Opinion
NO. 2016 CU 1482 C/W 2016 CU 1483
02-17-2017
IN RE: S.H. DOB 5/29/11 AND A.H. DOB 7/8/08 KELISIA R. ANDREWS v. ISAAC L. HUBBARD
DEAN M. ESPOSUO BATON ROUGE, LA ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE ISAAC L. HUBBARD MURPHY F. BELL, JR. BATON ROUGE, LA ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT KELISIA R. ANDREWS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION Appealed from the 19th Judicial District Court, Family Court, in and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Trial Court No. F185964 c/w No. F202695
Honorable Hunter Greene, Judge DEAN M. ESPOSUO
BATON ROUGE, LA ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
ISAAC L. HUBBARD MURPHY F. BELL, JR.
BATON ROUGE, LA ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
KELISIA R. ANDREWS BEFORE: PETTIGREW AND McDONALD, JJ., AND CALLOWAY, J. Pro Tern. PETTIGREW, J.
Judge Curtis A. Calloway, retired, is serving as judge pro tempore by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
The mother in this family court matter, Kelisia Andrews (Andrews) appeals a judgment dated April 4, 2016, that awarded joint custody of the two minor children to both she and the father of the children, Isaac Hubbard (Hubbard); changed the domiciliary parent from Andrews to Hubbard; and held Andrews in contempt of court, for failing to adhere to previous interim visitation orders of the family court. The contempt decree ordered Andrews to serve ninety days in jail, and to pay Hubbard's attorney fees and court costs. After a thorough review of the record and the issues raised on appeal, we affirm.
Subsequent to rendering judgment, the family court granted Andrews' request and amended the sentencing on the contempt decree to allow Andrews' release from the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison and allow her to serve her remaining jail sentence in Monroe, Louisiana, on her days off from work.
PENDING RULE TO SHOW CAUSE
On November 8, 2016, this court, ex proprio motu, issued a rule to show cause why the appeal should or should not be dismissed as untimely. On December 28, 2016, this court referred the rule to show cause to the panel to whom the appeal was docketed. The dates and events pertinent to the timeliness of this appeal are as follows. Notice of the family court judgment on appeal was issued on April 5, 2016. See La. C.C.P. art. 1913. That judgment contains a decree of contempt and a decree concerning child custody. As to the contempt decree, there is no question that the appeal was timely filed, as it was filed within sixty days from the expiration of the delay for a new trial, if none is filed, or from the date of notice of the court's action on a motion for new trial. See La. C.C.P. arts. 3943; 3942; and 2087(A). As to the appeal of the custody decree portion of the judgment, under the facts and circumstances herein, timeliness is not as straight forward.
On April 6, 2016, Andrews filed a rule for modification of sentence with the family court. It has long been recognized that a court will look to the import of a pleading and not be bound by the title. Every pleading is to be construed so as to do substantial justice. La. C.C.P. art. 865. The caption of the pleading does not control. Rather, the court is obligated to determine the substance of the pleading. Smith v. Cajun Insulation, Inc., 392 So.2d 398 (La. 1980). Accordingly, for purposes of timeliness, we consider that pleading, albeit titled differently, in accordance with its true substance -- a motion for new trial, timely filed, thus triggering an additional delay for appealing the judgment to the date on which the family court rules on said motion.
The record reveals that on April 19, 2016, the family court granted the motion in favor of Andrews, ordering that she be released from East Baton Rouge Parish Prison and that she serve the remainder of her sentence at the jail in Monroe, Louisiana, on her days off from work. Thus, April 19, 2016, became the date from which appeal delays began to run. Andrews sought a suspensive appeal, which ordinarily would give her thirty days from April 19, 2016, to appeal that portion of the judgment. See La. C.C.P. arts. 3943, 3942, and 2087(A)(2). Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3943, an appeal of a custody judgment can be taken only within the delay provided in La. C.C.P. art. 3942, and such an appeal shall not suspend execution of that judgment. Thus, an appeal of a custody judgment is statutorily mandated to be devolutive. Moreover, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3942, the appeal can be taken only within thirty days from the applicable date pursuant to Article 2087(A) -- the applicable date being the date of the mailing of the notice of the court's ruling on Andrews' motion for reconsideration of sentence, which we have earlier deemed to be a motion for new trial, April 19, 2016.
