Opinion
No. CV 00 0082467S
September 23, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Background
On August 20, 2002, the Supreme Court of the State of Connecticut directed this court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the plaintiff taxpayers have suffered injury sufficient to confer standing to challenge the constitutionality of Conn. Gen Stat. § 10-51 (b) and/or in the alternative whether the educational cost sharing formula and its benefits sufficiently compensate for any taxpayer harm claimed by the plaintiffs. Seymour v. Region One, 261 Conn. 475 (2002). On February 27, 2003, the court held an evidentiary hearing to meet the mandate of the Supreme Court. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered briefs to be filed by all parties due three weeks after receipt of the transcript of the hearing.
Briefs were file on April 16, 2003. On April 17, 2003, the defendant Town of Canaan filed a "Motion for Order" arguing that certain portions of the plaintiff's brief contain improper material and as such should be stricken. The defendant Attorney General, the defendant Town of Salisbury and the defendant Region One Board of Education filed Memoranda in support of the defendant Town of Canaan's Motion for Order. The Court heard argument by all parties on said motion on May 15, 2003. At said hearing, the Court reasoned that pursuant to the practice book it could not "strike" improper material. It could however disregard said material. All counsel agreed that this would be the proper procedure. On May 28, 2003, the Court issued a Memorandum of Decision on the Motion for Order and again ruled that certain materials contained in the Plaintiff's Past Hearing Memorandum were improperly included in said memorandum as such were improperly included in said memorandum as such were previously excluded from evidence at the hearing after full argument. The Court further noted that plaintiff's counsel failed to file any motions to reargue or motion for reconsideration within the time mandated by Conn. Practice Book Section 11-12. The Court then again ruled on the appropriateness of the Attorney General's questioning of Ms. Seymour and CT Page 10880-t further ordered that photocopies annexed to the plaintiff's brief be disregarded as not being admitted into evidence. The Plaintiff then filed a Motion to Suppress that was denied.
Law
The first issue to be addressed in this case is whether the Plaintiffs Gabriel Seymour and Joyce Schurk have established standing under Sadloski v. Manchester, 235 Conn. 637, 646-50 (1995), the case recognized as controlling by the Connecticut Supreme Court in its remand in Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, 261 Conn. 475, 489 (2002).
In Seymour, the Connecticut Supreme Court acknowledged that it reaffirmed the basic tenets of taxpayer standing in Sadloski ( supra). Seymour, supra at 489. The Plaintiff's status as a taxpayer alone however does not automatically confer standing.
. . . The plaintiff must also allege and demonstrate that the allegedly improper municipal conduct cause[d her] to suffer some pecuniary or other great injury . . . Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co., supra; Belford v. New Haven, supra, 53; Atwood v. Regional School District No. 15, 169 Conn. 613, 617, 363 A.2d 1038 (1975); Bassett v. Desmond, 140 Conn. 426, 430, 101 A.2d 294 (1953) . . . It is not enough for the plaintiff to show that her tax dollars have contributed to the challenged project; Bell v. Planning Zoning Commission, supra, 498 The plaintiff must prove that the project has directly or indirectly increased her taxes; Atwood v. Regional School District No. 15, supra, 617; or, in some other fashion, caused her irreparable injury in her capacity as a taxpayer. Basset v. Desmond, supra; Cassidy v. Waterbury, 130 Conn. 237, 245, 33 A.2d 142 (1943)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sadloski v. Manchester, supra, 235 Conn. 647. We then held, in effect, that, because standing is a practical concept, common sense suggests that a taxpayer who challenges a part of a particular governmental program must demonstrate his or her injury in the entire fiscal context of that program, taking into account both the burdens and benefits of the program, and not just by demonstrating that the presumably burdensome part of the program itself divorced from the larger program of which it is a part, causes injury. Id., 468. (Emphasis added.)
Seymour, 261 Conn. at 490.
The Seymour Court further observed that:
The defendant does not challenge, for standing purposes, the sufficiency of the plaintiff's allegation that the tax burdens on the CT Page 10880-u plaintiffs and other taxpayers in Canaan for educating their students is substantially greater than the equivalent cost to taxpayers in every other member town in the district except for North Canaan. This presumably satisfies the pleading requirement that a taxpayer allege that the challenged statute "in some . . . fashion, [other than a simple increase in taxes] caused her irreparable injury in her capacity as a taxpayer." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 647. The defendant submits, instead, that as a legal matter, the formula set forth in § 10-51 (b) must be evaluated in light of the equalization formulas set forth in the educational cost sharing statutes, and as a factual matter, those formulas demonstrate that the plaintiffs have not in fact suffered the injury of which they complain sufficiently to demonstrate their standing as taxpayers.
Seymour, 261 Conn. at 490-91 (footnote omitted). The Seymour Court concluded that unlike Sadloski there had been no full evidentiary hearing to make the determination whether the taxpayer suffered harm and whether the educational cost sharing statutes (hereinafter ECS) may remedy any alleged taxpayer harm. The Court remanded the case to this Court for an evidentiary hearing on standing as well as a determination of the benefits of the ECS to compensate for taxpayer harm claimed by the plaintiffs. Seymour, 261 Conn. at 491-91.
