Opinion
CASE NO. 07CV2107-MMA (BLM).
July 28, 2009
On October 10, 2006, Plaintiffs Andrew Shalaby and Sonia Dunn-Ruiz filed a product liability action in Alameda County Superior Court against Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. ("Newell") and The Home Depot, Inc. ("Home Depot"). (Doc. No. 1.) Defendants then removed the case to the Northern District of California, after which Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") that kept Home Depot as a named Defendant but substituted Irwin Industrial Tool Company, Inc. ("Irwin") as a defendant in place of Newell. (Id.) Thereafter, Bernzomatic, a division of Irwin, sued Worthington and Western Industries, Inc. for indemnity in a third-party complaint. (Id.) On October 30, 2007, the Northern District of California transferred the action to this Court. (Id.)
For simplicity, Irwin Industrial Tool Company Inc., The Home Depot, Inc., Bernzomatic, Western Industries, and Worthington Industries shall be collectively referred to as "Defendants" unless noted otherwise.
BACKGROUND
This action arises out of events that occurred on the night of April 21, 2006, in which Mr. Shalaby was engulfed in flames while he used a handheld torch attached to a MAPP gas cylinder. (Id.) It is undisputed that Third-Party Plaintiff Bernzomatic manufactured the handheld torch; however, it remains in dispute whether Worthington Industries or Western Industries manufactured the MAPP gas cylinder. Initially, Mr. Shalaby alleged that he was using the torch to light a campfire. He claimed that he kneeled downward over the fire ring, depressed the igniter button, heard a hissing sound, then a loud boom, and was then engulfed in flames. (Shalaby Depo. I at 141:2-12, 145:6-12, 146:3-16, 147:17-22, 151:14-152:4, 159:17-160:8.) Within a few days of the accident, an unknown staff member at the campground discarded the torch and MAPP gas cylinder. (Ratliff Depo. 37:15-17.)Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Robert Anderson, concluded that the accident was the result of a defective braze joint in the MAPP gas cylinder. Dr. Anderson did not conclude that there were any defects in the torch itself. After the close of discovery, however, Mr. Shalaby began alleging that immediately prior to depressing the trigger button, he lightly tapped the tip of the torch against a piece of firewood at the moment of the explosion. (Consolidated Opp. [Doc. No. 172] at 4:14-16.) Based on Mr. Shalaby's new recollection of how the accident occurred, Dr. Anderson conducted new tests, which led him to the new conclusion that the fracture groove on the torch, in addition to the braze joint on the MAPP Cylinder, was defective. Shortly after the close of discovery, which included depositions of Mr. Shalaby and Dr. Anderson, Plaintiffs turned the new report over to Defendants. Defendants thereafter sought to exclude the untimely report. (Doc. No. 46.) Plaintiffs then moved to supplement their expert discovery with the new report. (Doc. No. 93.) They also moved for leave to amend the complaint to assert the new factual allegations. (Doc. No. 98.)
On March 11, 2009, in a thorough and well-reasoned order, Magistrate Judge Major denied Plaintiffs' motion to supplement their expert discovery with Dr. Anderson's supplemental report. (Doc. No. 131.) On March 27, 2009, Magistrate Judge Major affirmed her March 11 ruling by denying Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. (Doc. No. 146.) In accordance with Magistrate Judge Major's rulings, the Court thereafter denied Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. (Doc. No. 204.) On July 7, 2009, the Court also found as moot Bernzomatic's motion to preclude Plaintiffs from relying upon Dr. Anderson's untimely supplemental report and the opinions and conclusions contained therein based on Magistrate Judge Major's and this Court's previous rulings. (Doc. No. 207.)
Now pending before the Court are three motions. The first motion is Worthington's motion to exclude Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Robert Anderson under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). (Doc. No. 58.) The second motion is Worthington's motion to exclude Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Alison Vredenburgh under Daubert. (Doc. No. 53.) The third motion is Irwin Industrial Tool Company, Inc. and The Home Depot's Daubert motion for summary judgment, which also seeks to exclude the proffered testimony of both Drs. Anderson and Vredenburgh. (Doc. No. 45.) Bernzomatic contends that summary judgment is warranted because Plaintiffs' experts' testimony is inadmissible under Daubert, and they cannot establish a prima facie case for products liability without the expert testimony. (Id.) For purposes of simplicity, the Court shall address these motions together.
Because Bernzomatic, the third party plaintiff in this action, is a division of Irwin and the manufacturer of the torch, to the extent that the Court refers to the subject motion for summary judgment is shall refer to it as "Bernzomatic's motion."
On May 25, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a lengthy document entitled "Plaintiffs' Request for Judicial Notice." (Doc. No. 200.) Defendants promptly objected to this filing, arguing that it is "obviously a camouflaged motion for summary judgment." (Doc. No. 202.) The Court agrees. "A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." FED. R. EVID. 201(b). The facts for which Plaintiffs seek judicial notice are clearly in dispute, and the request appears to be nothing more than an untimely motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' request is DENIED.
The Court notes that much of Plaintiffs' opposition focuses on Mr. Shalaby's new factual recollections and frequently refers to Dr. Anderson's excluded untimely supplemental report. In accordance with the Court's previous rulings, the Court shall disregard all arguments and references pertaining to the excluded evidence when addressing the merits of Defendants' various motions at issue in this order.
In conjunction with its reply brief, Bernzomatic filed several objections to evidence in Plaintiffs' opposition. (Doc. No. 192-1.) To the extent that the Court discusses and relies on evidence in this Order, it finds that the evidence is admissible and overrules any objection to it.
DISCUSSION
I. Motions to Exclude Expert Testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 A. Legal Standard
Rule 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. Pursuant to Rule 702, a witness qualified as an expert in "scientific . . . knowledge" may testify thereto if: "(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data; (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case." Fed.R.Evid. 702.The trial court acts as a gatekeeper to the admission of expert scientific testimony under Rule 702. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579-80. The court must conduct a preliminary assessment to "ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant but reliable." Id. at 589. This two-step assessment requires consideration of whether: (1) the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid (the reliability prong); and (2) whether the reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue (the relevancy prong). Id. at 592-93; Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226, 1228 (9th Cir. 1998).