A motion and order for appeal was fax-filed by Andrews on May 4, 2016, requesting a suspensive appeal. (The original of that faxed filing was entered into the record on May 11, 2016.) The filing, well within the thirty days from April 19, 2016, appears unquestionably timely. However, the family court did not sign the order, but rather handwrote "DENIED" on the signature line and "must be Devolutive Appeal Procedure - see CCP art. 3943 and art. 2087" just beneath it. (This action by the family court is undated.) Although the family court was correct as a matter of law -- that the appeal must be devolutive -- the solution generally taken by district courts when faced with a motion for a suspensive appeal, which is required to be devolutive, is to grant the motion and order for appeal, and simply designate thereon that the appeal granted is devolutive (and not suspensive as sought). The family court's denial of the motion and order for appeal, which was otherwise timely, created what appears to be a timeliness issue in this matter, as reflected beiow.
On June 2, 2016, out of an abundance of caution given the family court's denial of her first motion, Andrews fax-filed a second motion and order for appeal, this time requesting a devolutive appeal; this motion and order was granted and signed by the family court on June 15, 2016. Thus, Andrews' appeal appears to be untimely, having been filed more than thirty days from the expiration of the seven days allowed for the filing of a motion for new trial following issuance of notice of judgment. (She had thirty days from April 12, 2016, which is seven days following issuance of notice of the judgment of the court on April 5, 2016.) However, our decision herein on appeal, to consider the motion for reconsideration of the sentence as a motion for new trial, effectively lengthened the delay for filing a motion and order for appeal. Instead of having thirty days from April 12, 2016, Andrews now had thirty days from April 19, 2016, or May 19, 2016, to timely file a motion and order for appeal.
The second motion and order for appeal fax-filed on June 2, 2016, is clearly outside of the thirty days. However, we note that appeals are favored by law and the Code of Civil Procedure mandates that the article of the code be construed liberally, and with due regard for the fact that rules of procedure implement the substantive law and are not an end in themselves. See La. C.C.P. art. 5051. Moreover, La. C.C.P. art. 2161 provides that an appeal shall not be dismissed because of an irregularity, error, or defect unless it is imputable to the appellant. As noted, ordinarily, a district court would strike the reference to a suspensive appeal and grant a devolutive appeal. Thus, the family court would have been well within its authority and discretion to do so on the first motion and order for appeal that was timely filed; thus preserving the timeliness of the appeal. We find the irregularity that caused Andrews' second motion and order for appeal to be filed untimely was due to the family court's actions, and is in no way imputable to Andrews. Finally, we also note that Hubbard did not file a response brief to this court's rule to show cause urging that the appeal was untimely or that he would be prejudiced by any action that would deem it timely.
In accordance with the statutory scheme reflecting that appeals are favored by law, we find it appropriate under these circumstances to ignore the second motion and order for appeal, and deem Andrews' motion and order for appeal filed on May 2, 2016, as the one subject to review. That motion and order was timely filed; thus, we conclude this appeal was timely filed and the rule to show cause is denied.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Hubbard and Andrews, although not married and each keeping a separate residence, had an exclusive relationship during which two children were born in East Baton Rouge Parish in 2008 and 2011. On July 6, 2012, Hubbard filed a petition to establish custody, child support, and visitation. Despite Andrews seeking a continuance, the family court denied that request and held a hearing, in Andrews' absence, on March 14, 2016, following which it rendered the judgment at issue herein.
