Opinion
# 2012-049-028 Claim No. 120607 Motion # 2012-049-028 Claim No. M-81018 # 2012-049-028 Claim No. M-81175
06-08-2012
SHAHID v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Synopsis
Case information
UID: 2012-049-028 Claimant(s): ABDUS SHAHID Claimant short name: SHAHID Footnote (claimant name) : Defendant(s): THE STATE OF NEW YORK Footnote (defendant name) : Third-party claimant(s): Third-party defendant(s): Claim number(s): 120607 Motion number(s): M-81018, M-81175 Cross-motion number(s): Judge: David A. Weinstein Claimant's attorney: Abdus Shahid, Pro Se Eric T. Schneiderman, NYS Attorney General Defendant's attorney: By: Joseph Paterno, Assistant Attorney General Third-party defendant's attorney: Signature date: June 8, 2012 City: Albany Comments: Official citation: Appellate results: See also (multicaptioned case) Decision
Claimant Abdus Shahid filed the claim at issue on November 18, 2011, and served it upon the Attorney General's Office on February 21, 2012. No notice of intention has been served.
The claim alleges improper conduct by a Housing Court Judge and Court Attorney of the Civil Court of New York City, concerning various cases arising out of false violation reports at a building he owns in Brooklyn. In particular, Shahid alleges that two holdover suits against tenants were allowed "unlawfully" to go to trial (Claim ¶ 10); the cases were wrongly consolidated before one judge (Claim ¶ 19); the cases were improperly dismissed on August 17, 2011 (Claim ¶ 20); and the Court then denied Shahid's motion for reconsideration on September 20, 2011 (Claim ¶ 22). Shahid maintains that these actions were based on a "deal" reached by the judge and court attorney with certain interested parties, involving the payment of cash to the court attorney (Claim ¶¶ 10, 19-20, 22-23). The claim references no events that took place after September 20, 2011.
No affidavit of service was appended to Shahid's claim, and as of February 8, 2012, no answer had been filed by defendant. As a result, this Court issued an order to show cause dated February 8, 2011 [sic] (motion no. M-81018), which directed claimant to show cause why the claim should not be dismissed for failure to comply with the service requirements of the Court of Claims Act by March 14, 2012. The order indicated that the State could make any relevant submission "as it deems appropriate."
On February 21, 2012, claimant submitted a notarized affidavit of service sworn by "Md. A. Ansari," indicating that he had served a "Notice of Claim" - apparently the claim at issue - by certified mail, return receipt requested on February 15, 2012.
Defendant did not file a response to the Order to Show Cause. Rather, on March 9, 2012, it filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss this claim (motion no. M-81175), on the ground that it was untimely served, and barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. Claimant opposes the application, alleging that he received instruction from the New York State Supreme Court pro se clerk to file a "notice of claim" in the Court of Claims "within 90 days of last incidence as like as for the case against New York City you have to file notice of claim to Comptroller pursuant to General Municipal Law (GML) 50-i,"which instruction Shahid says he followed (Aff. in Opp. ¶ 1). Claimant further argues that he does not know the Court's "special rules," and that the Court must construe his pro se filings liberally. Nowhere in this filing, no matter how interpreted, does he disclose any event relevant to his claim that took place after September 20, 2011.
It is not clear if Shahid claims he was required to comply with section 50-i, or was merely analogizing the Court of Claims provisions to that section.
Discussion
During the pendency of the Order to Show Cause, claimant presented proof that his claim has now been served, and defendant's responsive motion does not allege improper service. Therefore, I proceed first to address defendant's motion to dismiss (motion no. M-81175).
Claims against the State for monetary damages arising out of both negligent and intentional acts of wrongdoing must be served on the State within 90 days of their accrual, unless a notice of intention has been timely served (see Court of Claims Act § 10[3] and [3-b]).Timely service is a jurisdictional requirement that must be strictly construed, and the failure to file within the designated period is fatal to the claim (see Welch v State of New York, 286 AD2d 496 [2d Dept 2001]). Objections based upon failure to timely serve and file a claim must be raised with particularity in the answer or by a motion to dismiss before service of the responsive pleading, pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 11(c). Here, defendant has raised the timeliness objection in a pre-answer motion made prior to the expiration of its time to answer the claim.
