Opinion
3:19-CV-2041-M-BH
05-10-2022
GARY SHELDON, ID # 13437-045, Plaintiff, v. MARTHA UNDERWOOD, et al., Defendants.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
By Special Order No. 3-251 , this pro se case has been automatically referred for full case management.
Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, received on May 4, 2022 (doc. 50), should be DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
In this action, Gary Sheldon (Plaintiff), a federal inmate, sued multiple employees of FCI-Seagoville in their individual and official capacities under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). (See docs. 40, 41, 47.) He alleges that the defendants unlawfully classified him as a sexual offender, which resulted in the imposition of unconstitutional conditions of confinement and violation of his constitutional rights; he alleges retaliation based on events that occurred after he filed the action. (See generally id.) Plaintiff also filed a motion for expedited service and issuance of a preliminary injunction. (See doc. 44.)
On April 29, 2022, it was recommended that his complaint be dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915A(b) as frivolous and for failure to state a claim, and that his prior motion for injunctive relief be denied. (See doc. 49.) His current motion for injunctive relief on his claims, dated April 27, 2022, was received on May 4, 2022. (See doc. 50.)
II. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction “pursuant to Rule 65(a) Fed.R.Civ.P. enjoining the defendants, their successors in office, agents and employees and all other persons employed within the BOP to comply wit [sic] APA requirements, see Castellini v. Lappin, 365 F.Supp.2d 197, 206 (D. Mass. 2005), protecting correspondence, see Martyr v. Bachik, 770 F.Supp.2d 1406 (D. Or[.] 1991).” (doc. 50 at 2-3.)
The Fifth Circuit has recognized that a plaintiff may request “injunctive relief from violation of his federal constitutional rights.” Rourke v. Thompson, 11 F.3d 47, 49 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)); see also Ramsey v. United States, No. 3:96-CV-3358-G, 1997 WL 786252, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 1997) (a plaintiff may seek injunctive or declaratory relief in addition to monetary relief in a Bivens action). Issuing an injunction “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, not to be granted routinely, but only when the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” White v. Carlucci, 862 F.2d 1209, 1211 (5th Cir. 1989) (quotation marks and citation omitted). To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs any damage the order might cause to the responding party; and (4) that the injunction will not disserve the public interest. Enrique Bernat F., S.A. v. Guadalajara, Inc., 210 F.3d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 65. If the party seeking an injunction fails to carry the “heavy burden” to show each of these prerequisites, a preliminary injunction is not warranted. Enter. Int'l, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 762 F.2d 464, 472 (5th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the April 29 recommendation, the Court found that because Plaintiff's claims against the defendants under Bivens arise in a new context, and special factors counsel against extending Bivens to them, his claims are without merit and are subject to dismissal as frivolous and for failure to state a claim. (See doc. 49 at 7-16.) For the reasons set forth in the recommendation, he cannot establish a likelihood of success on the merits of this Bivens action, and his motion for a preliminary injunction should be denied.
III. RECOMMENDATION
The Motion for Preliminary Injunction, received on May 4, 2022 (doc. 50), should be DENIED.