The Daubert analysis focuses on the principles and methodology underlying an expert's testimony, not on the expert's conclusions. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. However, the Supreme Court has cautioned that "conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another." General Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). As such, "[a] court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." Id. Nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires the admission of opinion evidence connected to existing data "only by the ipse dixit of the expert." Id.
B. Dr. Robert Anderson
1. Qualifications
According to his curriculum vitae ("CV"), Dr. Anderson has several chemistry related degrees, as well as a Ph.D. in Metallurgy from Stanford University. (Anderson Decl. at Ex. 1.) He is also licensed as a registered Metallurgical Engineer in the State of California. Formerly, Dr. Anderson was the department chair of the Department of Materials Engineering at San Jose State University, where he was also a full professor, and served as an associate professor at Stanford University. (Id.) Dr. Anderson has also held positions in several professional associations, including: Director and Fellow of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, where he also served as the former chairman of the Engineering Sciences Section; Fellow and Past President of the National Academy of Forensic Engineers; and Diplomate and Director of the Institute of Forensic Engineering Sciences. (Id.) It appears from the motions pending before the Court that Dr. Anderson's qualifications are not in dispute. Thus, the Court finds that Dr. Anderson's education, training, and experience, meet the standards for qualification as an expert witness in metallurgy under Fed.R.Evid. 702.
Metallurgy is the scientific study and technology of extracting metals from ores, refining them for use, and creating alloys and useful objects from them. American Heritage Science Dictionary 2002.
2. Proffered Testimony
Defendants challenge the admissibility of Dr. Anderson's testimony on the grounds that the proffered testimony fails to meet the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Daubert. As stated by the Daubert Court, there is a two-part inquiry under Rule 702 for determining the admissibility of proffered expert opinion testimony. Expert testimony must be "not only relevant, but reliable." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
a. Reliability
The first prong the Court must address is whether the proffered testimony is reliable. Reliable testimony must be grounded in the methods and procedures of science and signify something beyond "subjective belief or unsupported speculation." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. The inferences or assertions drawn by the expert must be derived by the scientific method. Id. In essence, the court must determine whether the expert's work product amounts to be "good science." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995) (" Daubert II") (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593). In Daubert I, the Supreme Court outlined factors relevant to the reliability prong, including: (1) whether the theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether the theory or methodology employed is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. The Supreme Court emphasized the "flexible" nature of this inquiry. Id. at 594. As later confirmed in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999): "Daubert's list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case. Rather the law grants a district court the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination." Id. at 141-42.
In additional, the Supreme Court Daubert case shall be referred to hereinafter as "Daubert I."
i. Testing
Dr. Anderson contends that the braze material between the center valve housing and the cylinder is the weak element in the assembly. (Anderson Decl. at Ex. 5, p. 4.) He theorizes that the braze material is weak because it has voids and lacks sufficient fusion to the cylinder wall and valve housing. (Id.) In assessing the porosity in the brazed joint, Dr. Anderson performed several tests as described in his initial report. (Id. at 3.) In microphotographs of the brazing material, black spots appear, which Dr. Anderson contends are voids rising above mere porosity resulting from poor "wetting" and incomplete penetration of the braze joint. (Id. at 3.) Dr. Anderson stated that his understanding of how Worthington applies the braze paste to its MAPP gas cylinders was based on the description provided by Mr. Gentry, but his description of the process was at odds with how Mr. Gentry described the process. (Id.) Dr. Anderson also conceded at his deposition that he did not conduct any independent investigation into the process. (Anderson Depo. at 178:7-17.)
It does not appear from the motions before the Court that Defendants are contesting the quality of the various metallurgical tests conducted by Dr. Anderson. Thus, the Court finds that Dr. Anderson's metallurgical tests were conducted in accordance with generally accepted principles.
Moreover, Dr. Anderson provides no basis for his conclusion that the voids make the braze material unacceptably weak. He admitted in his deposition that he had not conducted any tests to determine what level of porosity or voids would make a brazed joint unreasonably weak and that he did not know of any standards regarding acceptable amounts of porosity in a brazed joint. (Anderson Depo. at 179:5-182:23.) He was also unable to name any study or test to support his opinion that the levels of porosity or voids made the braze joint insufficiently strong. (Id.) Yet, Dr. Anderson concluded that the voids found in the braze material were unacceptable. As the Ninth Circuit has stated, "something doesn't become `scientific knowledge' just because it's uttered by a scientist; nor can an expert's self-serving assertion that his conclusions were `derived by the scientific method' be deemed conclusive[.]" Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1315-16.
Dr. Anderson also hypothesizes that one of the reasons the voids occur is because the melting point of the braze paste is less than the temperature of the braze furnace. (Id. at 164:1-165:5.) However, Defendants contend that Dr. Anderson's opinion is based on an erroneous understanding of the composition of the braze paste. (Worthington Mot. to Exclude at 11:18-12:18.) Dr. Anderson asserts that the braze is a copper, nickel compound. (Anderson Decl. at Ex. 5, p. 3; Anderson Depo. at 164:16-23.) Stephen Gentry, Worthington's Regulatory Affairs Manager, and Dr. Thomas Eager both attest to the fact that the braze contains phosphorous in addition to copper and nickel. ( Gentry Decl. at ¶ 7; Eager Decl. at ¶ 23.) The Court also notes that the results of Dr. Anderson's EDS test reflected the presence of phosphorous in the braze. (Anderson Decl. at Ex. 5.) Defendants contend that the existence of phosphorous gives the braze paste a higher melting point than that contemplated by Dr. Anderson. (Gentry Decl. at ¶ 8.) Despite being apprised of the apparent discrepancy multiple times, Dr. Anderson has never addressed the existence of phosphorous in the braze paste or Defendants' arguments about how this affects the melting point of the paste. Plaintiffs' Opposition fails to address the argument in its entirety.
Mr. Gentry's previous positions with Worthington include Quality Control Manger and Project Engineer. His responsibilities at Worthington have included the design and development of propane cylinders and valves. (Gentry Decl. at ¶ 1.)