Court of Claims Act § 10(4) allows six months for service of "any other claim not otherwise provided for by this section." To the extent this claim could be construed to fall within this catchall, it must be dismissed in any case, as barred by judicial immunity for reasons set forth below.
Claimant's own affidavit of service, and the envelope in which the claim was served on the Attorney General (Aff. in Supp. Ex. A), make clear that the claim was not served prior to February 15, 2012, nearly five months after the last alleged act of wrongdoing set forth in the claim. The State has therefore demonstrated that the claim was served upon it after the ninety-day period for such service had passed.
Claimant asserts that the claim should not be dismissed due to his pro se status and lack of familiarity with Court procedure, and because he complied with the requirements of General Municipal Law § 50-i. But those contentions are unavailing. The former is not grounds for avoiding this Court's rules for timely service (see Matter of Sandlin v State of New York, 294 AD2d 723, 724 [3d Dept 2002] [affirming dismissal of pro se claim as time barred, despite claimant's assertion that "his failure to timely file . . . was due to his lack of awareness 'of the short filing period'"]). As to General Municipal Law § 50-i, that provision addresses service of a tort claim "against a city, county, town, village, fire district or school," and thus has no relevance to timely service upon the State.
In any case, since the essence of Shahid's claim is that a judge and her court attorney decided particular matters improperly, his action is barred by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. That doctrine forbids the imposition of civil damages for acts taken in a judicial capacity. While there is a narrow exception to such immunity if there "lacks any jurisdiction supporting judicial authority for the action taken" (Alvarez v Snyder, 264 AD2d 27, 34 [1st Dept 2000]), nothing in the present claim indicates that such exception applies in this case.
When the actions of a state-employed judge are "cloaked with judicial immunity," the State may not be held liable for them(see Davey v State of New York, 31 AD3d 600 [2d Dept 2006], quoting Montesano v State of New York, 11 AD3d 436 [2d Dept 2004]). Further, judges are protected against liability for their legal rulings even if such rulings are knowingly false, or written with intent to injure the claimant (see Sassower v Finnerty, 96 AD2d 585 [2d Dept 1983]; see also Montesano, supra). Nor do claimant's assertions that the decisions at issue were corrupted by bribery allow him to proceed. Allegations of improper motive, or even "malicious wrongdoing" do not allow a suit to proceed against actions covered by judges' absolute immunity (see Mertens v State of New York 73 AD3d 1376, 1377 [3d Dept 2010]).
I presume, for purposes of this opinion, that the judge and court attorney are state employees, as defendant has not challenged this Court's jurisdiction on the ground that the allegations do not implicate the State.
--------
Finally, judicial immunity extends to the allegations of misconduct leveled in the claim against the court attorney, as well as the judge (see Lodichand v Kogut, 91 AD3d 608 [2d Dept 2012] [allegations of misconduct against court attorney referee acting in her official capacity covered by doctrine of judicial immunity]; Weiner v State of New York, 273 AD2d 95, 96 [1st Dept 2000] [judicial immunity applies to "the Judge and her staff"]).
In light of the foregoing, defendant's motion no. M-81175 is granted, and the claim is hereby dismissed. Motion no. M-81018 is vacated as moot.
SO ORDERED.
June 8, 2012
Albany, New York
David A. Weinstein
Judge of the Court of Claims
Papers Considered:
1. Order to Show Cause, filed February 9, 2012, Motion No. M-81018.
2. Defendant's Notice of Motion, and annexed Exhibit, Motion No. M-81175.
3. Claimant's Affirmation in Opposition, and annexed Exhibit, Motion Nos. M-81018, M-81175.
4. Defendant's Reply Affirmation, Motion Nos. M-81018, M-81175.