Opinion
Civil Action 2:18-cv-602
10-24-2022
DAARON SHEARS, Plaintiff, v. C.O. MOONEY, Defendant.
Judge Nora Barry Fischer
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the Court deny Plaintiff Daaron Shears' “Motion to Enforce and Uphold Mediation Agreement and/or Alternative Agreement.” (ECF 145.)
II. REPORT
A. Relevant Background
In this civil rights action, which Shears filed in 2018, he claimed that Defendant Mooney, a corrections officer at SCI Greene, violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. (ECF 64.) This case was eventually referred to the Court's prisoner pro se mediation program and the Court appointed Attorney Scott Scheinberg to represent Shears during the alternative dispute resolution process. (ECF 132.)
In June 2020, the mediator notified the Court that this case was resolved because the parties had agreed to settle it. (ECF 139.) On June 24, 2020, the Court issued an order statistically closing the case until the settlement was finalized and the parties filed the stipulation of dismissal under Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF 141.) The Court stated that “nothing contained in this Order shall be considered a dismissal or disposition of this action[.]” (Id.)
The parties, in what appears to have been an oversight, never filed a stipulation of dismissal. Thus, although this case is closed for statistical purposes, no order from the Court has been issued dismissing it.
There things stood until recently, when Shears filed the pending pro se motion to enforce the settlement agreement the parties entered into in July 2020 (“Agreement). (ECF 145.) Shears asserts that under the terms of the Agreement he was to receive a payment of $2,000.00, a transfer to SCI Frackville and entry in its Behavioral Management Unit (“BMU”) program in exchange for his release of all claims against Defendant. Shears contends that the Agreement was breached because he did not remain at SCI Frackville until he graduated from its BMU program. (Id. at 1.) As relief for the alleged breach of the Agreement, Shears, who is currently housed at SCI Rockview, seeks specific enforcement of the Agreement (that is, he seeks an order from this Court directing that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) transfer him to SCI Frackville). In the alternative, Shears seeks $2,500.00 for the alleged breach of the Agreement. (Id.)
In Defendant's response opposing Shears' motion (ECF 147), Defendant explains that the DOC housed Shears at SCI Frackville from July 21, 2020 until October 20, 2020. Shears was then transferred to SCI Rockview to continue the BMU program there because the BMU program at SCI Frackville had closed. Defendant asserts that the Agreement was not breached because it did not provide that Shears would remain at SCI Frackville permanently or until he completed its BMU program.
Defendant points out that Shears did not seek to enforce the settlement agreement in October 2020 when he was transferred to SCI Rockview. Rather, Shears waited about 19 months and until he was housed at SCI Forest before filing the pending motion. (The DOC recently transferred Shears back to SCI Rockview.)
The Agreement states that the DOC will transfer Shears to SCI Frackville within 60 days and that once there “he will enter the same level of the [BMU program] that he was in at SCI Smithfield before being transferred. Once Plaintiff successfully completes the BMUeither at SCI Frackville or another State Correction Institution-he will be afforded programming opportunities based on this prescriptive programing plan, subject to availability.” (ECF 154 at p. 2, ¶ 1, emphasis added.)
In Shears' reply (ECF 150), he insists that the Agreement was breached because under its alleged terms he “was to graduate from” SCI Frackville's BMU program. (Id. at p. 1, ¶ 2.) Shears does not contest the fact that the DOC housed him at SCI Frackville between July 21, 2020 and October 20, 2020 and that SCI Frackville's BMU program closed for at least some time (although he asserts it reopened not long after he was transferred to a different institution).
At the Court's direction Defendant filed the Agreement under seal. (ECF 154.) Shears has moved for a hearing on his motion to enforce the Agreement. (ECF 151, 155.) The Court will deny his request for a hearing by separate order because there is no basis for one.
B. Discussion
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), as codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3626, comprehensively revised the rules of injunctive litigation in prison condition cases, including setting a standard governing the term of prison injunctions and other prospective relief and requiring courts to make findings about the relationship between prospective relief provisions and the legal violations that they are intended to correct. Neither party discusses the PLRA's application to Shears' motion, but the Court must do so because the PLRA expressly addresses the remedies available to a party that is alleging, as Shears is here, that a private settlement agreement has been breached.
