Opinion
2:22-cv-01624-MMD-NJK
12-20-2022
RAYMOND SHARPE, Plaintiff, v. LIEUTENANT RUIZ, et al., Defendants.
SCREENING ORDER
MIRANDA M. DU CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I. SUMMARY
Pro se Plaintiff Raymond Sharpe, who is incarcerated in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections, has submitted a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1-1, 4.) The matter of the filing fee will be temporarily deferred. The Court now screens Sharpe's Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Sharpe has submitted two identical copies of his Complaint. (ECF Nos. 1-1, 4-1.)
II. SCREENING STANDARD
Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which an incarcerated person seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings, however, must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
In addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a federal court must dismiss an incarcerated person's claim if “the allegation of poverty is untrue” or if the action “is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the court applies the same standard under § 1915 when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or an amended complaint. When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).
Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the court takes as true all allegations of material fact stated in the complaint, and the court construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). Allegations of a Pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). While the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id.
Additionally, a reviewing court should “begin by identifying pleadings [allegations] that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” Id. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
Finally, all or part of a complaint filed by an incarcerated person may be dismissed sua sponte if that person's claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable (e.g., claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).
III. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT
In his Complaint, Sharpe sues multiple Defendants for events that took place while he was incarcerated at High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”). (ECF No. 1-1 at 1-4.) Sharpe sues Lieutenant Ruiz, Warden Calvin Johnson, Director Charles Daniels, and Deputy Director Brian Williams, Sr. (Id.) Sharpe brings five claims and seeks $2 million in damages. (Id. at 6-13.)
The Complaint alleges the following. Sharpe was housed in Unit 5AB at HDSP. (Id. at 4.) One day, Ruiz called Sharpe into the “unit office” to speak with him about a “housing issue.” (Id. at 4, 6.) At the time, Unit 5AB was on lockdown, and inmates were supposed to remain in their cells. (Id. at 4.) During their conversation, Ruiz asked Sharpe, “So I heard you had a problem with my people, is this true?” (Id.) Sharpe said he did not know what Ruiz was talking about. (Id. at 4-5.) Ruiz then dismissed Sharpe from the office and instructed the “tower officer” to let three Sureno gang members out of their cells. (Id. at 5.) One of the Surenos entered the office and “briefly” spoke to Ruiz. (Id.) Sharpe saw Ruiz hand a “shank” to the Sureno. (Id.)
As Sharpe was walking back to his cell, one of the Surenos attacked him. (Id.) The other two Surenos “joined in,” and the Sureno with the shank began stabbing Sharpe in the back. (Id.) Ruiz left his office and joined the fray, tripping Sharpe and then “slam[ming]” him. (Id.) This allowed the Surenos to “get on top of” Sharpe and “stab[ ] [him] more.” (Id.) Sharpe was stabbed a total of nine times. (Id.) Ruiz “orchestrated” the attack in an attempt to “have [Sharpe] killed.” (Id. at 6.)
Once the attack ended, Ruiz took Sharpe to “operations” as he “bled out.” (Id. at 5.) Believing that he would not “get any medical attention at all,” Sharpe called a mandown. (Id.) As a result, several nurses showed up and treated him. (Id.)
Based on these allegations, Sharpe asserts (i) an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, (ii) an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, (iii) a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, and (iv) a claim for conspiracy to violate constitutional rights. (Id. at 6-10.) The Court liberally construes the Complaint as also raising an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Ruiz and a supervisory liability claim against Johnson, Daniels, and Williams.
A. Eighth Amendment-Failure to Protect
Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). To establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must establish that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to serious threats to the inmate's safety. See id. at 834. To demonstrate that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to a serious threat to the inmate's safety, the prisoner must show that “the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate . . . safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [the official] must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. Prison officials may not escape liability because they cannot, or did not, identify the specific source of the risk; the serious threat can be one to which all prisoners are exposed. See id. at 843.
This standard “does not require that the guard or official believe to a moral certainty that one inmate intends to attack another at a given place at a time certain before that officer is obligated to take steps to prevent such an assault.” Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). The officer must, however, “have more than a mere suspicion that an attack will occur.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, “[i]t will not suffice for [p]laintiff merely to show that someone should have protected him, or that the attack on him was someone's fault; he must show that the defendants knew they should have protected him but failed to do so.” Dixon v. Harrington, Case No. 11-cv-01323, 2013 WL 28639, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2013) (collecting cases).
Sharpe states a colorable failure-to-protect claim. He alleges that during a conversation in the unit office, Ruiz asked him whether he “had a problem with my people.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 4.) Sharpe said he did not know what Ruiz was talking about, whereupon Ruiz dismissed him from the office and allowed three Sureno gang members to leave their cells. (Id. at 5.) One of the Surenos entered the unit office, where he received a shank from Ruiz. (Id.) The Surenos then attacked Sharpe, stabbing him with the shank Ruiz had provided. (Id.) After the attack began, Ruiz left his office and, instead of breaking up the fight, tripped Sharpe and “slam[med]” him. (Id.) As a result of Ruiz's intervention, the Surenos were able to “get on top of” Sharpe and stab him more. (Id.) These allegations are sufficient to plead that Ruiz “knew [he] should have protected [Sharpe] but failed to do so.” Dixon, 2013 WL 28639, at *4 (emphasis omitted). Thus, the failure-to-protect claim will proceed against Ruiz.
