Opinion
NO. 01-12-00209-CR
2013-10-15
DARLA MARIE SHEFFIELD, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 122nd District Court
Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 11 CR 0361
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Darla Marie Sheffield of driving while intoxicated (DWI) and using her car as a deadly weapon. The trial court assessed punishment at 10 years' confinement. In two issues, Sheffield argues that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that she used her car as a deadly weapon and (2) the trial court erred by limiting her cross-examination of a State witness. We affirm.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a) (West 2012).
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.05 (West 2012).
Background
Benjamin Mills testified that on the morning of her arrest, Sheffield held a beer in her hand and asked him to ride with her to the liquor store. Mills agreed and entered Sheffield's Honda Passport. When they arrived at the liquor store, Sheffield bought a pint of whiskey and drank it while sitting in her car. As they drove away from the liquor store, Sheffield drove "real fast" and "reckless," swerving between lanes, and dodging other cars.
Kenneth Edwards testified that he and his girlfriend were on the same road when he saw a Honda Passport travelling at "enormous" speeds. Scared of crashing with Sheffield's car, Edwards moved his car to the side of the road. Edwards watched as Sheffield's car kept going, weaving through traffic, nearly hitting another car, and causing other drivers to break sharply to avoid a collision. Edwards called emergency assistance and told the dispatcher that Sheffield's Passport was traveling about 90 miles per hour, nearly hit another car, and that in his opinion the driver was under the influence.
The phone call between Edwards and the dispatcher was recorded and played for the jury at trial.
Inside the vehicle, Mills feared they would crash. Mills testified that he asked Sheffield to stop the car. Sheffield pulled into a Wendy's restaurant parking lot, bumping the side fender of another car. When Mills exited the car and walked inside the restaurant, Sheffield drove away. While at the Wendy's restaurant, Mills told a police officer that he had been a passenger in Sheffield's car.
Soon thereafter, William Wilkinson saw Sheffield's car moving at "a high rate of speed," not staying in one lane, and nearly hitting several cars. Wilkinson testified that he exited his vehicle, stepped into traffic, and flagged down Sheffield's car. Sheffield stopped.
According to Wilkinson, he asked Sheffield to give him her car keys. She had difficulty removing them from the ignition because her car was still in drive. Wilkinson directed Sheffield to shift gears into park. Sheffield placed the car in park, turned off the engine, and willingly handed her keys to Wilkinson. Then Sheffield yelled at Wilkinson to return her keys, but he refused. When police officers arrived at the scene, Wilkinson identified Sheffield as the driver and gave them her car keys.
Officer R. Franco testified that he saw an open pint of liquor in Sheffield's car. Sheffield swayed and would not follow directions. Officer Franco believed that Sheffield was intoxicated but did not conduct a field sobriety test because of her "erratic behavior and uncooperativeness." Sheffield refused a breath test. Officer Franco then arrested Sheffield for DWI and drove her to a hospital for a mandatory blood draw to test her blood alcohol level. Testing of the blood sample revealed that Sheffield's blood alcohol concentration was .27, more than three times greater than the legal limit.
Although Sheffield admitted at trial that she was drinking alcohol on the day of her arrest, she denied that she was driving the car. She testified that Mills was the driver. Sheffield stated that Mills was not driving recklessly. Sheffield was convicted of DWI and using her car as a deadly weapon. The trial court assessed punishment at 10 years' confinement. Sheffield appealed.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In her first issue, Sheffield contends that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to find that she used her car as a deadly weapon. She argues that (1) she was not the driver and (2) any evidence that she was driving recklessly should be given no weight.
A. Standard of review
We review the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence using a single standard of review. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); see Ervin v. State, 331 S.W.3d 49, 52-54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd). Evidence is insufficient to support a conviction if, considering the entire record in the light most favorable to the verdict, no rational fact finder could have found that each essential element of the charged offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Evidence is insufficient under this standard when the record (1) contains no evidence, or merely a "modicum" of evidence, probative of an element of the offense, or (2) conclusively establishes a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 313-14, 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2786, 2789; see also Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 518.
We presume that the fact finder resolved any conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict and defer to that resolution, provided that the resolution is rational. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 2793; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; see also Powell v. State, 194 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (holding "cumulative force" of all circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to support guilty verdict).
