose a security threat to both prisoners and staff. Compl. ¶ 15. Also in August of 2018, Patterson communicated these conclusion to SCDC's Office of General Counsel and Plaintiff's request for recognition of the Hebrew Israelite faith was disapproved by Annie Rumler in that office. Compl. ¶ 16. Brown communicated this determination to the SCDC Chaplains. ECF No. 65-3, ¶ 9. Plaintiff alleges that because of the continuous denial of Plaintiff's requests for faith recognition of the Hebrew Israelite religion and his inability to practice his religion, he suffers from depression and has made numerous attempts at suicide. Compl. ¶¶ 17-27.
Following Defendants' motion to dismiss, the only claims remaining in this action are Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief as to all Defendants in their official capacities and Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Rumler in her individual capacity as to the Equal Protection and the South Carolina Religious Freedom Act. See Order (ECF No. 39).
III. DISCUSSION
In his motion, Plaintiff asserts that because SCDC refuses to recognize the Hebrew Israelite religion, he is subjected to forced haircuts and shaves, exclusion from participating in religious programs, denial of Hebrew Israelite books, literature, and accouterments, denial of a kosher or vegan diet as proscribed by Hebrew Isrealite theology, and denial of observing Hebrew Israelite high holy days. He asks the court to enter a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order directing the SCDC to “authorize formal recognition of Hebrew Israelites as a faith group so that SCDC officials and chaplaincy may facilitate the practice of the Hebrew Israelite faith and make the necessary accommodations.” Pl. Motion p. 2 (ECF No. 45).
In Capital Associated Industries, Inc. v. Cooper, 129 F.Supp.3d 281, 287-88 (M.D. N.C. 2015), the court succinctly set forth the applicable Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit law regarding preliminary injunctions:
“The standard for granting either a TRO or preliminary injunction is the same.” Sarsour v. Trump, 245 F.Supp.3d 719, 728 (E.D. Va. 2017).
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy involving the exercise of a very far-reaching power that is only to be employed in the limited circumstances that demand it. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008); In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir.2003), abrogated on other grounds by eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006). Whether to grant this relief is in the sound discretion of the court. Winter, 555 U.S. at 24, 129 S.Ct. 365. Courts generally employ preliminary injunctions for the limited purpose of preserving the status quo during the course of litigation in order to prevent irreparable harm and to preserve the ability of the court to render meaningful relief on the merits. Microsoft, 333 F.3d at 525. The Fourth Circuit has defined the status quo as the “last uncontested status between the parties which preceded the controversy.” Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 320 (4th Cir.2013) (quoting Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., 675 F.3d 355, 378 (4th Cir.2012)). The party seeking a preliminary injunction bears the burden of justifying such relief. Wagner v. Bd. of Educ., 335 F.3d 297, 302 (4th Cir.2003). To prevail on a motion for preliminary injunction, a party must establish “[1] that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that [it] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in its favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 365.
Such a remedy “is a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from success on the merits as a matter of course.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 32, 129 S.Ct. 365. “In each case, courts ‘must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.' ”Id. at 24, 129 S.Ct. 365 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987)). In doing so, the Supreme Court has instructed federal courts to “pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Id. Even in cases where a plaintiff has shown likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm, the balance of equities and the public interest factors can weigh in favor of denying a preliminary injunction. See id. at 23-24, 31 n. 5, 129 S.Ct. 365.
To demonstrate a likelihood of success on a claim, a “plaintiff need not establish a ‘certainty of success,' but must make a clear showing that he is likely to succeed at trial.” Di Biase v. SPX Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Pashby, 709 F.3d at 321). The same issues raised in this case have already been addressed in a prior case filed by Plaintiff arising out of the same facts and circumstances. In Shelley v. Stirling, et al, 4:18-cv-2229-JD-TER (the previous action), Plaintiff alleged the same facts as those alleged herein against three of the same defendants, Stirling, Brown, and Patterson, claiming violations of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq. In that case, Defendants averred that they denied recognition of the Hebrew Israelite faith as a religious group within SCDC due to its racist teachings, which would cause a security threat among inmates and staff, but failed to point to specific evidence of racist teachings from the religion. See Report and Recommendation pp. 12-14 (ECF No. 128 in the previous action). The court held that even though issues of fact exist “as to the racial teachings of the Hebrew Israelite,” Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. See Order pp. 4-5 (ECF No. 140 in the previous action). However, the only claims before the court in the previous action were claims against Defendants in their individual capacities for monetary damages. In the present case, Plaintiff has asserted claims for injunctive relief, which are not barred by qualified immunity. See Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 498 n.9 (4th Cir. 2014).