To decide whether the plaintiffs have standing, the Court must examine the record to determine whether the plaintiffs have suffered any pecuniary or other great injury; whether the formula in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-51 (b) directly or indirectly increased their taxes or caused them great injury. This examination must occur within the entire fiscal context taking into account the burdens and benefits of ECS. Seymour, 261 Conn. at 491. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that neither plaintiff has established standing.
Discussion:
At the evidentiary hearing on February 27, 2003, the movant Attorney General produced two witnesses. The first, Ms. Lauren Elliott qualified as an expert witness without objection. (Transcript, 2/27/02 at page 10; hereinafter "T. 10.") Ms. Elliott testified that she has been a tax assessor for seventeen years in various towns in the State of Connecticut as well as in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. (T. 6.) She is presently the assessor for the Town of Canaan. (T. 7.) She is experienced in property reevaluations for the purposes of assessing property taxes. (T. 7.) Her own evaluation company has conducted reevaluations in the Towns comprising Region One Board of Education, specifically Salisbury, in 2000; Sharon and Kent in 1999, Cornwall, 2001; the revaluation in CT Page 10880-v Canaan in 1998 and as the Town Assessor, she performed the revaluation in Canaan in 2002. (T. 8.) Ms. Elliott is a certified assessor for the State of Connecticut. (T. 9.) She is also certified by the Office of Policy and Management to do revaluation work. (T. 9.) She has testified as an expert witness concerning assessments in the Courts of the State of Connecticut. (T. 10.) She is familiar with the properties in the Town of Canaan. (T. 11.)
Ms. Elliott proceeded to testify about the plaintiffs' properties in the Town of Canaan and their respective taxes. (T. 11-21, Exhibit 2-6.) Ms Seymour owns two properties in Canaan, one parcel comprised of 6.05 acres containing her residence and an adjacent unimproved parcel comprised of 4.11 acres. The assessed value of the first parcel is $103,100. The assessed value of the second parcel is $28,200. (Ex. 2.) Ms. Seymour pays a tax of $3,221.88 on the first parcel and a tax of $881.25 on the second parcel. The tax rate is 31.25 (mils) of the assessed value. (T. 18.) (Ex. 4.)
The assessment is based on the 1998 revaluation. The current 2002 revaluation was just completed prior to the hearing and had yet to be signed by Ms. Elliott. (T. pp. 12-13.)
The mill rate is against the assessed values. (T. 15.)
The plaintiff Joyce Schurk owns property in the Town of Canaan comprised of 1.74 acres containing a house and outbuildings. (T. 16.) The assessed value is $70,800. (T. 17.) The tax on the property allowing for a $1,500 veteran's exemption thereby reducing their assessed taxable value to $69,300 is $2,165.63. (T. 19, Ex. 5.) Ms. Elliott further testified that the mill rate in Canaan has remained essentially the same from the 1998 assessment to the current tax year. (T. 20.)
In addition Ms. Elliott prepared a property tax analysis for the hearing utilizing CAMA systems, that is, Computerized Assisted Mass Appraisal. (T. 22, Ex. 6.) This computerized tax analysis inputs the characteristics of the plaintiffs' properties utilizing information from their respective tax assessor's cards from the Town of Canaan. The purpose of this analysis was to determine what each plaintiffs' assessment and tax liability would be for each town located within Region One Board of Education. (T. 20-23.) The conclusion reached by such analysis was that the assessment of the Seymour property and the Schurk property in any of the corresponding towns in Litchfield would result in the same approximate tax. (T. 27-28.) Further, Ms. Elliott testified that the grand list in Canaan had increased by approximately 30 per cent. She believed that if municipal spending remained constant the mill rate would decrease by one third. (T. 28.)
The Attorney General offered as his next and last witness Mr. Robert Brewer, the manager of the Division of Grants for the State of Connecticut Department of Education. (T. 32.) Mr. Brewer testified that he had worked for that department for thirty-three years, the last fifteen CT Page 10880-w in the capacity of manager. (T. 32.) In particular, Mr. Brewer outlined the working and purpose of the educational cost sharing grant (ECS). (T. 33.) The ECS is an equalization grant. Its purpose is to "recognize the various abilities of the 169 towns in the State of Connecticut to raise funds to pay for education and to distribute the State's share, which in this case is about $1.5 billion in a proportion that's inverse to the town's ability to pay. So that a wealthier community would receive less support from the State, a needier community would receive additional funds." (T. 33-34.)
The ECS grant formula is based on three pieces; the foundation, that is, the amount of money the State allocates per student per year, currently just under $5,900.00; the number of students within the town adjusted for factors such as poverty, academic performance, limited English proficiency and finally, the relative ability of the towns to pay based on their property wealth. (T. 34.) The ECS has its own definition of property wealth based on an equalized net grand list (ENGL) which considers and factors into the equation the equalized grand list of the town, per capita income and median household income. (T. 34, 37.) Once calculated the ECS grant is paid to the Town Treasurer. (T. 35.) Mr. Brewer further testified to other grants paid directly to the school districts, specifically transportation grants, school construction grants, special education grants and bonus grants. (T. 35, 36, 49.) These grants similarly are based on a sliding scale factoring in the town's ability to pay. (T. 36.) The ECS grant however is the primary grant. (T. 36.)
