Opinion
12906 Dkt. No. B25527/17 Case No. 2019-03966
01-19-2021
Andrew J. Baer, New York, for appellant. Geoffrey P. Berman, Larchmont, for respondent. Dawne A. Mitchell, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Riti P. Singh of counsel), attorney for the child.
Andrew J. Baer, New York, for appellant.
Geoffrey P. Berman, Larchmont, for respondent.
Dawne A. Mitchell, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Riti P. Singh of counsel), attorney for the child.
Gische, J.P., Oing, Moulton, Mendez, JJ.
Order of disposition, Family Court, New York County (Patria Frias–Colon, J.), entered on or about June 6, 2019, which, upon a finding of permanent neglect, terminated respondent mother's parental rights to the subject child and transferred custody of the child to petitioner agency and the Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York for the purpose of adoption, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
The finding of permanent neglect is supported by clear and convincing evidence. The record shows that the agency expended diligent efforts by discussing with respondent the necessity of completing her service plan, scheduling visitation, and by referring her for mental health services and substance abuse treatment (see Matter of Tion Lavon J. [Saadiasha J.], 159 A.D.3d 579, 73 N.Y.S.3d 48 [1st Dept. 2018] ). The record also shows that respondent permanently neglected the child despite the agency's diligent efforts by failing to comply with mental health services, substance abuse treatment, and to visit consistently (see e.g. Matter of Malcolm M.L. [Ruby C.], 177 A.D.3d 442, 112 N.Y.S.3d 720 [1st Dept. 2019] ; Matter of Zariah M.E. [Alexys T.] 171 A.D.3d 607, 608, 96 N.Y.S.3d 855 [1st Dept. 2019] ).
A preponderance of the evidence supports the Family Court's determination that it was in the child's best interest to terminate respondent's parental rights and free her for adoption (see Matter of Star Leslie W., 63 N.Y.2d 136, 147–148, 481 N.Y.S.2d 26, 470 N.E.2d 824 [1984] ). At the time of the proceedings, the child had spent most of her life in foster care, not having resided with the mother since she was, at most, two years old, and was well-bonded with the foster mother who wishes to adopt her (see Matter of Jada Serenity H., 60 A.D.3d 469, 874 N.Y.S.2d 113 [1st Dept. 2009] ).
A suspended judgment was not appropriate here given the length of time the child has been in foster care and the strong ties she has formed with her foster mother and because there was no evidence that respondent had a realistic and feasible plan to provide an adequate and stable home for the child (see e.g. Matter of Felicia Malon Rogue J. [Lena J.], 146 A.D.3d 725, 726, 46 N.Y.S.3d 66 [1st Dept. 2017]; see also e.g. Matter of Tion Lavon J. [Saadiasha J.], 159 A.D.3d 579, 579–580, 73 N.Y.S.3d 48 [1st Dept. 2018] ).