Prior to the filing of the petition to establish custody, there was no formal order for custody or visitation, and it appears that both parents had a close and loving relationship with the children. They lived, primarily with Andrews, and Hubbard enjoyed unfettered visitation. According to Hubbard, he is the only father figure the children have ever known. In February 2012, Andrews, together with the children, moved from Baton Rouge to Monroe for her job. Hubbard alleges that Andrews left without informing him of the whereabouts of the children and that the move left him with only intermittent visitation. He alleged in his petition that he had only been allowed two visitations with the children, from February 25-27, 2012, and again, from March 11-April 1, 2012, with no telephone contact in the interim. He further alleged that he had not been able to see the children's new living arrangements and did not know what those arrangements were. Hubbard alleged that as a result of Andrews' move to Monroe, he was "essentially estranged" from the children. On July 6, 2012, he filed the petition seeking to have physical and legal custody established.
Hubbard also alleged that Andrews had taken "extreme measures" to interfere with his relationship with the children in addition to relocating to another city (approximately 233 miles from Baton Rouge) without his knowledge or consent. He specified these measures consisted of changing her telephone number and refusing to allow him visitation with the children on a regular basis.
Additionally, he alleged a concern about Andrews exhibiting "mental instability" by screaming and cursing with no cause, and "peeling off in her vehicle" causing the minor son to almost fall out of the moving vehicle. Hubbard questioned Andrews' ability to care for the children on a regular basis, and alleged that she lacked the presence of mind, parental skills, and patience to care for and safeguard the physical and mental well-being of the children.
In addition to seeking joint custody and domiciliary status, or in the alternative, joint custody with 50/50 shared custody and significant regular and holiday visitation with the children, Hubbard requested that Andrews be ordered to undergo a psychological evaluation at her cost, and that she be ordered to pay her pro rata share of child support, uncovered medical, dental, vision, educational, and extracurricular expenses.
A written stipulation signed by the parties on August 21, 2012, approved by the family court on September 19, 2012, and reduced to judgment on June 19, 2013, provided for the interim custody, visitation, and child support of the children. On February 11, 2014, Hubbard filed a motion for contempt and to modify custody, alleging that Andrews, in violation of the June 19, 2013 judgment, refused to allow him to exercise visitation with the children "for several months." Additionally, he sought a modification of the joint custodial arrangement in place, alleging Andrews displays "violent tendencies and mental instability," and that joint custody was not in the best interest of the children. He sought the designation of interim domiciliary status parent and provisions for visitation. On the same date of the filing of this motion, a rule to show cause issued, setting the matter for hearing on March 11, 2014.
However, on April 24, 2014, Hubbard filed a motion to reset the hearing, indicating therein that the matter was passed without date as a result of not being able to locate Andrews' attorney. The matter was reset for May 20, 2014. On August 8, 2014, Hubbard filed another motion to reset the hearing for the same reason set forth in the prior motion -- the inability to locate Andrews' attorney. The matter was, again, reset for hearing on September 2, 2014.
On September 2, 2014, apparently having been located, Andrews' attorney filed a "Rule to Make Past Due Child Support Executory, With Rule for Contempt and Attorneys Fees," claiming that Hubbard also was in violation of the family court's June 19, 2013 judgment by refusing to pay child support or financial support for additional extraordinary medical expenses and extracurricular activities of the children. Andrews sought an award for the alleged arrearages of the child support as well as a finding of contempt against Hubbard. Following a September 23, 2014 hearing on Andrews' rules, the parties entered another written stipulation, reduced to judgment by the family court on October 15, 2014, that ordered the immediate resumption of the previously ordered visitation schedule, ordered Hubbard to add a certain amount of arrearage payment to his monthly child support obligation, and pretermitted the issues of contempt and permanent child custody and support to a trial on the merits, set for November 18, 2014.
Less than ten days later, on October 24, 2014, Andrews filed a supplemental reconventional demand for custody and child support alleging sexual misconduct by Hubbard with one of the minor children, which the child reported following visitation with Hubbard since the October 15, 2014 judgment, and seeking sole custody.
