Opinion
2014-05-7
Hermes Bidkar SERPAS, et al., respondents, v. Robert A. BELL, et al., appellants.
Perez & Varvaro, Uniondale, N.Y. (Alex M. Temple of counsel), for appellants. Mallilo & Grossman, Flushing, N.Y. (Angela A. Capri of counsel), for respondents.
Perez & Varvaro, Uniondale, N.Y. (Alex M. Temple of counsel), for appellants. Mallilo & Grossman, Flushing, N.Y. (Angela A. Capri of counsel), for respondents.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., PLUMMER E. LOTT, SANDRA L. SGROI, and HECTOR D. LASALLE, JJ.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Winslow, J.), dated November 9, 2012, as denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the accident resulted from an unforeseen medical emergency.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiffs allegedly sustained injuries when the vehicle in which they were traveling was struck by a vehicle operated by the defendant Brandi M. Bell and owned by the defendant Robert A. Bell. The defendants, relying solely upon the deposition testimony of Brandi M. Bell, subsequently moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, inter alia, on the basis that Brandi M. Bell had suffered an unforeseen medical emergency that rendered her unconscious at the time of the accident. The Supreme Court, inter alia, denied that branch of the defendants' motion.
The operator of a vehicle who becomes involved in an accident as the result of suffering a sudden medical emergency will not be chargeable with negligence as long as the emergency was unforeseen ( see Doran v. Wells, 101 A.D.3d 937, 957 N.Y.S.2d 249;Romero v. Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth., 25 A.D.3d 683, 811 N.Y.S.2d 692;State of New York v. Susco, 245 A.D.2d 854, 666 N.Y.S.2d 321;Thomas v. Hulslander, 233 A.D.2d 567, 649 N.Y.S.2d 252;Abish v. Cetta, 155 A.D.2d 495, 547 N.Y.S.2d 358). Here, the defendants failed to demonstrate their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, because they did not come forward with competent or expert medical evidence to establish the existence of the claimed medical emergency and its unforeseeable nature ( see Sang Hyub Han v. Onyan, 83 A.D.3d 1037, 921 N.Y.S.2d 533;Mowton v. Rabiner, 40 A.D.3d 1058, 836 N.Y.S.2d 687;see generally Parisella v. Jack Haverty's Auto Parts, 296 A.D.2d 539, 745 N.Y.S.2d 494). Accordingly, that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on this basis was properly denied, without regard to the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' submissions in opposition ( see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923, 501 N.E.2d 572;Sang Hyub Han v. Onyan, 83 A.D.3d 1037, 921 N.Y.S.2d 533;Mowton v. Rabiner, 40 A.D.3d 1058, 836 N.Y.S.2d 687).