Opinion
CIV-23-1093-R
07-31-2024
ROMAN VLADIMIROVICH SERPIK, Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF DEREK MANNING, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SUZANNE MITCHELL UNITED STATES JUDGE
Plaintiff seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged civil rights violations during his arrest and subsequent detention. Doc. 23, at 26. United States District Judge David L. Russell referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 4. The undersigned recommends partial dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint.
I. Screening.
Federal law requires the Court to screen complaints filed by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. §§ 1915A(b), 1915(e)(2)(B).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1184 (10th Cir. 2010).
This Court construes “[a] pro se litigant's pleadings. . . liberally,” holding them “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The Court, however, may not serve as Plaintiff's advocate, creating arguments on his behalf. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
II. Plaintiff's claims and relief sought.
Plaintiff names as Defendants Sheriff Derek Manning; Undersheriff Jeffrey Miller; Victor Haro, Lieutenant at Jail; Marlyn Haro (Sheriff's office); Capt. Scott; Ms. Murphy (Medical); Beckham County Jail; Jill C. Weedon (Judge); Angela C. Marsee (Beck. Co. District Attorney); Donna Howell (Beck Co. Court Clerk); Officer Nation (Jailer); Officer T. (Jailer); Officer Pearson (Jailer). Doc. 23, at 27-28, 30. All Defendants except for the Beckham County Jail are named in both their individual and official capacities.
Plaintiff first claims he was falsely arrested. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff alleges “Defendant Angela Marsee knew as the District Attorney that all warrantless arrests have to be brought before a magistrate or judge instead of jail” and that by “not advising her agents of the correct law violated Plaintiff Roman[']s rights under the 4th, 6th, 8th, 13th, [and] 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution.” Id. ¶ 116; see also id. ¶ 120 (“Defendant(s) Marsee and Donna Howell Jan. 25th knowingly and willingly filed into [a] Beckham Co. Dist. Court [c]ase . . . false, fraudulent information different than the warrantless arrest states, and with Defendant Jill Weedon (Judge) went along with the scheme to Oct. 25th, 2023 trial [in this RICO]. Without a valid warrant and challenged subject matter and personal matter jurisdiction, even though challenged although never established, ruled against Plaintiff. Defendant[s'] actions violated . . . [the] 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 13th, 14th Amendments.”).
He next claims mistreatment in prison, including having his clothes stripped in the shower and being “kicked, thrown, [and] drug” while naked; being refused a Bible, clean food, water, and a phone call; being refused medical care; being refused access to the law library; being subjected to twenty-hour-hour light that exacerbated his migraines and a mattress that hurt his back and hand nerves, requiring physical therapy; being subjected to disparate treatment when jail officials seized his books; being intimidated out of filing legal documents. Id. at 4-20.
He alleges that, in retaliation for complaining of false arrest and insufficient medical care, Defendants “Pearson, Franks and Jonesdrug and beat Roman . . . using continuing excessive force against Plaintiff, punching, kicking, throwing against the concrete wall when Plaintiff at the time has not had his day in Court”; he names Defendants Pearson, Manning, Miller, Officer Haro, and Beckham County Jail/Sheriffs, alleging violations of the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. ¶ 117; see also Id. ¶ 119 (“Defendant Nurse Murphy . . . did not stop any guard from using excessive force” and after the beating “did absolutely no exam or check up ....”).
Neither Franks nor Jones is named as a Defendant. See Doc. 23, at 1, 27-28.
He also alleges Defendants “Manning, Miller, Lt. Haro, Marlyn Haro, Capt. Scott, Beckham Co. Jail/Sheriffs, Murphy . . . denied Plaintiff access to his scheduled Nov. 2nd 2023 doctors appt. and denied religious food fruit and veggie - diet,” in violation of the First Amendment. Id. ¶ 121; see also id. ¶ 126 (“Defendant(s) Manning, Miller, Lt. Haro, Capt. Scott, Ms. Murphy, Beckham County Jail/Sheriffs . . . denied a religious, kosher biblical diet with fruits and vegetables and . . . have denied attendance at jail church on Thursdays,” in violation of the First Amendment.).
He alleges “Defendant(s) Murphy, Lt. Haro, Capt. Scott, Manning, Miller, Backham Co. Jail/Sheriffs, knowing of continuing serious medical needs . . . in form of dental, chronic migraines, back & nerve pain, and accommodation to previous medical conditions have ignored and denied all complaints and denied access to [a] real doctor,” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. ¶ 123.