B. Eighth Amendment-Excessive Force
When a prison official stands accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the question turns on whether force was applied in a goodfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it may also be proper to consider factors such as the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. See id. at 7. Although an inmate need not have suffered serious injury to bring an excessive force claim against a prison official, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force. See id. at 9-10.
Sharpe states a colorable excessive force claim. He alleges that Ruiz “orchestrated” the Surenos' attack in an attempt to have him killed. (ECF No. 1-1 at 6.) In support of this assertion, Sharpe alleges that (i) during a conversation in the unit office, Ruiz asked him whether he “had a problem with my people”; (ii) shortly before the attack, Ruiz handed a shank to one of the Sureno assailants; and (iii) during the attack, Ruiz assisted the Surenos rather than protecting him. (Id. at 4-5.) These allegations support a plausible inference that Ruiz ordered the three Sureno gang members to attack Sharpe. Moreover, as a result of Ruiz's order, the Surenos allegedly stabbed Sharpe nine times. (Id. at 5.) Thus, Sharpe sufficiently alleges that Ruiz directed the use of force against him maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm. See Dillingham v. Garcia, Case No. 1:19-cv-00461-AWI-GSA, 2021 WL 971331, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2021) (finding that the defendant's “conduct-directing inmate Soto to attack Plaintiff-is an act of excessive force against Plaintiff using inmate Soto as a weapon”), adopted by 2021 WL 3109991 (E.D. Cal. July 22, 2021). The excessive force claim will therefore proceed against Ruiz.
C. Eighth Amendment-Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment and “embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.'” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when he acts with “deliberate indifference” to the serious medical needs of an inmate. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828. “To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective standard-that the deprivation was serious enough to constitute cruel and unusual punishment-and a subjective standard- deliberate indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012).
To establish the first prong, “the plaintiff must show a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). To satisfy the deliberate indifference prong, a plaintiff must show “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Id. “Indifference may appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). When a prisoner alleges that delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, the prisoner must show that the delay led to further injury. See Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that “mere delay of surgery, without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical indifference”).
Sharpe fails to state a colorable claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. He alleges that, following the stabbing, Ruiz took him to “operations” as he “bled out.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 5.) Sharpe believed that he would not “get any medical attention at all,” so he called a man-down. (Id.) As a result, several nurses showed up and treated him. (Id.) The gravamen of this claim appears to be that, by taking Sharpe to “operations” rather than the infirmary, Ruiz caused a delay of medical treatment for Sharpe's stab wounds. But Sharpe fails to allege facts showing that this delay “caused substantial harm.” Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Thompson v. Henderson, Case No. 06-cv-1157, 2010 WL 3361181, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2010) (“A 45-minute delay, by itself, does not constitute deliberate indifference, absent evidence establishing that the delay was harmful”) (internal quotation marks omitted), adopted by 2010 WL 3366192 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2010). Sharpe does not allege that, because he was forced to call a man-down in “operations,” he suffered any additional injuries. Nor does Sharpe say how long he waited for medical treatment after Ruiz took him to “operations.” Thus, the Court dismisses the deliberate-indifference claim without prejudice and with leave to amend.
D. Fourteenth Amendment-Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is essentially a direction that all similarly situated persons be treated equally under the law. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An equal protection claim may proceed under one of two theories. First, a plaintiff may state an equal protection claim by alleging that he was intentionally discriminated against based on his membership in a protected class. See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001); Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). Alternatively, if the challenged action did not involve a suspect classification, a plaintiff may still state an equal protection claim by alleging that (i) the plaintiff is a member of an identifiable class, (ii) the plaintiff was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated, and (iii) there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); SeaRiver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 2002).
Sharpe fails to state a colorable equal protection claim. He alleges that Ruiz violated his right to equal protection by ordering the Sureno gang members to attack him. (ECF No. 1-1 at 10.) Sharpe does not plausibly allege, however, that Ruiz ordered the attack because of Sharpe's membership in a protected class. To be sure, Sharpe claims that, shortly before the attack, Ruiz asked him whether he “had a problem with my people.” (Id. at 4.) But it is unclear whether “my people” refers to an ethnic group or simply to the Sureno gang that carried out the attack. Thus, this remark is insufficient to support a plausible inference that Ruiz ordered the assault because Sharpe belonged to a protected class. Additionally, Sharpe fails to allege facts supporting a class-of-one equal protection claim. In particular, he includes no allegations suggesting that he is a member of an identifiable class or that he was treated differently from other similarly situated inmates. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the equal protection claim without prejudice and with leave to amend.