Apparently, the trial set November 18, 2014, did not occur; the record contains a notice to appear to the parties advising that the case was fixed for review on March 31, 2015. Apparently that hearing too, was passed without date, as the record contains a pleading entitled "Petition for Ex Parte Custody" filed by Andrews on April 15, 2015, seeking the "immediate, emergency ex parte sole custody of one of the minor children, based on the same allegations of molestation she raised in her supplemental reconventional demand. Following a hearing held that same day, the family court denied the ex parte petition, and set a hearing on the sole custody issue for April 21, 2015. However, the record reveals that a case Management Schedule dated April 21, 2015, was filed, setting discovery deadlines and assigning the case for trial "for a 2nd setting" on July 9, 2015, and for a "first setting" on October 7, 2015. On October 15, 2015, another case Management Schedule was filed, this time assigning the matter for trial for a first setting on March 14, 2016.
On December 15, 2015, Andrews filed a "Petition for Protection From Abuse" on behalf of herself and the minor children, reiterating the sexual abuse allegations against Hubbard that she raised in her supplemental reconventional demand and in her ex parte petition seeking sole custody. On that same date, the parties filed another written stipulation in the record setting provisions for interim visitation by Hubbard. Also on December 15, 2015, another case Management Schedule was filed, delaying discovery deadlines, but assigning the same March 14, 2016 date for a trial on the merits. Finally, also on December 15, 2015, the family court issued a protective order (temporary restraining order) against Hubbard prohibiting all contact between himself and Andrews "except to exchange custody of the children." That order also set a hearing for December 23, 2015, on the rule to show cause why such protective order should not be made permanent, and continued the current order of joint custody. On December 23, 2015, Andrews did not appear for the hearing and the order for protection was dismissed. Also on that date, the family court entered yet another stipulated judgment into the record providing for the physical custody of the children in the summer and also ordering "the hearing set for June 16, 2015 is re-set for June 30, 2015. The record also contains a Family Court Order For Arrest issued by the court ordering the Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish to bring Andrews before the court to show why she should not be held in contempt of court for failure to appear at the December 23, 2015 hearing. The Order for Arrest was not filed into the record until March 2, 2016, and without further explanation, the record contains a notice to the Sheriff dated March 22, 2016, recalling the family court's order for the arrest of Andrews.
The record contains voluminous re-settings of dates assigned for hearings and for the trial on the merits, as well as numerous stipulated judgments entered to address pleadings filed in the interim, prior to the trial date, and the several case management schedules. Because of the high volume of the interim activity, the entire chronology of these settings and judgment is not readily apparent from the record. For example, apparently there was a hearing set for June 16, 2015, that was re-set for June 30, 2015. Another notice appears in the record advising the parties that their "case" is set for review on February 16, 2016, but makes no mention of the earlier setting of the trial for March 14, 2016, although the record contains a transcript of the trial on the merits, which was, indeed, held on March 14, 2016. --------
The trial of the matter was held on March 14, 2016.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Andrews asserts the following assignments of error:
1. The Court erred in failing to grant the Appellant/Defendant, Kelisia Andrews a continuance and holding the trial without her present.
2. The Court erred in changing the domiciliary parent to the Appellee/Plaintiff, Isaac Hubbard.
3. The Court erred in holding the Appellant/Defendant in Contempt.
4. The Court erred in not granting the Appellant/Defendant a new trial.
5. The Court erred in holding the Appellant/Defendant in contempt for failure to comply with the visitation schedule.
DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS
Motion to Continue
On the morning of the trial, which as the foregoing history reflects, was postponed and reset many different times since the original petition was filed in 2012, counsel for Andrews verbally urged a motion to continue trial on Andrews' behalf, as she was not present in court, for alleged medical reasons. Counsel explained that Andrews was pregnant, and had an "emergency doctor's appointment" on March 8, 2016, following which she became considered a high-risk pregnancy, placed on observation, and ordered to "bed rest." Counsel stated he had received phone calls from Andrews that she was feeling very ill and he requested that she send him the necessary documentation. The family court, after considering the evidence, denied the motion and proceeded with trial in Andrews' absence. For the reasons that follow, we find the court did not abuse its much discretion in finding there was insufficient evidence to support Andrews' claim of a medical impediment to her appearance at trial and denying the motion to continue.