Defendants also contend that Dr. Anderson did not perform a sufficient amount of testing and what limited testing he did conduct does not support his theory that a failure in the braze joint was the cause of Mr. Shalaby's injuries. (Worthington's Mot. to Exclude [Doc. No. 58] at 17:14-18:9.) Dr. Anderson based his opinions in part on "pull tests" performed by one of his associates, Chris Schneider, on two cylinders. (Anderson Depo. at 66:15-24.) During the first test, Mr. Schneider applied lateral force to the cylinder with a torque wrench prior to conducting the pull test, which caused the cylinder to fail in the parent metal. (Id. at 56:20-57:4; 68:15-69:13.) During the second test, Mr. Schneider performed the pull test without applying lateral force to the cylinder, which caused the cylinder to fail in the brazed joint. (Id. at 68:15-69:1; 72:3-5.) Dr. Anderson maintained that this testing allowed him to rule out the possibility of a failure in the parent metal of the torch Mr. Shalaby was using at the time of the accident. (Anderson Depo. 52:11-53:2; 68:15-72:1.)
The Court finds several issues with these tests, as well as the conclusions Dr. Anderson reached as a result of the testing. As an initial matter, the Court finds the second test suspect. In connection with its motion to exclude, Worthington provided a video of the two "pull tests." (Huang Supp. Decl., Ex. P.) In the video depicting the second test where the failure allegedly occurred in the parent metal, there is an initial failure which causes a flame for approximately 30 seconds. At that point, an individual — presumably Mr. Schneider — walks from the rear of the cylinder to the left side of the cylinder and after a few moments, grabs the wrench and pulls it downward, which results in another failure that causes a large flame ball that goes out almost instantly. Id. Having reviewed Dr. Anderson's deposition testimony, there is no reference to or explanation of this second failure. Worthington's expert Dr. Thomas Eager contends that the initial failure was in the parent metal, and that the second failure was in the braze joint. (Worthington's Mot. to Exclude at 8:7-23.) He asserts that the braze joint only failed because it had been substantially weakened by the flame that was caused by the initial failure at the time when the second force was applied. (Id.) Plaintiffs' opposition does not address the issue. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the testing factor cuts against a finding of reliability.
Although the Court does not find it particularly clear, it appears that Plaintiffs are alleging both a manufacturing and design defect. As to the alleged design defect, Dr. Anderson opines that the MAPP cylinder has a "design defect" because the "valve is in a high-stress area where it meets the cylinder," and contends that it should be "redesign[ed] to make it stronger." (Anderson Depo. at 138:12-22.) Dr. Anderson testified at his deposition that this design defect could be rectified by riveting or flaring the valve back or putting a shield or "doughnut" to spread out forces on the cylinder wall. (Id. at 139:1-140:3.) Dr. Anderson, however, admitted that he had not designed a cylinder with the proposed changes, nor had he seen such a design before in a MAPP gas cylinder, or in any other flammable gas cylinder. (Id. at 138:23-25; 140:6-11.) Dr. Anderson also admitted that he had not tested and was unaware of any testing of the proposed design. (Id. at 140:15-20.) Thus, the testing factor cuts against the reliability of Dr. Anderson's proffered testimony regarding this alternative design.
ii. Peer Review and Publication
Plaintiffs first point to Dr. Anderson's consideration of the 49 C.F.R. § 178.65 specifications, which provide the specifications for non-reusable (non-refillable) cylinders, as well as a report entitled "The Behaviour of `Bernzomatic' MAPP and Propane Cartridges When Exposed to Heat and Flame." (Pls.' Opp. at 30:18-26; Anderson Decl., Ex. 3, 4.) As an initial matter, the report about the exposure of MAPP gas cylinders to heat and flame does not pertain to the strength of the braze joint and, as Dr. Anderson conceded, only enabled him to rule out the theory that Mr. Shalaby kicked the torch into the fire pit. (Anderson Decl. at ¶ 4.)
The specifications provide several requirements relating to the overall strength of the braze joint:
(iii) Brazed seams must be assembled with proper fit to ensure complete penetration of the brazing material throughout the brazed joint.
(iv) Minimum width of brazed joints must be at least four times the thickness of the shell wall.
(v) Brazed seams must have design strength equal to or greater than 1.5 times the minimum strength of the shell wall.
(vi) Welded seams must be properly aligned and welded by a method that provides, clean uniform joints with adequate penetration.
(vii) Welded joints must have the strength equal to or greater than the minimum strength of the shell material in the finished cylinder.49 C.F.R. § 178.65(c)(2). Although the specifications are relevant, they do not "support" Dr. Anderson's theory. Assuming Dr. Anderson's testimony that the black spots that appear in the metallurgy tests are indeed voids, there is still brazing material from the center valve housing down into the interior of the cylinder shell, which appears to comply with the requirement for complete penetration "throughout the brazed joint." The requirements that would seem most relevant to the question of whether the brazed joint was defective would relate to the overall strength of the brazed joint, as well as the strength of the brazed joint as compared to the strength of the shell wall. Dr. Anderson, however, conducted no test to determine the strength of the brazed joint or the strength of the brazed joint compared to the shell wall, and indicated during his deposition that he "[a]bsolutely do[es] not need to do that." (Anderson Depo. 180:1-9; 181:5-21.) Accordingly, it does not appear that the regulations provide support for Dr. Anderson's theory.
Dr. Eagar contends that the black areas, which are magnified 100 to 200 times, are in fact iron phosphides. (Eagar Decl. at ¶¶ 20-22.)
Plaintiffs also place great emphasis on the fact that in reaching his conclusions, Dr. Anderson relied on several other cases of litigation that arose out of similar incidents involving MAPP gas cylinders. (Pls.' Opp. at 22:19-24.) In his initial report, Dr. Anderson identified seven cases involving MAPP gas cylinders that he reviewed. (Anderson Decl., Ex. 5.) In his deposition, Dr. Anderson stated that his opinion was supported after reviewing nine other alleged incidents of braze failure. (Anderson Depo. at 76:11-25; 81:11-83:17.) On cross examination, however, Dr. Anderson conceded that he had no information about six of these incidents beyond a review of the complaint, and he admitted that he did not know whether any of these cases involved a failure of a braze joint. (Id. at 83:19-86:2; 100:7-104:4; 112:21-115:8.)
