Opinion
CASE NO. 935 CRD-2-89-10
SEPTEMBER 20, 1990
The claimant was represented by Jay B. Levin, Esq. and F. Jerome O'Malley, Esq., Dupont, Tobin, Carberry O'Malley.
The respondents were represented by John W. Greiner, Esq., Murphy Beane.
This Petition for Review from the October 24, 1989 Finding and Award of the Commission for the Second District was heard April 27, 1990 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners A. Thomas White, Jr., and James Metro.
OPINION
The respondent city's appeal contends that under the Heart and Hypertension statute, Sec. 7-433c, certain chapter 568 benefits are not payable. It therefore contests the award of Sec. 31-308(d) specific indemnity benefits for permanent partial impairment of the heart, Sec. 31-284b fringe benefits for group health insurance and Sec. 31-283a rehabilitation benefits.
Morgan v. East Haven, 208 Conn. 576 (1988) is cited in support of the contention that no permanent partial impairment should be paid. But a later decision, Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181 (1990) aff'g 7 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 84, 703 CRD-4-88-3 (1989) hold claimants could receive Sec. 31-308(d) specific indemnity benefits under Sec. 7-433c. Felia is directly on point and is dispositive of this issue.
Another Supreme Court decision rendered after Morgan, Deschnow v. Stamford, 214 Conn. 394 (1990) aff'g 7 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 86, 706 CRD-7-88-33 (1989) is similarly dispositive of the Sec. 31-284b issue. The court there ruled those benefits payable in Sec. 7-433c cases.
Deschnow also addresses the rehabilitation benefits issue by implication:
In Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181 (1990) this court . . . reviewed the relationship between Sec. 7-433c and chapter 568. The crucial legislative instruction in Sec. 7-433c is its provision that a disabled police officer or firefighter . . . `receive from his municipal employer compensation and medical care in the same amount and the same manner as that provided under chapter 568 if such . . . disability was caused by a personal injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment and was suffered in the line of duty and within the scope of his employment.' We construed Sec. 7-433c to require that, once Sec. 7-433c coverage is established the measurement of an employee's economic benefits must be the same as the measure of damages for economic benefits provided to a disabled employee under chapter 568. Id., 185. Deschnow, supra at 397.
The Felia and Deschnow reasoning applies equally to rehabilitation benefits.
We therefore affirm the award below and remand to the district for the award of interest due under the statute.
Commissioners A. Thomas White and James Metro concur.