E. Conspiracy to Violate Constitutional Rights
“To state a claim for a conspiracy to violate one's constitutional rights under section 1983, the plaintiff must state specific facts to support the existence of the claimed conspiracy.” Burns v. Cnty. of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989). The plaintiff must show “an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights,” and “[t]o be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.” Crowe v. Cnty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 440 (9th Cir. 2010). Moreover, the plaintiff must establish that an “actual deprivation of his constitutional rights resulted from the alleged conspiracy.” Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Sharpe states a colorable claim for conspiracy to violate constitutional rights. He alleges that Ruiz directed three Sureno gang members to attack him. Sharpe supports the existence of this alleged conspiracy with several factual allegations, including that (i) during a conversation in the unit office, Ruiz asked him whether he “had a problem with my people”; (ii) shortly before the attack, Ruiz handed a shank to one of the Sureno assailants; and (iii) during the attack, Ruiz assisted the Surenos rather than protecting him. (ECF No. 1-1 at 4-5.) Liberally construed, these allegations are sufficient to plead that Ruiz and the Sureno gang members had “an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights,” and that an “actual deprivation of [Sharpe's] constitutional rights resulted from the alleged conspiracy.” Crowe, 608 F.3d at 440; Hart, 450 F.3d at 1071. Thus, the conspiracy claim will proceed against Ruiz.
F. Supervisory Liability
A defendant is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. There is no respondeat superior liability under [§] 1983.” Id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”).
“A showing that a supervisor acted, or failed to act, in a manner that was deliberately indifferent to an inmate's Eighth Amendment rights is sufficient to demonstrate the involvement-and the liability-of that supervisor.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2011). “Thus, when a supervisor is found liable based on deliberate indifference, the supervisor is being held liable for his or her own culpable action or inaction, not held vicariously liable for the culpable action or inaction of his or her subordinates.” Id. at 1207. As such, “a plaintiff may state a claim against a supervisor for deliberate indifference based upon the supervisor's knowledge of and acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by his or her subordinates.” Id.
Sharpe fails to state a colorable supervisory liability claim. He does not allege that Warden Johnson, Director Daniels, and Deputy Director Williams were directly involved in the events described in the Complaint. Instead, Sharpe vaguely asserts that Johnson “didn't do his job,” and that Daniels and Williams are “aware of what's been occurring at HDSP.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 7.) Sharpe also contends that these Defendants “share[d] a duty to protect [him] and to insure that [he is] free of cruel and unusual punishment.” (Id. at 8.) These conclusory allegations are insufficient to plead that Johnson, Daniels, and Williams “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. Thus, the Court dismisses the supervisory liability claim without prejudice and with leave to amend.
Because Sharpe fails to state any colorable claims against Johnson, Daniels, or Williams, the Court dismisses them from the entirety of this action without prejudice.
G. Leave to Amend
Although the Court grants Sharpe leave to amend, it does not grant him leave to amend in any way that he sees fit. Sharpe has leave to amend to allege additional facts supporting (i) the Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, (ii) the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, and (iii) the supervisory liability claim. The Court does not give Sharpe leave to assert new claims.
If Sharpe chooses to file an amended complaint, he is advised that an amended complaint supersedes (replaces) the original complaint and, thus, the amended complaint must be complete in itself. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that “[t]he fact that a party was named in the original complaint is irrelevant; an amended pleading supersedes the original”); see also Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that for claims dismissed with prejudice, a plaintiff is not required to reallege such claims in a subsequent amended complaint to preserve them for appeal). Sharpe's amended complaint must contain all claims, defendants, and factual allegations that he wishes to pursue in this lawsuit. Moreover, Sharpe must file the amended complaint on this Court's approved prisoner civil rights form, and it must be entitled “First Amended Complaint.”
The Court notes that if Sharpe chooses to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies, as outlined in this order, he will file the amended complaint within 30 days from the date of entry of this order. If Sharpe chooses not to file an amended complaint curing the stated deficiencies, this action will proceed only against Ruiz on (i) the Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, (ii) the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, and (iii) the claim for conspiracy to violate constitutional rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is therefore ordered that a decision on the application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 4) is deferred.
The Clerk of Court is directed to file the Complaint (ECF No. 1-1).
It is further ordered that Defendants Johnson, Daniels, and Williams are dismissed from the entirety of this action without prejudice.
It is further ordered that the Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.
It is further ordered that the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim is dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.
It is further ordered that the supervisory liability claim is dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.
It is further ordered that the Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim will proceed against Defendant Ruiz.
It is further ordered that the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim will proceed against Defendant Ruiz.
It is further ordered that the claim for conspiracy to violate constitutional rights will proceed against Defendant Ruiz.
It is further ordered that, if Sharpe chooses to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies of his Complaint, as outlined in this order, Sharpe will file the amended complaint within 30 days from the date of entry of this order.
The Clerk of Court is directed to send to Sharpe the approved form for filing a § 1983 complaint, instructions for the same, and a copy of his Complaint (ECF No. 1-1). If Sharpe chooses to file an amended complaint, he will use the approved form and he will write the words “First Amended” above the words “Civil Rights Complaint” in the caption.
It is further ordered that, if Sharpe chooses to file an amended complaint, the Court will screen the amended complaint in a separate screening order. The screening process may take several months.
It is further ordered that, if Sharpe fails to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies outlined in this order, this action will proceed only against Defendant Ruiz on (i) the Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, (ii) the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, and (iii) the claim for conspiracy to violate constitutional rights.