He also alleges “Defendant(s) Manning, Miller, Lt. Haro, Capt. Scott, Officer T, Nation, and Beckham Co. Jail/Sheriffs placed Plaintiff in protective custody based on frivolous accusations Dec. 6th 2023 till current, protective custody (P.C.) that administratively segregates Plaintiff to 23 hour lockdown w/ 1 hour out to exercise, phone, shower and law library without a way for a procedural due process into why Plaintiff in P.C. except for Defendants retaliation actions,” in violation of the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. ¶ 125.
He also separately claims deprivation of law library access. He alleges “Defendant(s) Manning, Miller, Lt. Haro, M. Haro, Capt. Scott, Beck. Co. Jail, Pearson, Officer T and Weedon from November 1st to Nov. 29th, 2023 did absolutely nothing to assist with law library case search,” preventing Plaintiff from perfecting a civil appeal to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in violation of his right to access the courts under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. ¶ 122; see also id. ¶ 124 (“Defendant(s) Manning, Miller, Lt. Haro, Capt. Scott, Beck. Co. Jail/Sheriffs, Jill Weedon . . . continuously, knowingly, intentionally have denied ‘access to the courts' by providing an inadequate law library kiosk with many incomplete case law, legal dictionaries, shepard citations and - Defendant(s) failed to provide advocate to assist with case law search, legal books, or a way to access legal, lawful search material, causing disruptions in Plaintiffs [sic] ability to perfect his civil, criminal and other non-frivolous court cases.”); see also id. ¶ 127 (“Defendant(s) Lt. Haro, Pearson, Jill Weedon, Officer T . . . have been by through intimidation, coercion, threat, forcing Plaintiff to sign the law materials in and out ‘their way' and not by mark, symbol how Plaintiff usually signs,” denying him access to the courts in violation of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.); see also id. ¶ 128 (“Defendant(s) Manning, Miller, Lt. Haro, Officer T and Nation, with Pearson are in a ‘campaign of harassment' against Plaintiff with Defendant Beckham Co. Jail . . . with law library material sign in sheet taking a signature then not giving the law library material and forcing signatures ‘their way' ....”).
Finally, Plaintiff claims “Defendants Beckham Co. Jail did not stop the deposit of special error bills (collector bills) into it's [sic] own cash deposit” in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. ¶ 118.
For relief, Plaintiff asks for a declaration that Defendants violated his constitutional rights, a “preliminary and permanent injunction ordering defendants Jill Weedon, Angela Marsee, Donna Howell to show valid 4th Amendment Const. warrant for Plaintiff's arrest,” and an order directing Defendants Manning, Miller, Lt. Haro, Officer Haro, Scott, Murphy, Beckham County Jail/Sheriffs, Officer Nation, Officer T, and Officer Pearson “to provide a fruit based and veggie based religious diet to cease taking personal hygiene and to stop forcing signatures ‘their way' on any legal binding documents and allow Plaintiff church service as other inmates receive.” Id. at 24-25. He also requests damages from Defendants Manning, Miller, Lt. Haro, Officer Haro, Scott, Murphy, Beckham County Jail, Officer T, and Pearson. Id. at 25. Finally, he requests “a trial by jury on all issues triable by jury” and recovery of costs associated with this action. Id.
III. The Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claims relating to false arrest.
A. The Court should abstain from hearing Plaintiff's claims under the Younger abstention doctrine.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
This Court should refrain from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims of false arrest under the Younger abstention doctrine. A federal district court must abstain under Younger when three conditions are met:
First, there must be ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings. Second, the state court must offer an adequate forum to hear the federal plaintiff's claims from the federal lawsuit. Third, the state proceeding must involve important state interests, matters which traditionally look to state law for their resolution or implicate separately articulated state policies.Taylor v. Jaquez, 126 F.3d 1294, 1297 (10th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff's false arrest claims relate to his conviction in Beckham County Case No. CM-23-31. Doc. 23, at 21; see also State v. Serpik, No. CM-23-31, https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=beckham&numbe r=CM-2023-00031&cmid=10626355 (last visited July 1, 2024). He appealed his conviction to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, which he has not shown to be an inadequate forum, and that appeal is still pending. Serpik v. State, No. M-2023-910, https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=appellate&numbe r=M-2023-910&cmid=136548 (last visited July 1, 2024). Indeed, “Younger requires only the availability of an adequate state-court forum, not a favorable result in the state forum.” Winn v. Cook, 945 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2019). And the State of Oklahoma possesses a strong interest in administering its criminal justice system. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986) (recognizing the States' “powerful” “interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference”).
Plaintiff also has a pending appeal related to the same underlying prosecution in Serpik v. State, No. M-2023-561, https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=appellate&numbe r=M-2023-561&cmid=135645 (last visited July 1, 2024). See United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007) (exercising “discretion to take judicial notice of publicly-filed records in our court and certain other courts concerning matters that bear directly upon the disposition of the case at hand”).