The evidence presented in support of the motion was a copy of a document dated March 7, 2016 that appears to come from a doctor's office or hospital file (although there is no heading nor other identifier of the originator thereof), entitled "Follow up Instructions." The document suggests Andrews was seen in the facility that date, and indicates that Andrews should follow-up on March 8, 2016 (the following day) with "Primary Health Services-Monroe," The document also states:
Comments:Attached to and submitted together with this document are two copies of an identical informational-like page with the notation: " Patient Information Education " and entitled "THREATENED MISCARRIAGE," containing information regarding the causes, risk factors, sign and symptoms, and diagnosis of a miscarriage.
Follow up with Primary Health TOMORROW for a repeat beta HCG level. Return to ED if symptoms worsen in any way!!!
We note the documentation indicates Andrews was seen for a problem related to her pregnancy a full week prior to the trial date, but provides little information. Notably, it does not indicate that bed rest was ordered or advised, or that she would be unable to attend a trial in one week's time. There was no other medical record introduced, nothing from any of her treating physicians, and nothing regarding any follow-up to the March 7, 2016 incident. While a medical condition may be considered a "good ground" for granting a continuance as required by La. C.C.P. art. 1601, the determination depends largely on the facts of each case and is within the discretion of the district/family court. Our review reveals the record supports the family court's finding that the evidence is insufficient to support a valid claim of a medical condition or problem that would warrant the grant of a continuation of trial in this matter.
We recognize, as argued by Andrews, that the denial of her motion resulted in the matter proceeding to trial in her absence. However, her counsel was present and participated in the questioning of the witnesses, and Andrews has not specified any particular prejudice to her caused by her absence at trial. And while we agree with Andrews that the interest of a parent in having a relationship with his or her children is a liberty interest protected by the constitution, that interest is held by Hubbard as well. The family court may well have considered that Hubbard was equally entitled to having the matter, filed by him more than four years prior, heard and decided at a trial on the merits. Finally, we note also that the court may also have considered that Andrews, with no explanation or excuse, did not appear on the date of the hearing of her ex parte motion and order for a restraining order alleging sexual abuse of one of the children by Hubbard, and an arrest warrant issued for her failure to appear at the hearing. Additionally, we note for the reasons detailed below, even if Andrews would have been at the trial and provided her testimony on her behalf, the record contains documentary evidence to support the family court's ultimate ruling that any testimony provided by Andrews would not have been able to refute. In any event, the record amply supports the family court's denial of the motion to continue, and does not reflect an abuse its discretion.
New Trial
In assignment of error number 4, Andrews asserts the family court erred in not granting her motion for new trial/reconsideration. We note that to the extent that the family court modified the terms of the ninety-day jail sentence imposed on Andrews, the motion for new trial was granted in part in her favor. Thus, we presume the assignment addresses the remaining portions of the judgment that were not modified. In support thereof, Andrews submitted lengthy narrative containing forty-seven paragraphs of the history of this matter in her own words. Attached to this narrative are several documents that were not introduced into evidence at the trial, and are not subject to our review. Moreover, much of the narrative and the attachments relate to facts and circumstances that were not established or made part of the record, and likewise, are not subject to our review. Andrews has made no showing that any of this information or evidence was newly discovered or could not have been obtained prior to or during the trial in this matter. Further, for reasons discussed below on the remaining assignments of error, we find the judgment is supported by the record and is not contrary to the law and evidence. None of the peremptory grounds for granting a new trial have been satisfied. See La. C.C.P. art. 1972. Additionally, the family court is granted discretion to grant a new trial for "good ground" therefor, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1973. We find no good ground presented in our review of the record, and the family court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Andrews a new trial.
Changes in Child Custody
Andrews also assigns error to the portion of the judgment that modified child custody to designate Hubbard as the domiciliary parent. The judgment also provided for Andrews' visitation rights with the children with the condition that she first post a $5,000.00 bond, removed the requirement that Hubbard always have a female present when exercising his custodial rights with the female minor child, provided that law enforcement facilitate and assist Hubbard in obtaining the physical custody of the children, and ordered Andrews to cooperate with him and to provide all necessary forms for Hubbard to enroll them in school. Only the modification changing the domiciliary parent designation from Andrews to Hubbard is challenged by Andrews on appeal. Andrews argues that change was not supported by the record and that the family court erred by not conducting the proper analysis in modifying custody.