For the three other incidents, Dr. Anderson stated that he had only reviewed photographs of the accident cylinders and admitted that he could not know for certain whether the cylinders failed in the braze joint without physically inspecting them. (Id. at 95:23-96:5; 108:13-19; 111:9-21.) Dr. Anderson did, however, indicate that he contacted experts in two of those cases as a means of bolstering his own opinion that the cylinders failed in the braze joint. (Id. at 88:3-10; 109:1-5.) As to the Glenn case, however, Dr. Anderson admitted that he did not ask Dr. Carr, Glenn's expert, whether the failure was in the braze joint. (Id. at 88:3-10.) As to the Venderlinde case, Dr. Anderson stated at his deposition that he spoke to Venderlinde's expert, Dr. Thomas Crane, who he says told him that the failure occurred in the braze joint. (Id. at 109:1-8.) Defendants dispute whether this is in fact true. (Worthington Reply at 3:18-20; Ergo Decl. at ¶¶ 2-3.) Regardless of the veracity of Dr. Anderson's testimony, however, it does not appear to the Court that the Venderlinde case supports Dr. Anderson's theory. Plaintiffs have provided nothing to the Court to show that the facts of the Venderlinde case are similar to those here, or anything to show how Dr. Crane reached the conclusion that the failure was in the braze material. The burden is on the proponent of the expert to establish, by "a preponderance of the evidence[,] . . . that the expert is qualified to render the opinion. . . ." Heston v. City of Salinas, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96095, at *4-*5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007) (citing Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 588-90). Plaintiffs cannot meet this burden by merely stating, without any evidentiary support, that Dr. Crane's opinion in an unrelated case supports Dr. Anderson's theory.
Finally, Plaintiffs provide no evidence to indicate that Dr. Anderson's two reports, which were prepared in connection with this litigation, were peer reviewed. Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor cuts against a finding that Dr. Anderson's theory is reliable.
As to Dr. Anderson's proposed design for the design defect claim, Dr. Anderson conceded at his deposition that he was not aware that the proposed design had been the subject of any peer review or recognition by a professional publication. (Anderson Depo. at 140:21-141:8.) Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor also cuts against the reliability of Dr. Anderson's proposed alternative design.
iii. Rate of Error
In cases where a specific scientific technique is used, the court should "consider the known or potential rate of error." Daubert I, 509 at 594. Here, Plaintiffs have provided no evidence or testimony regarding any known or potential rate of error for the "pull tests" conducted by Dr. Anderson. Attached to Dr. Anderson's declaration is an excerpt from a 1985 edition of "Metals Handbook Desk Edition," published by American Society for Metals. (Anderson Decl., Ex. 2.) Having examined the portion of the excerpt relating to the microhardness testing procedure that Dr. Anderson utilized in this case, there is no discussion about the rate of error. Moreover, Dr. Anderson only performed two tests in this case, which were not identical in nature. Thus, it is impossible to discern the rate of error in the tests conducted by Dr. Anderson himself. Without any tangible evidence of error rates for the "pull tests" performed by Dr. Anderson, this factor also weighs against a finding of reliability as to Dr. Anderson's theory that the braze material failed in this case.
iv. General Acceptance
In Exhibit 2 attached to Dr. Anderson's declaration, Dr. Anderson states that the included reference manual is "generally accepted and used by professional engineers." ( Anderson Decl., Ex. 2.) Although the Court agrees that a microhardness test is a generally accepted way to test the strength of the brazing material, valve, and cylinder, the Court finds this factor has little weight in light of the problems with the particular tests performed here as noted supra. v. Litigation Generated Opinions
In addition to the four factors discussed supra, the Ninth Circuit has also found one "very significant" additional factor to be "whether the experts are proposing to testify about matter growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying." Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1317. Dr. Anderson is a paid consultant who conducted the research underlying his report for the purposes of this litigation only. In Daubert II, the Ninth Circuit cautioned that "If the proffered expert testimony is not based on independent research, the party proffering it must come forward with other objective, verifiable evidence that the testimony is based on `scientifically valid principles.' One means of showing this is by proof that the research and analysis supporting the proffered conclusions have been subjected to normal scientific scrutiny through peer review and publication." Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1317-18. Plaintiffs have clearly not met this burden.
vi. Other considerations
In addition to the foregoing factors, the Court also finds that one additional consideration weighs against a finding of reliability. Defendants contend that Dr. Anderson's testimony should be excluded as unreliable because he disregarded the testimony of Park Rangers Ratliff and Stephens, the only two individuals who saw the torch after the accident occurred.
Shortly after the explosion occurred, Ratliff and Stephens both observed the torch. Ratliff, one of the rangers who observed the torch after the accident, testified that prior to becoming a park ranger at Campland he was a certified welder for the Navy and was familiar with the torch used by Mr. Shalaby. (Ratliff Depo. at 56:1-57:57:23; 66:2-10.) Ratliff testified at his deposition that after the incident, he examined the torch and cylinder for approximately one hour. (Id. at 66:20-23.) Ratliff testified that he observed that the torch had a "right-angle bend to it," and that there was a crack in the cylinder at the bottom thread level of the cylinder. (Id. at 25:16-25; 28:1-15.) Ratliff further testified that the crack was "forced open, outward . . . like an explosion outward," (Id. at 67:21-69:24), and that "[i]t appeared to me that the torch . . . might have been banged against something that might have adjusted the thread area of where the torch nozzle and the canister would connect and . . . may have weakened that area in the process of being banged." (Id. at 70:10-19.) Stephens, who had also used MAPP gas on several occasions, testified that the cylinder was "burst open . . . just beyond the threads of the neck." (Stephens Depo. at 41:9-18; 42:14-43:1.) He described the split as measuring "approximately two and a half inches long" and "maybe a quarter-inch wide." ( Id. at 42:14-43:1.) Ratliff also testified that another staff member at the campground threw the torch and cylinder away two or three days after the accident. (Ratliff Depo. at 37:15-17.)