A "deadly weapon" is defined as "anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury."Sullivan v. State, 248 S.W.3d 746, 751 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.). Evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a deadly weapon finding if it demonstrates (1) the object meets the statutory definition of a dangerous weapon, (2) the deadly weapon was used or exhibited during the transaction from which the felony conviction was obtained, and (3) other people were put in actual danger. Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (West Supp. 2012).
B. The evidence was sufficient to show that Sheffield was the driver
Sheffield claims there was insufficient evidence that she was the driver. Mills testified that he rode in the passenger seat and Sheffield drove the car "fast" and "reckless." When the car was parked at a Wendy's restaurant, Mills told a police officer that Sheffield was the driver. That police officer confirmed Mills's testimony. Other witnesses also confirmed that Mills rode in the passenger seat. Edwards saw a Honda Passport traveling at an "enormous amount of speed." He described the driver as a white person with short, wild, gray hair. Edwards also testified that he saw the same person driving Sheffield's car at the Wendy's restaurant and parked near Murdoch's.
Wilkinson testified that Sheffield sat in the driver's seat and gave him her car keys after he flagged down her car. Wilkinson described Sheffield's hair as "mangled." Wilkinson also identified Sheffield as the driver to police officers at the scene and watched as they took her into custody. He again identified her to the jury.
Sheffield admitted that she owned the Honda Passport SUV described by the other witnesses. She contends, however, that the witnesses incorrectly identified her as the driver. She argues that Mills, a black male, was driving her car. Sheffield also argues there is insufficient evidence that she was driving because no law enforcement officers saw her operating her car before her arrest. Absence of direct evidence is not itself determinative; circumstantial evidence is no less probative, and it alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. See Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. The resolution of these factual disputes and credibility determinations are within the province of the jurors. See Id.
Sheffield conceded that she never told the arresting officer she was not the driver. Recorded emergency assistance calls and testimony from Mills, Edwards, and Wilkinson contradict Sheffield's testimony that she was not driving.
Because the record contains significantly more than a scintilla of evidence that Sheffield was driving her SUV on the day of her arrest, we hold the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding.
C. The evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's deadly weapon finding
Sheffield next argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove she used her car as a deadly weapon. The State argues the evidence is sufficient that her car was a dangerous weapon because Sheffield's car meets the statutory definition of a dangerous weapon, she was arrested for DWI while driving the car, and she put other people in actual danger.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence of a deadly weapon finding, we apply a two-part analysis: we first consider the manner in which the defendant used the vehicle in the felony; second, we consider whether the way in which the vehicle was used could have caused death or serious bodily injury. Sierra v. State, 280 S.W.3d 250, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). When evaluating the manner in which the vehicle was used, we consider several factors including intoxication, speeding, disregard of traffic signs or signals, driving erratically, and failure to control the vehicle. See Id. at 255-56.
1. Manner of vehicle use
It is undisputed that Sheffield had been drinking the day she was arrested for DWI. The State's forensic expert testified that her blood alcohol concentration was .27, more than three times the legal limit. Mills, Edwards, the officers on the scene, the in-car video, the breath-test-refusal video, and Sheffield's testimony evidence that she was intoxicated when she was arrested. Sheffield admitted to drinking "quite a bit" of brandy. The arresting officer said her speech was incoherent and she was "uncooperative." The arresting officer also discovered an open container and observed a "[s]trong odor of alcohol on her breath."
Mills, Edwards, and Wilkinson testified that Sheffield was speeding and swerved between cars. Mills testified that she was driving so fast that he was scared she was going to crash the car. Edwards's emergency assistance call and Wilkinson's testimony confirm that Sheffield drove at a high rate of speed. Edwards said that Sheffield's car was traveling at 90 miles per hour. Edwards also observed that the driver of the car did not follow traffic signals. Similarly, Wilkinson testified that Sheffield's car stopped at green lights and ran red lights. Other drivers honked at Sheffield's car when it weaved between lanes. Wilkinson testified that he had an uninterrupted, unobstructed view of Sheffield's erratic and reckless operation of her vehicle.