There is a distinction between the burden of proof required to change a custody plan ordered pursuant to a considered decree and the burden of proof required to change a custody plan ordered pursuant to a non-considered decree (or stipulated judgment). Hansbrough v. Hansbrough, 2010-0846, 2010 WL 3724735, at *2 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/24/10). A "considered decree" is an award of permanent custody in which the trial court receives evidence of parental fitness to exercise care, custody, and control of children. Id. By contrast, a non-considered decree or stipulated judgment is one in which no evidence is presented as to the fitness of the parents, such as one that is entered by stipulation or consent of the parties, or that is otherwise not contested. Id.
Once a considered decree of permanent custody has been rendered by a court, the proponent of a change of custody bears the heavy burden of proving that a change of circumstances has occurred, such that the continuation of the present custody arrangement is so deleterious to the child as to justify a modification of the custody decree, or that the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is substantially outweighed by its advantages to the child. Id.; see also Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So.2d 1193, 1200 (La. 1986).
In cases such as this one where the underlying custody decree is a stipulated judgment and the parties have consented to a custodial arrangement with no evidence as to parental fitness, the heavy burden of proof rule enunciated in Bergeron is inapplicable. Hansbrough, 2010 WL 3724735, at *2. Rather, a party seeking a modification of a consent decree must prove that there has been a material change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child since the original (or previous) custody decree was entered and that the proposed modification is in the best interest of the child. Id.
Based on the foregoing, to the extent that Andrews argues that the family court erred by not imposing a heavier burden on Hubbard as purportedly required by law, we find no merit. The law is clear, as is the fact that there has never been a prior considered decree of custody rendered in this case. The record reflects that the parties entered numerous stipulated judgments into the record reflecting the terms of custody and visitation on which the parties had agreed. Thus, under the facts and circumstances of this case, Hubbard did not have the heavier burden, but rather simply had to show a material change in circumstances since the previous stipulated judgment, and that the proposed modification is in the best interest of the child.
A trial court's determination of custody is entitled to great weight and will not be reversed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown. Elliott v. Elliott, 2005-0181 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/11/05), 916 So.2d 221, 226, writ denied, 2005-1547 (La. 7/12/05), 905 So.2d 293.
Our review of the record reveals Hubbard presented evidence sufficient to support that a material change in circumstances had occurred since the previous stipulated judgment, and that the modification, designating Hubbard as the domiciliary parent, removing the restriction that the daughter could not be in the presence of a male without a female adult present, and awarding Andrews visitation every other weekend after she posted a bond to secure the return of the children after her visitation with them, was in the best interest of the children as provided in La. C.C. arts. 131, 134. Accordingly the family court did not abuse its discretion.
At the outset, the record supports a material change in circumstances to warrant a change in custody. On a morning when Andrews had arranged with Hubbard that she would drop off the children for visitation, and she knew he had plans to take family photographs with the children, Andrews did not show up. Instead, as Hubbard became aware later, she had taken the children and moved to Monroe. She gave no prior notification to Hubbard that she was moving, and she did not give him a reason as to why she was moving. When she contacted him after arriving in Monroe, she refused, initially, to give him any information or answer his questions about where she and the children were staying, if the move was permanent, or just a visit, whether the children were enrolled in school, or her new phone number, after advising him that she had changed it. The move caused Hubbard to retain an attorney to assist him in getting information from Andrews and visitation with his children. Because of the move, Hubbard went from having a close and daily relationship with his children to having to go weeks, perhaps even months, without seeing them. Andrews' abrupt and unexplained move to Monroe also provides an evidentiary basis for the family court's conclusion that Andrews was actively seeking to alienate the children from their father.
