Opinion
A21-0458
10-28-2021
Basim Asmar Shakir-Bey, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, et al., Respondents.
Washington County District Court File No. 82-CV-20-3448.
Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Cochran, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Jeanne M. Cochran, Judge.
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Self-represented appellant Basim Asmar Shakir-Bey challenges a district court order summarily denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
2. Shakir-Bey has been incarcerated since 1998 when he was convicted of three counts of first-degree burglary and five counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The district court sentenced him to cumulative sentences totaling approximately 67 years. While incarcerated, Shakir-Bey has unsuccessfully challenged his convictions and sentences in both a direct appeal and a postconviction proceeding. See State v. Shakir-Bey, No. C1-99-358, 1999 WL 1216338 (Minn.App. Dec. 21, 1999), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 23, 2000).
3. In August 2020, Shakir-Bey filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in district court, again challenging his convictions and sentences on various grounds.
4. In a March 2021 order, the district court denied Shakir-Bey's petition for habeas corpus relief. The district court concluded that the petition was an improper collateral attack on Shakir-Bey's convictions and sentences.
5. A writ of habeas corpus is a statutory civil remedy by which a petitioner may obtain relief from unlawful imprisonment or restraint. Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2020). Habeas relief is generally limited to resolving jurisdictional defects and violations of constitutional rights. State ex rel. Young v. Schnell, 956 N.W.2d 652, 673-74 (Minn. 2021). A petitioner may not use habeas review "as a cover for a collateral attack upon a judgment of a competent tribunal which had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person of the defendant." Breeding v. Swenson, 60 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Minn. 1953). A habeas petition "may not be used as a substitute for an appeal," State ex rel. Shannon v. Tahash, 121 N.W.2d 59, 61 (Minn. 1963), and a petition is properly denied where the petitioner could have raised the underlying claims through other legal means, see Kelsey v. State, 283 N.W.2d 892, 894 (Minn. 1979) (affirming dismissal of habeas petition because petitioner could have raised the challenge by direct appeal or postconviction petition).
6. This court may affirm a denial of a petition when the petition, on its face, fails to present a case for issuing a writ of habeas corpus. State ex rel. Nelson v. Rigg, 107 N.W.2d 378, 379 (Minn. 1961).
7. On appeal, Shakir-Bey reiterates many of the same arguments that he raised in his habeas corpus petition. Specifically, Shakir-Bey challenges his convictions on the bases of insufficient evidence, actual innocence, ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and denial of a fair trial and fair appellate review. He also argues that his sentences are unlawful because he was not prosecuted by indictment, his sentences were improperly enhanced, he was sentenced on included offenses, and the district court failed to provide him with the required number of peremptory challenges during jury selection.
8. As the district court correctly concluded, Shakir-Bey could have raised each of these claims either in his direct appeal or in a petition for postconviction relief. As such, Shakir-Bey's claims constitute an improper collateral attack on his convictions and sentences.
9. We are not persuaded otherwise by Shakir-Bey's suggestion that he may challenge his criminal-sexual-conduct convictions in a habeas petition because the supreme court announced a new interpretation of law in State v. Ortega-Rodriguez, 920 N.W.2d 642 (Minn. 2018). There, the supreme court held that a conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct requires the state to prove that "sexual penetration" occurred. Ortega-Rodriguez, 920 N.W.2d at 647. If Shakir-Bey wanted to assert a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his criminal-sexual-conduct convictions based on Ortega-Rodriguez, he could have raised that argument in a postconviction petition following the issuance of that opinion.
10. Shakir-Bey also appears to seek reversal of the district court's order denying his petition for habeas corpus on the ground that the district court did not rule on two pending motions filed by Shakir-Bey prior to issuing its order denying his petition for habeas corpus relief. The pending motions included: a motion for default judgment and a "motion for imposition of judicial estoppel." In both motions, Shakir-Bey argued that he was entitled to habeas relief because respondent Warden Guy Bosch had not filed a timely response to his petition for habeas corpus. Shakir-Bey contends, without explanation, that the district court was "required by law to respond to" his motions prior to issuing its order of dismissal.
11. Shakir-Bey has failed to provide any legal support for his assertion that the district court erred by declining to rule on his motions. We generally do not consider inadequately briefed arguments. Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Minn.App. 2007). Moreover, while the district court did not expressly rule on the motions, the record reflects that the district court twice informed Shakir-Bey that he had not properly served the warden with his habeas petition. Shakir-Bey does not direct us to any evidence in the record that he accomplished proper service of process. Without such evidence, he cannot demonstrate that the warden failed to respond to his habeas petition within the appropriate timeframe. Accordingly, we discern no basis for reversing the district court's order.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.