Opinion
Civil Action 4:18-CV-2080
07-19-2021
MATTHEW JOHN SHEFFER, Plaintiff, v. CENTRE COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
BRANN, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Matthew John Sheffer, proceeding pro se, is an inmate currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Houtzdale (“SCI-Houtzdale”), located in Clearfield County, Pennsylvania. On June 7, 2018, Sheffer filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County against the following defendants: Pennsylvania State Trooper Jeffery Ebeck (“Trooper Ebeck”); Assistant District Attorney Crystal Hundt (“ADA Hundt”); Centre County; Stephanie Cooper, Esquire (“Attorney Cooper”); and several Centre County Judges and Magisterial District Judges (collectively referred to as the “Judicial Defendants”). (Doc. 1-1, at 5). On October 24, 2018, Trooper Ebeck removed this matter to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). (Doc. 1, at 2).
In late October and early November 2018, multiple Motions to Dismiss were filed by Defendants. (Doc. 4; Doc. 5; Doc. 8; Doc. 10). The Court granted these Motions to Dismiss on June 26, 2019. (Doc. 25; Doc. 26). After the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the Court's dismissals, Sheffer filed an Amended Complaint on January 11, 2021. (Doc. 32; Doc. 33; Doc. 44). Defendant Centre County filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint on January 22, 2021, and Defendants Crystal Hundt and Jane Doe filed a separate Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint on the same day. (Doc. 45; Doc. 46). Defendant Jeffery Ebeck filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint on January 25, 2021. (Doc. 48). The Motions to Dismiss have been fully briefed and are ripe for disposition. (Doc. 49; Doc. 50; Doc. 51; Doc. 52). For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss be denied and that this matter be stayed pending Sheffer's state court appeal.
I. The Amended Complaint
In his Amended Complaint (“the Complaint”), Sheffer brings various claims against the Defendants under the United States Constitution and state common law. (Doc. 44). Sheffer's causes of action arise from his prosecution and bond determination during criminal proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County. (Doc. 44); see Commonwealth v. Sheffer, No. CP-14-CR-0000205-2017 (Centre Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl.). According to the Complaint, Sheffer was arrested on January 24, 2017 after being charged with multiple counts of sex-based felony offenses. (Doc. 44, ¶¶ 8-16). During the preliminary hearing that followed Sheffer's arrest, his bail was set at $250,000. (Doc. 44, ¶ 18).
Sheffer submits that Defendant Ebeck, a Pennsylvania State Police Officer, lied during Sheffer's preliminary hearing. (Doc. 44, ¶ 19). Sheffer also asserts that evidence did not support his guilt, some evidence was intentionally destroyed, and that the investigation into his crimes was inadequate, but that he was still convicted on February 13, 2020. (Doc. 44, ¶¶ 19-24). On April 8, 2020, Sheffer appealed his conviction. (Doc. 44, ¶ 25). The appeal is currently before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Commonwealth v. Sheffer, 580 MAL 2020 (Pa.).
Based on these factual allegations, Sheffer brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 44, ¶ 1). Specifically, Sheffer raises (1) an unreasonable search or seizure claim under the Fourteenth Amendment arising from his detention and the subsequent search of his home, (2) a due process claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments arising from “the manipulation of the courts by destroying evidence and modifying investigative reports 6 months prior to any charge being filled (sic), ” and (3) an excessive bail claim under the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 44, ¶¶ 29-31). Sheffer brings additional causes of action under Pennsylvania state law. (Doc. 44, ¶¶ 38-65). For relief, Shaffer seeks compensation in the form of $2,000,000 plus punitive damages. (Doc. 44, ¶¶ 66-67).
II. Discussion
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the complaint's factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint's ‘bald assertions' or ‘legal conclusions…'” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). The court also need not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261. This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v. President of the United States, 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.
Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action. There is no requirement that the pleading be specific or probable. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347 (citing Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at 224, 233-234 (3d Cir. 2008). Rule 8(a) requires a “showing that ‘the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545).
With the aforementioned standards in mind, a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, ” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Nonetheless, pro se plaintiffs are still subject to the basis pleading requirements of Rule 8. Rhett v. New Jersey State Superior Court, 260 Fed.Appx. 513 (3d Cir. 2008). The Third Circuit has further instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
B. Claims Brought Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Sheffer's complaint asserts several federal civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a private cause of action with respect to violations of federal constitutional rights. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but instead provides remedies for rights established elsewhere. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States Constitution. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995).
C. Sheffer's state court appeal must be resolved prior to the Court's consideration of his claims
Defendants Centre County, Crystal Hundt, and Jane Doe assert that Sheffer's Due Process and Malicious Prosecution claims are barred because they would impugn a prior conviction. (Doc. 49, at 24-25; Doc. 50, at 22-24). Sheffer concedes that he cannot proceed on his claims until he succeeds in invalidating his prior conviction. (Doc. 51, at 6). The entirety of Sheffer's lawsuit implicates his prior conviction, so no remedy may issue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 until that conviction is invalidated.
“[H]arm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” may not be remedied under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the conviction or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). This extends to bail decisions. Giallorenzo v. Beaver County, 241 Fed.Appx. 866, 867 (3d Cir. 2007).
[A] state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)-no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)-if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the confinement or its duration.Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (emphasis in original). The Third Circuit directs that “when a claim clearly sounding in habeas corpus is combined with a § 1983 claim for damages, the district court should not dismiss the § 1983 claim, but instead may, in its discretion, stay the action until state remedies are exhausted in the habeas claim.” Melvin v. Nickolopoulos, 864 F.2d 301, 304 (3d Cir. 1988).
Here, Sheffer challenges the basis of the search of his property and his detention, the treatment of evidence which led to his conviction, and the amount of bail levied against him. (Doc. 44, ¶¶ 27-37). He alleges that his injuries are “a result of the trespass, excessive bail, false arrest, and imprisonment[.]” (Doc. 44, ¶ 32). If Sheffer were to prevail on his claims, it would imply that his conviction and the bail determination are illegitimate. These challenges to the grounds of Sheffer's conviction and the amount of his bail must be exhausted in the courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania prior to being brought before this Court. See Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006) (“In Heck, the Supreme Court held that where success in a § 1983 action would implicitly call into question the validity of conviction or duration of sentence, the plaintiff must first achieve favorable termination of his available state or federal habeas remedies to challenge the underlying conviction or sentence.”); Toulson v. Beyer, 987 F.2d 984, 987 (3d Cir. 1993). Since Sheffer's direct appeal is currently pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, it is recommended that the § 1983 claim be stayed until the direct appeal is resolved. See Melvin, 864 F.2d at 304.
Sheffer pleads that his direct appeal is still before the courts of the Commonwealth. (Doc. 44, ¶ 25); see Commonwealth v. Sheffer, 580 MAL 2020 (Pa.)
III. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that this case be STAYED until Sheffer exhausts all state remedies available in challenging his conviction. Sheffer is to notify the Court upon resolution of his state court appeals. As such, it is recommended that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss be DENIED without prejudice to their being re-filed upon the stay being lifted. (Doc. 45; Doc. 46).
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated July 19, 2021. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.