There are narrow exceptions to Younger abstention. But “federal injunctive relief against pending state prosecutions [is] appropriate” “[o]nly in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown.” Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971). And “it is the plaintiff's heavy burden to overcome the bar of Younger abstention by setting forth more than mere allegations of bad faith or harassment.” Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 885, 889 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Neither Plaintiff's complaint nor the record of his criminal proceedings implicates an exception to Younger abstention. Based on the record, the undersigned cannot conclude Plaintiff will face irreparable injury if the Court abstains. See also Winn, 945 F.3d at 1258 (“[T]he only injury that arises from delaying dismissal of the charges (until state remedies are exhausted) is that the defendant must go through a trial and appeal, which is not the sort of injury that satisfies the Younger exception; in particular, the process of proceeding through a trial and appeal does no damage to the right to a speedy trial.”).
Because the three conditions requiring abstention under Younger exist in this case and in the absence of “extraordinary circumstances,” the undersigned determines abstention is “non-discretionary” and “[this] court is required to abstain” from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims of false arrest. Chapman v. Oklahoma, 472 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Crown Point I, LLC v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n, 319 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003)).
B. Alternatively, Defendants Judge Weedon and Marsee are immune from suit for money damages.
Plaintiff names as Defendants Judge Jill Carpenter Weedon and District Attorney Angela Marsee. Should this Court decline to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims of false arrest under Younger, supra § III.A., it should find Defendants Judge Weedon and Marsee are absolutely immune from suit.
Plaintiff alleges “Defendant Angela Warsee knew as the District Attorney that all warrantless arrests have to be brought before a magistrate or judge instead of jail” and that by “not advising her agents of the correct law violated Plaintiff Roman[']s rights under the 4th, 6th, 8th, 13th, [and] 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution.” Doc. 23, ¶ 116. He also alleges “Defendant(s) Marsee and Donna Howell Jan. 25th knowingly and willingly filed into [a] Beckham Co. Dist. Court [c]ase . . . false, fraudulent information different than the warrantless arrest states, and with Defendant Jill Weedon (Judge) went along with the scheme to Oct. 25th, 2023 trial [in this RICO]. Without a valid warrant and challenged subject matter and personal matter jurisdiction, even though challenged although never established, ruled against Plaintiff. Defendant[s'] actions violated . . . [the] 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 13th, 14th Amendments.” Id. ¶ 120.
“[J]udges are generally immune from suits for money damages.” Stein v. Disciplinary Bd. of Sup. Ct. of N.M., 520 F.3d 1183, 1195 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991)). “There are only two exceptions to this rule: (1) when the act is ‘not taken in [the judge's] judicial capacity,' and (2) when the act, ‘though judicial in nature, [is] taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.'” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12). But unless one of these exceptions applies, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, [or] was done maliciously.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). “The ‘judicial acts' for which judges enjoy immunity include all functions normally performed by a judge when the parties deal with the judge in [their] judicial capacity.” Bradley v. Gray, 78 F. App'x. 84, 85 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 362). Nothing in his complaint suggests Defendant Judge Weedon was acting outside her judicial capacity or without jurisdiction when she allegedly violated Plaintiff's rights. She is therefore entitled to absolute immunity for her conduct in overseeing his trial.
Similarly, “[p]rosecutors enjoy absolute immunity to liability under § 1983 for actions ‘within the scope of their prosecutorial duties.'” Gradle v. Oklahoma, 203 Fed.Appx. 179, 182 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Arnold v. McClain, 926 F.2d 963, 966 (10th Cir. 1991)). “The common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the same considerations that underlie the commonlaw immunities of judges ....” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-423 (1976). This immunity extends to “initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case.” Id. at 431. “This is so even if the prosecutor acted ‘with an improper state of mind or improper motive.'” Medina v. Weber, 531 Fed.Appx. 902, 903 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Shmueli v. City of New York, 424 F.3d 231, 237 (2d Cir.2005)). Defendant Marsee is therefore entitled to absolute immunity for her conduct in prosecuting Plaintiff's trial.
Plaintiff's allegations also implicate Court Clerk Donna Howell. Doc. 23, at 21. “There is a substantial question [] whether the doctrine of absolute immunity extends” to clerks of court. Stein, 520 F.3d at 1191. “The 13 presumption is that qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect government officials in the exercise of their duties.” Id. (quoting Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432 n. 4 (1993)). But absolute immunity is not automatically available when a defendant's work is part of judicial process. Id. “[C]ourt clerks are generally entitled only to qualified immunity.” Id. Two circumstances may entitle a court clerks to absolute immunity: “First, absolute immunity may be available to protect clerks performing quasijudicial duties, such as setting bail. Second, it may protect clerks ‘acting under the command of a court decree or explicit instructions from a judge.'” Id. (quoting Henriksen v. Bentley, 644 F.2d 852, 856 (10th Cir. 1981)). The Court makes no conclusions at this stage about whether Defendant Howell is entitled to absolute immunity.