Dr. Anderson testified that he did not consider Stephens' testimony because "that would be the result of an explosion and not a mechanical failure of a poorly designed joint." (Anderson Depo. at 150:12-16.) Dr. Anderson also indicated that he did not accept Stephens' testimony regarding the length of the crack and would not opine about the length of the crack in Mr. Shalaby's cylinder. (Id. at 150:23-151:17.) In addition, Dr. Anderson indicated that he did not believe Mr. Ratliff was describing a fractured surface that was curled outward. ( Id. at 150:17-22.) Dr. Anderson admitted that both Ratliff's and Stephens' description of the torch and cylinder "would suggest that there was some explosion on the inside consistent with perhaps dropping it in the fire leading the pressure to build up. The pressure does not vent properly, and it builds up and it opens up." (Id. at 144:15-22.) Dr. Anderson also conceded that his theory was directly contradicted by Ratliff's and Stephens' description of the cylinder. (Id. at 146:25-147:7.) When asked why he discounted both descriptions, Dr. Anderson responded:
I believe their deposition was [sic] taken the following April, about a year later. I think the recollection of . . . Randy Stephens was rough. And I think that I put more weight on Warren Ratliff, mainly because he seemed to have worked with the material before. And I got a different opinion reading the Ratliff depo. . . . Besides, there would be a tremendous amount of smoke issues on it. The outer surface would be burned. It just didn't seem reasonable to me.
(Id. at 147:8-24.)
The Court finds it curious that Dr. Anderson disregarded the testimony of the only two witnesses who actually saw Mr. Shalaby's torch after the accident occurred. Both rangers consistently testified that the crack appeared to be blown outward, and both indicated that it looked as if the crack was caused by an explosion. The Court also notes that Paramedic Joe Russo, who treated Mr. Shalaby at the accident scene, testified that Mr. Shalaby stated he had kicked the cylinder into the campfire which resulted in an explosion, thus further corroborating the testimony of the rangers. (Russo Depo. at 14:3-25; 22:6-23:7.) Dr. Anderson, however, dismissed this as a possibility because it was "farfetched." (Anderson Depo. at 137:137:1-17.) Dr. Anderson later testified that he did not consider the theory that Mr. Shalaby threw the cylinder into the fire pit because he considered it "very bizarre and not credible." (Id. at 187:7-14.) Dr. Anderson, however, conceded that there were documents and testimony to support this "bizarre" theory, and acknowledged that while he chose to believe part of Ranger Ratliff's testimony, he chose to disregard his testimony regarding abuse as "one of the bizarre issues . . . Because I've seen other failures, pictures that we've just passed out today from other situations, that this is a critical area, that it tends to fail. . . ." (Id. at 188:7-25.) In light of Dr. Anderson's complete disregard of the state of the torch and cylinder as described by the only witnesses who viewed them after the accident, and Dr. Anderson's failure to give a reasonable explanation for failing to consider these descriptions, the Court finds this as yet one more reason why his opinions are not reliable. "The gatekeeping inquiry must be tied to the facts of a particular case." Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 942 (9th Cir. 2007.) "[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert." General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
When closely scrutinized, Dr. Anderson's opinion that the braze material failed in this case rests on one microhardness test — which Plaintiffs have failed to show was conducted according to generally accepted standards — that resulted in a failure of the braze material; an alleged statement made by an expert to Dr. Anderson in an unrelated case that a failure in the braze joint caused the failure of the cylinder in that case; and results from metallurgy tests that Dr. Anderson contends show the existence of voids or porosity in the braze material. From this, he leaps to the conclusion that the voids or porosity make the braze material in these MAPP gas cylinders unreasonably weak, that this porosity will cause the braze material to fail, and that Mr. Shalaby's cylinder failed in the braze joint. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds no indicia of reliability with respect to Dr. Anderson's proffered testimony that the braze material was the source of failure in Mr. Shalaby's cylinder. In addition, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have completely failed to provide any evidence that Dr. Anderson's testimony regarding his proposed alternative design is reliable. Accordingly, the Court, in its gatekeeping capacity, finds that Dr. Anderson's proffered testimony does not comport with Rule 702 or Daubert in terms of reliability.
b. Relevancy
Although the Court has determined that Dr. Anderson's proffered testimony is not reliable, thus making its relevance here minimal, there are additional reasons to find his proffered testimony irrelevant. The relevancy, or "fit," prong requires that the testimony be "relevant to the task at hand, . . . i.e., that it logically advances a material aspect of the proposing party's case." Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597). Relevancy requires opinions that would assist the trier of fact in reaching a conclusion necessary to the case. See Kennedy, 161 F.3d at 1230; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92. In light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Daubert, the Ninth Circuit has since construed the relevancy prong to be broader than the threshold relevancy determination under Rule 402. Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1231 n. 17 (stating that the Supreme Court "obviously did not intend the second prong of Rule 702 to be merely a reiteration of the general relevancy requirement of Rule 402"). In reaching such a conclusion, the Ninth Circuit cited the Supreme Court's recognition "that scientific expert testimony carries special dangers to the fact-finding process because it `can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it.'" Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595). With the above principles in mind, the Ninth Circuit advised, "Federal judges must therefore exclude proffered scientific evidence under Rules 702 and 403 unless they are convinced that it speaks clearly and directly to an issue in dispute in the case, and that it will not mislead the jury." Id.