Based on the evidence of Sheffield's intoxication, speeding, disregard of traffic signs or signals, erratic driving, and failure to control the vehicle, we hold that a rational fact finder could reasonably conclude that Sheffield used her car in a reckless or dangerous manner.
2. Threat of death or serious bodily injury
We next consider the second prong of the Sierra test: whether there was sufficient evidence that Sheffield used her car in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. Sierra, 280 S.W.3d at 255. A car is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury if there is "evidence that others were endangered." Sierra, 280 S.W.3d at 254 (quoting Mann v. State, 13 S.W.3d 89, 92 (Tex. App.— Austin 2000), aff'd, 58 S.W.3d 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). No specific intent to use a car as a deadly weapon need be shown. Drichas, 175 S.W.3d at 798. Nor must a car "intentionally strike another vehicle to justify a deadly weapon finding." Id. at 799. However, "a hypothetical potential for danger if others had been present," is not sufficient, without more, to establish a deadly weapon finding. Sierra, 280 S.W.3d at 254. Actual danger is required. Drichas, 175 S.W.3d at 798.
Sheffield argues that Wilkinson drove his vehicle the same pace as hers and, the fact that he was not alleged to have been driving recklessly or using his car as a deadly weapon manner, leaves as "the only rational inference" that Sheffield did not use her car as a deadly weapon either. We disagree.
While riding in Sheffield's car, Mills experienced anxiety because of several near collisions with other cars. Sheffield's driving was so dangerous that he thought she would hurt someone. Edwards testified that he had to make evasive maneuvers to avoid colliding with Sheffield's car and that other drivers honked their horns and slammed on their brakes to avoid Sheffield's vehicle. He testified that Sheffield nearly hit a car when her car "jumped up on the curb" at the Wendy's restaurant. Wilkinson saw Sheffield nearly rear-end several others and caused other vehicles to slam on their breaks to avoid colliding with Sheffield's car. Believing "she was going to kill somebody," Wilkinson felt obligated to get out of his friend's car, flag her down, and take her keys to prevent her from endangering anyone else.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that Sheffield's reckless driving did endanger other motorists; there was more than a hypothetical potential for danger. See Sierra, 280 S.W.3d at 254 (internal quotation omitted). Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Sheffield used her car as a deadly weapon.
We overrule Sheffield's first issue.
Limitation on Cross-Examination
In her second issue, Sheffield contends that the trial court erred by preventing her from effectively cross-examining Wilkinson about his prior terminated position as a sheriff's deputy and an alleged six-year-old Class C misdemeanor conviction for "public servant collecting debt." Sheffield argues that she has a Sixth Amendment right to question Wilkinson.
A. Standard of review
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435 (1986); Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The scope of appropriate cross-examination is necessarily broad. See TEX. R. EVID. 611(b) ("A witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility."); Carroll v. State, 916 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Nevertheless, trial courts have considerable discretion to impose reasonable limitations on cross-examination. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S. Ct. at 1435; Lopez, 18 S.W.3d at 222.
When attacking the credibility of witnesses, cross-examination regarding prior criminal convictions is proper if the crime was a felony or involved moral turpitude, regardless of punishment, and the court determines that the evidence's probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. TEX. R. EVID. 609(a); Delk v. State, 855 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Specific instances of misconduct are admissible to demonstrate that a witness is biased or has an interest in the outcome of the case. TEX. R. EVID. 613(b); Dixon v. State, 2 S.W.3d 263, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). While great latitude should be allowed in cross-examining witnesses to reveal possible bias, prejudice, or self-interested motives to falsify testimony, the proponent bears the burden of demonstrating the relevance of the proffered evidence to the issue of bias or prejudice. Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d 9, 26-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." TEX. R. EVID. 401.
We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Oprean v. State, 201 S.W.3d 724, 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Walker v. State, 321 S.W.3d 18, 22 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. dism'd). We will uphold a trial court's decision unless it falls outside the "zone of reasonable disagreement." Oprean, 201 S.W.3d at 726; Walker, 321 S.W.3d at 22.