Because Defendants are absolutely immune from suit for money damages, the undersigned recommends dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff's individual-capacity claims against Defendants Judge Weedon and Marsee under § 1915A(b). See Phan v. Babcock, 764 Fed.Appx. 837, 838 (10th Cir. 2019) (holding that the district court had properly dismissed with prejudice the claims against two judges who were entitled to absolutely immunity from a civil rights suit); Glaser v. City & County of Denver, 557 Fed.Appx. 689, 705-06 (10th Cir. 2014) (affirming the district court's dismissal, “with prejudice,” of plaintiff's § 1983 claims against state prosecutor for which the prosecutor had absolute immunity).
IV. Plaintiff's requests for injunctive relief are either moot or outside this Court's authority.
Plaintiff asks for a declaration that Defendants violated his constitutional rights, a “preliminary and permanent injunction ordering defendants Jill Weedon, Angela Marsee, Donna Howell to show valid 4th Amendment Const. warrant for Plaintiff's arrest,” and an order directing jail officials “to provide a fruit based and veggie based religious diet to cease taking personal hygiene and to stop forcing signatures ‘their way' on any legal binding documents and allow Plaintiff church service as other inmates receive.” Doc. 23, at 24-25.
Plaintiff appears to have served the entirety of his sentence in Beckham County Case No. CM-23-31. See Serpik, Docket Entry dated Nov. 2, 2023 (showing Plaintiff was sentenced for count one to a term of one year's imprisonment, with all but the first six months suspended, and for count two to a term of ten days' imprisonment). Plaintiff also filed two notices of change of address indicating he is no longer incarcerated. See Docs. 11, 24.
Turning to Plaintiff's request for an injunction related to mistreatment in prison, “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 15 (1974). So Plaintiff's release from custody renders moot his claim for injunctive relief related to conditions at his former facility. See Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1027 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Where the prisoner's claims for declaratory or injunctive relief relate solely to the conditions of confinement at the penal institution at which the prisoner is no longer incarcerated, courts have concluded that they are unable to provide the prisoner with effective relief.”).
Turning to Plaintiff's request for an injunction related to his arrest warrant, this request is “in the nature of mandamus relief.” Ruiz v. Okla. Cnty. Sheriff's Off., No. CIV 07-43-C, 2007 WL 950367, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 27, 2007) (referring to a request for “an order from this Court requiring the Respondent, Oklahoma County Sheriff's Office, to dismiss [a] state detainer”). Federal district courts have jurisdiction to enter mandamus relief against federal officials and agencies, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, but they may not enter mandamus relief against state officials. E.g., Sockey v. Gray, 159 Fed.Appx. 821, 822 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Federal courts are without jurisdiction to grant a writ of mandamus against state and local officials.”).
The Court should therefore dismiss Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
V. Plaintiff may not recover money damages from individual Defendants sued in their official capacities.
Plaintiff asks for money damages, generally, and names all Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. “However, ‘[s]ection 1983 plaintiffs may sue individual-capacity defendants only for money damages and official-capacity defendants only for injunctive relief.'” Hughes v. Oklahoma, No. CIV-21-1094-F, 2022 WL 3970650, at *7 n.6 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 31, 2022) (quoting Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1161 n.5 (10th Cir. 2011)). So the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs claims for money damages against the individual Defendants in their official capacities.
VI. The Beckham County Jail is not a suable entity.
Plaintiff names as a Defendant the Beckham County Jail. “Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a non-corporate entity's capacity to be sued is determined by the law of the state in which the district court is located,” and “Oklahoma law provides that each organized county can sue and be sued through its board of county commissioners.” Parks v. Oklahoma County, No. CIV-18-968-M, 2018 WL 7075289, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 15, 2018), adopted sub nom. Parks v. Taylor, No. CV-18-968-D, 2019 WL 254669 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 17, 2019). The Beckham County Jail “ha[s] no separate legal identities under Oklahoma law” and therefore cannot be sued under § 1983. Id. (collecting cases). So the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs claims against the Beckham County Jail.
VII. Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the following:
• all false arrest claims, in their entirety, see supra § III.A.;
• all claims for injunctive relief, see supra § IV;
• all remaining claims for money damages against individual capacity Defendants, see supra § V;
• all claims against Beckham County Jail, see supra § VI.
The undersigned advises Plaintiff of his right to file an objection to this report and recommendation with the Clerk of this Court on or before August 21, 2024, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). The undersigned further advises Plaintiff that failure to make a timely objection to this report and recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This report and recommendation does not terminate the referral to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in this matter.