Opinion
2699.
Decided January 15, 2004.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Barbara Kapnick, J.), entered on or about July 3, 2002, which, inter alia, granted plaintiff's cross motion to vacate a self-executing order of preclusion against it on the condition that plaintiff's counsel pay defendants' counsel $1,500, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Robert E. Sokolski, for Plaintiff-Respondent.
Marie Ann Hoenings, for Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Tom, J.P., Williams, Marlow, Gonzalez, JJ.
Inasmuch as plaintiff demonstrated a meritorious cause of action and a reasonable excuse for its default in timely complying with the discovery directives in the subject order of preclusion, plaintiff's cross motion to vacate the self-executing preclusion order was properly granted ( see CPLR 5015[a][1]; Fernandez v. Tsoumpas Bros. Co., 140 A.D.2d 257; cf. Clarke v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 300 A.D.2d 614; Tejeda v. 750 Gerard Props. Corp., 272 A.D.2d 124). Plaintiff's default was not willful and its submission of its responses to defendants' discovery demands, albeit after an 18-day delay, demonstrated its good faith intent to prosecute the action. Any prejudice to defendants by reason of plaintiff's late compliance, was adequately addressed by the court's provision conditioning the grant of plaintiff's cross motion upon payment of $1,500 to defendants' counsel ( see Heffney v. Brookdale Hosp. Ctr., 102 A.D.2d 842, appeal dismissed 63 N.Y.2d 770; Maglieri v. Saks, 33 A.D.2d 898).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.