Defendants contend that without having the torch that caused Mr. Shalaby's injuries, Dr. Anderson's opinions and conclusions are irrelevant. (Defs' Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. No. 45] at 6:22-7:7.) Specifically, the Defendants contend that in the absence of the actual torch, Plaintiffs cannot establish the essential element of causation. While the Court disagrees with this assertion, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs have failed to show that Dr. Anderson's opinion is sufficiently linked to the facts of this case. Dr. Anderson acknowledged during his deposition he did not know if the cylinder Mr. Shalaby was using at the time of the accident was the same as the exemplar cylinders that he examined and tested. Indeed, Dr. Anderson could not even state what year Mr. Shalaby's torch was manufactured. (Anderson Depo. 185:12-186:6.) This glaring omission makes it doubtful whether Dr. Anderson's "reasoning or methodology can be applied to the facts in issue." Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 592-93. This, combined with Dr. Anderson's admission that he disregarded the descriptions of the post-accident torch and cylinder by the only available eyewitnesses, shows that even were the Court to find Dr. Anderson's testimony reliable, it certainly would be of limited relevance to this cause of action. Although the issue is not before the Court, the braze material may indeed be unreasonably weak; however, this fact does not answer the ultimate question of what caused Mr. Shalaby's torch to fail, nor will it assist the jury in answering the question. Accordingly, because the Court finds Dr. Anderson's proffered testimony to be unreliable and irrelevant, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants' Daubert motions to exclude his testimony.
B. Dr. Alison Vredenburgh
Dr. Alison Vredenburgh, Ph.D., is Plaintiffs' expert on consumer warnings. In her report, Dr. Vredenburgh discusses the warnings on the torch. ( Gould Decl., Ex. 9.) She states that the warnings are in an illegible 6 point font, "which is too small for most people to read." (Vredenburgh Depo. at 72:24-25.) She also opines that the torch packaging should not have indicated that it was ideal for lighting grills if it in fact was not. (Id. at 78:21-79:10.) Dr. Vredenburgh also noted that the warnings should have included information indicating how to protect oneself in the event of an explosion. (Id. at 128:22-129:2.)
The Court notes that Plaintiffs' opposition contends that Dr. Vredenburgh opined that the warning on the cylinder should have advised the user to "wear proper clothing." (Pls.' Opp. at 36:10-16.) The Court, however, finds no support for Plaintiffs assertion in Dr. Vredenburgh's testimony.
Defendants seek to exclude Dr. Vredenburgh's proffered testimony on grounds that she is not qualified because she "does not possess the necessary skill, experience, training, or education required to establish her as an expert under the standards of FRE 702 to offer testimony pertaining to the design of a MAPP gas cylinder." (Worthington's Mot. to Exclude [Doc. No. 53] at 3:16-21; Bernzomatic's Mot. for Summ. J. at 17:24-19:21.) They also seek to exclude her proffered testimony on grounds that it is not relevant, and thus cannot meet the standards of Rule 702 and Daubert. (Worthington's Mot. to Exclude at 3:22-4:9; Bernzomatic's Mot. for Summ. J. at 19:22-21:17.)
1. Qualifications
Bernzomatic disputes Dr. Vredenburgh's qualifications to render an opinion in this case because "she lacks the necessary expertise and qualifications on various aspects of this case: the product, the industry, and the target audience." (Bernzomatic's Mot. for Summ. J. at 19:17-19.) Worthington's motion only disputes Dr. Vredenburgh's qualifications to testify as it relates to gas cylinder warnings. (Worthington's Mot. to Exclude at 3 n. 1.)
Rule 702 requires that a prospective witness be "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education[.]" Fed.R.Evid. 702; see also Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1315. The Ninth Circuit has defined this as the threshold issue in determining whether a witness may come "before the jury cloaked with the mantle of an expert[]" under Rule 702, and has cautioned that "care must be taken to assure that a proffered witness truly qualifies as an expert, and that such testimony meets the requirements of [that] Rule[.]" Jinro America Inc. v. Secure Investments, Inc., 266 F.3d 993, 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
Dr. Vredenburgh's CV indicates that she:
consults with businesses and industry in areas including product warning design, injury prevention, machine guarding, job design, job and task analysis, program evaluation, training, risk management, Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), organizational development and assessment, and research instrument development and validation.(Gould Decl., Ex. 8, at 2.) She is also a consultant for product liability, personal injury, and employment cases in the areas of "human factors, safety, and industrial-organizational psychology." (Id.) Although Dr. Vredenburgh lists a number of different industrial-organizational consulting jobs she has had in the past, only one appears to bear any resemblance to this litigation. According to her CV, in 2006, Dr. Vredenburgh served as a warnings consultant for Broco, Inc., for whom she "developed and tested warnings regarding an underwater cutting torch for the Owner's Manual and Packaging." In her June 13, 2008 report, Dr. Vredenburgh stated that her expertise is "based upon a combination of education, original theoretical research, and professional employment." (Gould Decl., Ex. 9, at 6.)
Worthington's only attack to Dr. Vredenburgh's qualifications arises in the context of her reference to a defect where the torch connects to the cylinder in her June 2008 report. (Worthington's Mot. to Exclude at 3:4-21; Gould Decl., Ex. 9, at 4.) Plaintiffs have failed to show that Dr. Vredenburgh is qualified to testify regarding the design of the MAPP gas cylinder. Dr. Vredenburgh even conceded that she is not an engineer and that design issues are outside her expertise. (Vredenburgh Depo. at 120:16-124:11.) Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Worthington's motion to exclude Dr. Vredenburgh's proffered testimony regarding the design of the MAPP gas cylinder.
Bernzomatic contends that Dr. Vredenburgh is unqualified to testify to any matters arising in this case because she has no knowledge of the product, she does not know how the product works, she is unfamiliar with the product audience, and she has no knowledge about the industry. (Bernzomatic's Mot. for Summ. J. at 17:25-19:21.) Upon review of the evidence, Bernzomatic's position appears to have credence. Dr. Vredenburgh testified that she had never operated a hand-held torch and cylinder. (Vredenburgh Depo. at 20:7-16; 29:17-19.) She also testified that the only time she could remember seeing a hand-held torch being operated was "more than 17 years ago." (Id. at 20:17-21:15.) She testified incorrectly how the torch is used, stating that she thought a user had to apply an external ignition source to light it. ( Id. at 32:1-6.) Dr. Vredenburgh also demonstrated that she was unfamiliar with the audience when she stated that the only time she had ever spoken to a user of a handheld torch and cylinder about his use of the product was "many, many years ago." (Id. at 36:25-29:3.)