The PLRA provides that private settlement agreements that involve prospective relief, such as the one into which the parties entered in this case, lack any judicial enforcement in federal court “other than the reinstatement of the civil proceeding that the agreement settled.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(2)(A). That is because under the PLRA, injunctive settlements must meet the standards and finding requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a) in order to be enforceable in federal court. This means that the court must find that the settlement is narrowly drawn, necessary to correct federal law violations, and the least intrusive way to do so. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). Settlements that satisfy the PLRA's standards and finding requirements are entered by the court as consent decrees and are judicially enforceable by that court. Id. § 3626(c)(1). See also Ingles v. Toro, 438 F.Supp.2d 203, 214-15 (S.D. N.Y. 2006); Honorable Harold Baer, Jr., Arminda Bepko, A Necessary and Proper Role for Federal Courts in Prison Reform: The Benjamin v. Malcolm Consent Decrees, 52 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 3, 51-55 (2008) (available on Westlaw).
Shears does not seek the reopening or reinstatement of this civil action. Rather, he seeks specific performance of the Agreement or, in the alternative, monetary damages to compensate for the alleged breach.
Section 3626(a)(1)(A) provides: “Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.”) (emphasis added). The PLRA defines “prospective relief” as “all relief other than compensatory monetary damages.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(7). It defines “relief” as “all relief in any form that may be granted or approved by the court, and includes consent decrees but does not include private settlement agreements.” Id. § 3626(g)(9).
Section 3626(c)(1) provides: “In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, the court shall not enter or approve a consent decree unless it complies with the limitations on relief set forth in subsection (a).”
The Court did not enter a consent decree in this case. Rather, the parties settled this action by private agreement that was not approved and entered by the Court in accordance with the PLRA's requirements for prospective relief. The PLRA does not prevent parties from reaching such private settlement agreements. However, such agreements are not subject to the district court's enforcement “other than the reinstatement of the civil proceeding that the agreement settled.” Id. § 3626(c)(2)(A); see also id. § 3626(g)(6) (defining private settlement agreement as “an agreement entered into among the parties that is not subject to judicial enforcement other than the reinstatement of the civil proceeding that the agreement settled[.]”); Ingles, 438 F.Supp.2d at 214-15 (critiquing the inability of a federal court to enforce a private settlement agreement in a case governed by the PLRA).
Section 3626(c)(2)(A) provides: “Nothing in this section shall preclude parties from entering into a private settlement agreement that does not comply with the limitations on relief set forth in subsection (a), if the terms of that agreement are not subject to court enforcement other than the reinstatement of the civil proceeding that the agreement settled.” (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the PLRA bars this Court from granting Shears the relief he seeks, which is specific enforcement of the provision of the Agreement he contends was breached or monetary damages for the alleged breach. Shears is not without a remedy, however. If he wants to litigate his claim that the Agreement was breached, he may file a breach of contract claim in state court. Id. § 3626(c)(2)(B) (“Nothing in this section shall preclude any party claiming that a private settlement agreement has been breached from seeking in State court any remedy available under State law.”); Ghana v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., No. 01-cv-1620, 2011 WL 3608633, *3 (D. N.J. Aug. 15, 2011) (under the PLRA, “if a settlement agreement is not by way of consent decree, a party asserting a breach of that settlement agreement is limited to moving for reinstatement of the action in federal court or filing an action in state court for breach of contract.”) (internal quotations omitted); Ingles, 438 F.Supp.2d at 215.
Finally, the Court notes that in the Agreement the parties included a provision providing “that the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania will retain jurisdiction to enforce a dispute arising from this Settlement Agreement and General release and will include language to that effect in the proposed dismissal order.” (ECF 154 at p. 4, ¶ 8.) As discussed above, the parties never filed a stipulation of dismissal along with a proposed dismissal order with language to that effect. Nor has the Court located any precedential authority that would support the conclusion the parties could simply contract around the PLRA requirements for court ordered prospective relief. Under the PLRA, the only remedy available to a party when seeking enforcement of a private injunctive settlement agreement (apart from the reinstatement of the civil proceeding that the agreement settled) is a breach of contract suit in state court.
In the Court's June 24, 2000 order (ECF 141), the Court stated that it “expressly retains jurisdiction in this matter to consider any issue arising during the period when settlement is being finalized, including, but not limited to, enforcing settlement.” That period has long since expired since the Agreement was signed by the parties in July 2020.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the above, it is respectfully recommended that the Court deny Shears' “Motion to Enforce and Uphold Mediation Agreement and/or Alternative Agreement.” (ECF 145.) Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Report and Recommendation to file objections to it. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).