As to irreparable harm, the movant must show the harm to be “neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent.” Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Medical Group, 952 F.2d 802, 812 (4th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). “Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with [the Supreme Court's] characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)). “The Supreme Court has explained that ‘loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.'” Newsom ex rel. Newsom v. Albemarle Cnty. Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 261 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976)).
Nevertheless, even if Plaintiff can show a likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm, the balance of equities and public interest factors find in favor of denying a preliminary injunction. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 23-24 (reversing preliminary injunction without reaching lower courts' holding that plaintiffs had established likelihood of success on the merits, because the plaintiffs had failed to establish the other factors). With respect to the balance of equities, the Fourth Circuit has long held that “absent the most extraordinary circumstances, federal courts are not to immerse themselves in the management of state prisons.” Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 1994). In Taylor, the Fourth Circuit stated that “sweeping intervention in the management of state prisons is rarely appropriate when exercising the equitable powers of the federal courts. This is true where conditions at the prison have been adjudged unconstitutional following trial on the merits. It is especially true where mandatory injunctive relief is sought and only preliminary findings as to the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits have been made.” Id. at 269; see also Price v. City of Fayetteville, N.C. , No. 5:13-CV-150-FL, 2013 WL 1751391, at *4 (E.D. N.C. Apr. 23, 2013) (citing E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 828 (4th Cir.2004); Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir.1980)) (noting that the Fourth Circuit has recognized that a stricter standard is required for a mandatory preliminary injunction, which does not preserve the status quo, and that such an injunction is only granted in very specific circumstances, usually only when extreme or serious damage will result). The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that “ ‘[t]he difficulties of operating a detention center must not be underestimated by the courts,” and that “correctional officials ... must have substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions to the problems they face.' ” Prieto, 780 F.3d at 255 (quoting Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 326, 132 S.Ct. 1510, 1515-16 (2012)). At least one court has noted that corrections facilities are “likely to be harmed by injunctions that ‘would interfere with the daily execution of prison policies and practices,' and ‘[s]uch an interference is not the place of federal courts, which do not stand in the position of overseeing the daily operations of prisons.' ” Holloway v. Coakley, No. 2:17-CV-74, 2018 WL 1287417, at *6 (N.D. W.Va. Mar. 13, 2018) (citing Dunn v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 2013 WL 365257, at *2 (N.D. W.Va. 2013)).
Here, Plaintiff has not shown the extraordinary circumstances necessary to warrant this court's interference in the management of SCDC prior to a full adjudication on the merits. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 291 (4th Cir.1980) (holding that where “substantial issues of constitutional dimensions” are before the court, those issues “should be fully developed at trial in order to [e]nsure a proper and just resolution”); Price v. City of Fayetteville, No. 5:13-CV-150-FL, 2013 WL 1751391, at *4 (E.D. N.C. Apr. 23, 2013) (“‘On an application for preliminary injunction, the court is not bound to decide doubtful and difficult questions of law or disputed questions of fact,' and ‘[a]s a prerequisite to the issuance of an interlocutory injunction, ... [t]here must be no disputed issues of fact'” (quoting Gantt v. Clemson Agric. Coll. of S.C., 208 F.Supp. 416, 418-19 (W.D.S.C.1962)).
With respect to whether the preliminary injunction is in the public interest, this question “certainly presents conflicting considerations. On one hand, the general public has an interest in ensuring that the constitutional protections afforded to the public, including those imprisoned, are vindicated; on the other hand, the public most certainly has an interest in the effective management of the prison system, both for the safety of the general public and those in the prison system, whether they be inmates or administrators.” Holloway, 2018 WL 1287417, at *7. Nevertheless, given the Supreme Court's “consistent counseling to give great deference to the experience of prison administrators, particularly when the decisions relate to security, id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)); see also Florence, 566 U.S. at 326 (“[C]orrectional officials ... must have substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions to the problems they face.”); Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 2168 (2003) (holding that in the prison setting, courts should give substantial deference to the judgment of prison administrators), Plaintiff fails to show that his requested injunction would be in the public interest.
Failure to satisfy any one of the relevant Winter factors mandates denial of the preliminary injunction. The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, 559 U.S. 1089, 130 S.Ct. 2371, 176 L.Ed.2d 764 (2010). Accordingly, because Plaintiff fails to meet all four Winter factors, the requested preliminary injunction/temporary retraining order is not appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction & Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 45) be denied.
The parties are directed to the important information on the attached page.