In addition, Dr. Vredenburgh's education and experience seem largely inapposite to this litigation. Plaintiffs, who are proffering the testimony, state in their opposition, "her specialty extends beyond traditional psychology in that she specializes in organizational psychology centered on social psychology, personnel, and human resources." (Pls.' Opp. at 35:1-3.) A review of her CV demonstrates a strong emphasis in human factors and ergonomics. (Gould Decl., Ex. 8.) It is unclear how this background makes Dr. Vredenburgh qualified to testify about warning labels on a torch and/or gas cylinder.
The only experience that appears to have any relation to this litigation is Dr. Vredenburgh's consulting job that related to an underwater cutting torch for which she was tasked with formulating and revising warnings. (Vredenburgh Depo. at 29:5-16; 44:17-46:14; 49:1-4.) Dr. Vredenburgh testified that the underwater torch did not have any attached gas cylinder, but rather received gas via a tube that is hooked to a compressor on a boat at the surface. (Id. at 15-25.) Due to a non-disclosure agreement, Dr. Vredenburgh was unable to discuss further any of the work she performed on the product in detail. (Id.) Bernzomatic contends that this is not enough to find Dr. Vredenburgh qualified because the underwater torch "obviously is directed at a different audience as a hand-held torch, does not present the same explosion hazards under water, and would not be purchased to light a campfire or a grill under water." (Bernzomatic's Mot. for Summ. J. at 19:2-7.) The Court agrees. Any connection between the two types of torches is tenuous at best, and Dr. Vredenburgh's experience with instruction manuals for an underwater torch is certainly insufficient to qualify her as an expert on warning labels for handheld torches attached to a gas cylinder.
2. Daubert Standards
Even were the Court to find that Dr. Vredenburgh is qualified to testify, her proffered testimony would ultimately be excluded as unreliable and irrelevant under the Daubert standards. Dr. Vredenburgh admitted during her deposition that she did not collect any empirical data, did not conduct any testing, did not conduct any surveys, did not seek data from the manufacturers, did not review any peer-reviewed literature, and she did not conduct any other kind of research prior to forming her opinion. (Vredenburgh Depo. at 9:9-10:11; 12:18-25; 34:11-13; 39:4-12; 40:6-11; 42:13-15.) Moreover, Dr. Vredenburgh described a detailed process of how she would normally evaluate warnings for her clients, but then admitted that because she was not hired to develop any warnings in this case, she did not follow this process in reaching her conclusion that the warning was inadequate. (Id. at 49:6-50:19.)
Moreover, it is doubtful whether her opinion would even be relevant. Her opinions regarding the torch and cylinder warnings do not speak clearly to the issue of causation because she could not say that the lack of warning resulted in Mr. Shalaby's injuries. Dr. Vredenburgh stated during her deposition that she could not say that the accident would not have occurred if the label on the torch was larger than a 6 point font. (Id. at 73:7-11.) She also stated that she could not say whether removing the statement that the torch was ideal for lighting grills would have prevented Mr. Shalaby's injuries. (Id. at 78:21-79:10.) Indeed, her theory hinged on the assumption that Mr. Shalaby purchased the torch for the sole purpose of lighting a grill or campfire. (Id. at 77:11-78:5.) However, Mr. Shalaby testified that he also purchased the torch for "storage in the motor home because [he] could do mechanical repairs if there's a breakdown." (Shalaby Depo., 346:14-347:3.) Moreover, when Dr. Vredenburgh stated that the warnings should have included information about how to protect oneself in an explosion, she failed to suggest anything specific that could have been added that would have prevented Mr. Shalaby's injuries. (Vredenburgh Depo. at 128:22-129:2.) Indeed, when asked what warning could have been added to the cylinder or torch that could have prevented the accident, she responded, "I don't know why it failed, so I don't know that a warning would have helped." (Id. at 125:5-22.)
Without being able to establish this essential element of a failure to warn cause of action, Dr. Vredenburgh's testimony is of limited relevance to this litigation. "Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, . . . the trial judge must determine at the outset . . . whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue." Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 592. The fact in issue for Plaintiffs' failure to warn cause of action is causation, i.e., whether the failure to warn Mr. Shalaby resulted in his injuries. Even if Dr. Vredenburgh's opinions were scientifically valid, her testimony is excludable because it does not shed light on the causation issue. Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS Bernzomatic's and Worthington's motions to exclude Dr. Vredenburgh's proffered testimony.
II. Bernzomatic's Summary Judgment Motion A. Legal Standard
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment only if he can demonstrate that (1) "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact," and (2) the moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A material issue of fact is one that raises a question that a trier of fact must answer to determine the rights of the parties under the substantive law that applies. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248. The initial burden is on the moving party to show that both prongs are satisfied. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23. If the moving party fails to discharge this initial burden, summary judgment must be denied, and the court need not consider the nonmoving party's evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).
If the moving party meets this initial burden, the nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment merely by demonstrating "that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 ("The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's position is not sufficient."). Rather, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by `the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The inferences to be drawn from the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2002). "Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
B. Bernzomatic's Motion for Summary Judgment
Bernzomatic argues that without Plaintiffs' experts, Plaintiffs have "failed in their duty to present a prima facie claim against Bernzomatic, and summary judgment is therefore appropriate." (Bernzomatic's Mot. for Summ. J. at 21:22-23.) In their opposition, Plaintiffs contend that summary judgment is inappropriate because strict liability applies, the defects can be established without expert testimony under the "consumer expectations test," and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. (Pls.' Opp. at 39:17-45:11.)
Federal district courts sitting in diversity apply state law to product liability claims. Stilwell v. Smith Nephew, Inc., 482 F.3d 1187, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2007). In California, a manufacturer, distributor, or retailer is liable in tort if a defect in the manufacture or design of its product causes injury while the product is being used in a reasonably foreseeable way. Soule v. General Motors Corp., 8 Cal. 4th 548, 560 (Cal. 1994). Under California law, "A product liability case must be based on substantial evidence establishing both the defect and causation (a substantial probability that the design defect, and not something else, caused the plaintiff's injury) and where . . . the complexity of the causation issue is beyond common experience, expert testimony is required to establish causation." Stephen v. Ford Motor Co., 134 Cal. App. 4th 1363, 1365 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Dimond v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 65 Cal. App. 3d 173, 177 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976.) Mere possibility alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case. Jones v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 163 Cal. App. 3d 396, 403 (1985).