On cross examination, Mr. Brewer admitted that he had no actual knowledge if once paid to the municipality, the ECS was indeed applied to education. There was however no direct evidence offered by plaintiffs to prove otherwise. (T. 51-54.)
Mr. Brewer prepared three exhibits for the Court, which were introduced into evidence without objection. (T. 43, 46, 48.) Said exhibits were calculated using data extracted from 2002-03 ECS calculations concerning the towns comprising Region One. Exhibit 7 delineates the primary data used to determine each town's respective wealth under the ECS formula. Said formula includes the three-year average ENGL for each town factoring in per capita income, median household income and the ECS wealth adjusted to the town's ENGL resulting in an income ranking of all 169 towns in the state. The last element, the base aid ratio represents the percentage of the ECS grant that the Town would receive of the base foundation of the just under $5,900 per pupil. (T. 38-42.)
Four of the towns comprising Region One, specifically Cornwall, Kent, Salisbury and Sharon rank in the top one third of Connecticut towns. Canaan ranks nearer the bottom of the one third at 55 with North Canaan ranked at the bottom of the second third at 107. (T. 43, 44.) Utilizing the base aid ratios, the four wealthiest towns receive the minimum of 6% of the ECS. (T. 44.) Canaan receives just under 17%. North Canaan CT Page 10880-x receives just over 45% of the foundation grant. (T. 44.).
Exhibit 8 demonstrates the ECS entitlement, 2002-03, for each town, the total number of weighted students and the resulting grant per need student. (T. 45). This entitlement is weighted based on poverty, performance on the State Mastery examination, which would indicate need for remedial services, limited English proficiency, et cetera. (T. 46). Again Mr. Brewer testified that the aid ratios for each town reflect their relative ability to pay. (T. 47). Accordingly, Cornwall, Kent, Salisbury and Sharon receive between $200 to $300 per need pupil whereas Canaan receives just under $1,000 and North Canaan, the town in the region with the lowest fiscal capacity, receives over $3,000 per pupil. (T. 47).
The final exhibit, Exhibit 9, reflects the relative share of the expenditures made on behalf of the Region One students coming from local sources versus the funds derived from state grants. (T. 48). Again, state grants were distributed according to the respective wealth of the Towns. North Canaan received 32%, Canaan, 12% with the four wealthier towns receiving between 4% to 5%. (T. 49.)
The Attorney General concluded his case with the testimony of Mr. Brewer. Counsel for the plaintiff proceeded with his case calling the Plaintiff Gabriel Seymour. The Plaintiff introduced into evidence copies of her tax records and payment to the Town of Canaan. (Exhibits A B.) The Plaintiff then attempted to introduce documents C-1 through C-5 which were various graphs and charts purporting to demonstrate the bases for her mathematical calculations outlining the inequities of Connecticut General Statute § 10-51 (b) alleged in her complaint. The Court excluded these documents from evidence on the basis of hearsay as Plaintiff failed to produce the original reports from which she had gleaned her original data supporting her calculations. (T. 78.) The Court did state that the witness could testify from her recollection as refreshed by her notes and calculations in C-1 through C-5 for identification. (T. 78.) This was never done. The Court did allow the Plaintiff's requests for Admissions and their responses. (T. 83-84.)
The Court reviewed the responses to the Requests for Admissions. The responses did not support the Plaintiffs' allegations.
Conclusion:
In reference to the Plaintiff Schurk, the only evidence before this Court is the Plaintiff's status as a taxpayer. She did not testify as to her particular injury. Credible and demonstrative evidence offered by the Attorney General established that her taxes did not increase as a result of the application of Conn. Gen. Stat. 10-51 (b). Nor did Ms. Schurk prove any other injury. The Court holds that the Plaintiff Schurk has CT Page 10880-y failed to demonstrate standing pursuant to the tenets delineated in Sadloski v. Manchester, 235 Conn. 637 (1995).
In reference to the Plaintiff Seymour, she testified that she had been injured by the cost allocation in that it was unfair and unequal in that taxpayers in the Town of Canaan can pay "four, five, six times as much as a similarly situated taxpayer in another regional member town . . ." (T. 88.) This statement is unsupported by evidence and in fact the Attorney General's analysis provided by Ms. Elliott's Exhibit 6 clearly refutes this statement. Ms. Seymour provided no evidence that her taxes have increased as a result of the cost allocation provided by Conn. Gen. Stat. 10-51 (b). Considering also the entire fiscal context, taking into account the benefits and burdens of the ECS, Seymour v. Region One, 261 Conn. at 491, the Court is compelled to conclude that Ms. Seymour has failed to establish the great harm required to confer standing. In addition the Attorney General has clearly established the benefit of the ECS to offset any claimed taxpayer harm. The Motion to Dismiss is granted.
ORDER
The Court having heard the evidence on the Attorney General's Motion to Dismiss, it is herein ordered. Granted.
The Court
Black, Judge
9/23/03