B. Wilkinson's misdemeanor and former employment as a deputy sheriff were not relevant
Before Wilkinson testified at trial, the State asked to approach the bench because it suspected Sheffield wanted to impeach Wilkinson by introducing evidence that he had been terminated from his employment as a Harris County Deputy Sheriff as a result of a misdemeanor conviction. According to Sheffield's counsel, Wilkinson plead guilty to a Class C misdemeanor in 2005 of acting as a public servant collecting debt. Sheffield also alleged the Sheriff's Department dismissed Wilkinson for this conviction.
At trial, Sheffield presented no evidence of the conviction or the statute under which Wilkinson was convicted.
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1. Wilkinson's misdemeanor was not relevant
Evidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record but only if the crime was a felony or involved moral turpitude. TEX. R. EVID. 609(a). Evidence of such convictions is admissible only when the trial court determines the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect to a party. Id. On cross-examination, specific instances of a witness's conduct, other than a conviction provided in Rule 609, may not be admitted for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness's credibility. TEX. R. EVID. 608(b).
Sheffield argues Wilkinson was convicted of a "public servant collecting debt" and that this crime involves moral turpitude. Sheffield argues that she should have been permitted to impeach Wilkinson with this specific instance of misconduct to demonstrate his bias, interest, motive, prejudice, or intent. See Delk, 855 S.W.2d at 704 (noting exception to Rule 609 when a witness makes statement suggesting he has never been arrested, charged or convicted of any offense).
Sheffield sought to elicit testimony that Wilkinson plead guilty to a Class C misdemeanor of acting as a public servant collecting debt; however, Sheffield did not make an offer of proof providing evidence of the conviction. See TEX. R. EVID. 103(b) (permitting offer of proof of excluded evidence, in absence of jury). Although Sheffield's counsel argued that the misdemeanor is like theft and malfeasance, thereby equating it to a crime involving moral turpitude, he provided no evidence or legal support to qualify the alleged misdemeanor conviction as a crime involving moral turpitude.
Because Sheffield presented no evidence to the trial court to demonstrate the relevance of Wilkinson's conviction, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting Sheffield's cross-examination of Wilkinson.
2. Wilkinson's employment history with Sheriff's Department was not relevant
Sheffield also argues that she should have been able to freely cross-examine Wilkinson about his employment history. She maintains that Wilkinson was dismissed because of his misdemeanor conviction and that his testimony had created a false impression with the jury.
Wilkinson's status as a former deputy was a collateral issue and "[t]he general rule is that a party is not entitled to impeach a witness on a collateral matter." Ramirez v. State, 802 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Sheffield provided no evidence of the circumstances of Wilkinson's termination from the Sheriff's Department. Nor did Sheffield present any evidence that Wilkinson's Class C misdemeanor conviction resulted in his departure from the sheriff's department.
Sheffield also argues she should have been able to cross-examine Wilkinson to correct a false impression. See Rankin v. State, 41 S.W.3d 335 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd). in Rankin, a witness lied under oath and left a false impression with the jury. Id. at 343-44. The trial court erred by preventing the defendant from correcting the false impression, but the error was harmless because the false impression did not contribute to the jury's verdict. Id. at 343, 345-46.
Unlike Rankin, Sheffield does not contend that Wilkinson lied under oath. Rather, Sheffield argues that the recorded emergency assistance phone call that identified Wilkinson as a "former peace officer" created for the jury the impression that Wilkinson was "more competent than the average citizen" to observe and comment on criminal activity. Sheffield maintains this false impression required correction. Wilkinson, however, testified truthfully about his employment with the Sheriff's Department and that he no longer works there. Wilkinson testified as a lay witness to a crime, not as a former sheriff's deputy. Sheffield presents no evidence of a false impression needing correction; therefore, the trial court did not err by limiting Sheffield's cross-examination of Wilkinson.
The trial court narrowly limited the scope of Sheffield's cross-examination of Wilkinson, only preventing questions regarding the reason Wilkinson left the Sheriff's Department. Because Sheffield presented no evidence demonstrating the relevance of Wilkinson's prior misdemeanor conviction, the circumstances surrounding his alleged dismissal from the Sheriff's Department, or a false impression needing correction, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting her cross-examination of Wilkinson.
We overrule Sheffield's second issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Harvey Brown
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Sharp and Brown. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).