Plaintiffs first contend that this case is a strict liability case. (Pls.' Opp. at 39:17-41:18.) In order for strict liability to attach to a manufacturer of a product, however, causation must be established. Sparks v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 32 Cal. App. 4th 461, 472 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). Because the Court has excluded the proffered testimony of both Dr. Anderson and Dr. Vredenburgh, Defendants contend that there is no triable issue of fact on the element of causation. Plaintiffs, however, contend that "Defendants have not met their burden of providing any evidence of unforeseeable misuse." Plaintiffs' argument is unpersuasive. Defendants have successfully demonstrated that Plaintiffs failed to make a showing sufficient to establish the element of causation. Because Plaintiffs will ultimately bear the burden of proof on this element at trial, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to present competent summary judgment evidence on the element of causation. Much of Plaintiffs' argument is directed to Plaintiffs' excluded theory that the fracture groove was defective and the cause of Mr. Shalaby's injuries. Plaintiffs do not even address the alleged defect in the brazed joint, and fail to connect their theory that the braze material failed in the cylinder to the facts of their case. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden. Considering that Plaintiffs have not presented competent summary judgment evidence on the element of causation, the Court need not consider whether Defendants have carried their burden of demonstrating that a triable issue of fact exists on their affirmative defense of unforeseeable misuse. Accordingly, the Court finds this argument to be without merit.
Next, Plaintiffs contend that causation can be established without expert testimony under the "consumer expectations test." (Pls.' Opp. at 41:19-43:18.) In California, "the consumer expectations test is reserved for cases in which the everyday experience of the product's users permits a conclusion that the product's design violated minimum safety assumptions, and is thus defective regardless of expert opinion about the merits of the design." Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 567. In applying the test, the California Supreme Court has advised, "The crucial question in each individual case is whether the circumstances of the product's failure permit an inference that the product's design performed below the legitimate, commonly accepted minimum safety assumptions of its ordinary consumers." Id. at 568-69.
Under the facts of this case, the consumer expectations test is not applicable. It is undisputed that the cylinder can explode for reasons other than a defect, e.g. abuse. An ordinary consumer of a torch and MAPP gas cylinder cannot reasonably expect that a cylinder will be designed to be indestructible and incapable of exploding. Moreover, Plaintiffs' theory of defect is one of technical and mechanical detail. Plaintiffs' theory seeks to establish that porosity in the braze material exists, the level of porosity makes the braze joint in the cylinder unreasonably weak, and that this is what caused Mr. Shalaby's injuries. "Indeed, both parties assumed that quite complicated design considerations were at issue, and that expert testimony was necessary to illuminate these matters." Id. at 570. A jury would be unable to assess the porosity in a cylinder without the benefit of an expert, nor would it be able to understand how the strength of the braze joint is affected by porosity. Like in Soule, this is simply not a case where the test should be applied.
The Court notes that much of Plaintiffs argument revolves around their theory that the fracture groove was defective. Based on the prior orders of this Court, and the fact that the Court has denied Plaintiffs' request for leave to amend, the Court did not consider any arguments relating to this theory. Thus, the only theory that shall be addresses is Plaintiffs' theory that the braze joint in the MAPP gas cylinder failed.
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur precludes the entry of judgment in Bernzomatic's favor. (Pls.' Opp. at 43:19-44:10.) Plaintiffs' reliance on this doctrine, however, is misplaced. In California, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is defined by statute as "a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence." Cal. Evid. Code § 646(b). The presumption arises only when the following circumstances exist: "(1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; [and] (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of plaintiff." Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist., 4 Cal. 4th 820, 825-26 (Cal. 1993). Here, the torch was not in the "exclusive control of the defendant," and Plaintiffs have not established that Mr. Shalaby did not contribute to the accident. Plaintiffs assert that the burden shifts to Defendants to prove that Mr. Shalaby's injuries were caused by misuse. (Pls.' Opp. at 44:7-10.) This contention, however, for the reasons noted above, is erroneous. Accordingly, this argument is also without merit.
Without the testimony of their experts, Plaintiffs have not presented any admissible evidence to create a triable issue of material fact regarding whether the torch was defective. Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS Bernzomatic's motion for summary judgment on all claims.
III. Additional Pending Motions
The Court notes that there are three additional motions that have been filed in this action but are not yet fully briefed. These motions are Worthington's motion for summary judgment against Plaintiffs (Doc. No. 49) and cross motions for summary judgment on the Third Party Complaint brought by Worthington and Bernzomatic (Doc. Nos. 44, 55). Although there does not appear to be Ninth Circuit case law that addresses the unique procedural posture of this case, several of our sister circuits have found quite clearly that a court is deprived of subject matter jurisdiction over the third party complaint when summary judgment is entered in favor of the original defendant/third party plaintiff because such a ruling eliminates the "case or controversy" of the third party complaint. See Faser v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 674 F.2d 856, 860 (11th Cir. 1982); Trw Title Ins. Co. v. Sec. Union Title Ins. Co., 153 F.3d 822, 827 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1998); Arcon Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 591 F. Supp. 15, 18-19 (M.D. Tenn. 1983). Here, Worthington's liability is secondary to, or derivative of, Bernzomatic's liability on the Plaintiffs' claims. Thus, in light of the fact that summary judgment has been granted in favor of Bernzomatic on all claims, the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the third party complaint because there is no longer a "case or controversy" at issue. Accordingly, the remaining motions for summary judgment are MOOT, and third party complaint is DISMISSED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS Third Party Defendant Worthington's motions to exclude testimony by Dr. Alison Vredenburgh (Doc. No. 53) and Dr. Robert Anderson (Doc. No. 58), and Defendants Irwin Industrial Tool Company, Inc. and The Home Depot, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 45). In addition, the Court FINDS AS MOOT the remaining motions for summary judgment (Doc. Nos. 44, 49, 55), and the third party complaint is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.This order disposes of all claims. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in favor of Defendants Irwin Industrial Tool Company and The Home Depot, and to terminate the case.