With regard to a modification of custody, declaring Hubbard as the domiciliary parent and providing Andrews with alternating weekend visits, the record, alone, provides ample documentary evidence that Andrews has willfully abused the judicial process and inexcusably violated the family court's orders and denied Hubbard his lawful rights to visitation with his children. Andrews exhibited a pattern of agreeing and stipulating to terms of custody, and immediately thereafter, willfully violating such orders and filing petitions making allegations against Hubbard that were subsequently unsubstantiated for lack of support. For example, on April 14, 2015, Andrews received a letter from Hubbard's counsel seeking to have her comply with Hubbard's court-ordered visitation; the following day, she filed an ex parte motion for custody, which was later denied, and continued to refuse to allow Hubbard visitation. Then, on December 15, 2015, after a hearing on contempt, Andrews and Hubbard entered a stipulated judgment whereby she agreed to comply with Hubbard's visitation; later that same day, Andrews filed a petition for protection from abuse. Andrews did not appear for the hearing on that motion. Finally, on three separate occasions, following a period of complaining to Hubbard about having to drive to drop the children off for visitation, Andrews brought allegations against Hubbard for molesting his children; the first two allegations concerned the daughter; the third allegation concerned his son. The record confirms that these allegations were found to be wholly unfounded and unsupported by both the Sheriff, and by the Department of Child and Family Services, following an investigation and interview with Hubbard.
In addition to abusing the judicial process and violating court orders granting Hubbard visitation, the record reveals a consistent pattern by Andrews of interfering with and preventing Hubbard from maintaining a relationship with the children. The evidence reveals that she involved both of the children in making baseless allegations of sexual abuse by Hubbard, which further reflects her unwillingness to promote a healthy relationship between the children and their father.
Finally, in rendering judgment, the family court carefully noted each factor in La. C.C. art. 134 and articulated evidentiary basis in the record for finding that awarding domiciliary status to Hubbard met the requirements, and was consistent with the factors enumerated therein. The record wholly supports that Hubbard displays love, affection, and healthy emotional ties with the children, as well as has the means to provide for them spiritually, physically, medically, and financially. The record establishes a history of a loving relationship between Hubbard and his children from the day they were born. He presented to the court his detailed plans for providing for the children, enrolling them in school, bringing them to and picking them up from school, and he also represented that he has a close family network and support system to assist him should he need it. Finally, despite the frustration caused by Andrews' actions in denying his visitation rights, and making false accusations against him, Hubbard testified that he felt it was healthy for the children to be a part of both parents' families and that he would do everything he could to promote that the children maintain consistent and loving relationships with their mother and her family.
Based on the foregoing and the additional evidence in the record, we not only conclude there is no abuse of discretion, we also find overwhelming evidentiary support for the family court's modification of custody in this matter. Accordingly, that portion of the judgment is affirmed.
Contempt Decrees
Andrews also assigns errors to the family court's rulings finding her in contempt of court. The only argument advanced in support thereof is that the family court did not discuss the allegations raised by her of sexual molestation of the children by Hubbard nor did the court consider that her violating the orders of Hubbard's visitation were justified in light of those allegations. As noted earlier, despite being investigated by the Sheriff's Office as well as the Department of Child and Family Services, the allegations against Hubbard were found to be without factual basis and were basically dismissed. Thus, Andrews' only purported explanation for being in violation of the court's orders lacks validity. Moreover, she does not argue, nor does the record support that her actions in refusing to abide by the court's orders were otherwise justified. For all the reasons detailed above as a basis for the change in custody, and inasmuch as those reasons also reflect numerous and repeated violations by Andrews of multiple orders of the court, we find the family court was well within its discretion in finding Andrews in contempt of court. These assignments also lack merit.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons discussed herein, the April 4, 2016 judgment of the family court, awarding joint custody of the children to Isaac L. Hubbard and Kelisia R. Andrews, designating Isaac L. Hubbard as domiciliary parent; awarding Kelisia R. Andrews visitation with the children every other weekend, maintaining the location for exchange of the children at the Shoney's in Natchez, provided she post the designated bond; and finding Kelisia R. Andrews in contempt of court is hereby affirmed in its entirety. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Kelisia R. Andrews.