Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-11066-RWZ.
December 15, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Petitioner John A. Serino was convicted of first-degree murder in a jury trial before the Middlesex County Superior Court on June 17, 1992, after instructing his attorney to waive all defenses including lack of criminal responsibility. Petitioner now serves a sentence of life imprisonment. He filed a notice of appeal on July 9, 1992, and subsequently a motion for a new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. On March 28, 2002, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction and denied petitioner's motion for a new trial. See Commonwealth v. Serino, 436 Mass. 408 (2002). Thereafter, he timely filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner originally alleged two grounds for the habeas petition, ineffective assistance of counsel at trial for counsel's failure to pursue a defense based on petitioner's mental competency, and ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal for counsel's failure to exhaust fully all avenues of appeal. On review of this petition, Magistrate Judge Lawrence P. Cohen issued a report and recommendation that the second ground be dismissed for lack of exhaustion. Accordingly, on March 23, 2004, petitioner filed a motion to amend his habeas petition to delete the unexhausted claim, and the Court allowed this motion. Respondent now moves to dismiss the reduced petition on the merits.
The prevailing standard for ineffective assistance requires that petitioner "identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). Additionally, courts must strongly presume that counsel have "rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Petitioner bases his claim on his counsel's failure to obtain an independent mental health examination to determine whether he was sufficiently competent to stand trial or assist in his own defense. According to petitioner, his conduct prior to trial strongly indicated mental illness, as he "appeared agitated, angry and was yelling." Appellant's Brief, p. 25. He was "curling up in a fetal position when police arrived, . . . flailing his arms and yelling racial slurs upon booking, and . . . repeatedly claiming that [the victim] was `his baby' and that she `was evil'." Id. Petitioner also "exhibited bizarre behavior in the courtroom, including his waiver of all defenses, his claim that he had `blacked out' with respect to the statements, and his comment that he `would request the death penalty' if convicted." Appellant's Brief, p. 26.
Notwithstanding petitioner's behavior, a psychiatrist, who examined petitioner on two separate occasions prior to trial, determined each time that he was competent to stand trial. See Appellant's Brief, p. 3. The trial court relied upon these professional reports and ruled accordingly.See Appellant's Brief, p. 5. As noted by the Supreme Judicial Court, petitioner has provided no evidence or explanation for why these two psychiatric evaluations should be disregarded or why an independent evaluation would produce a different result.Serino, 436 Mass. at 415. Additionally, the record indicates that petitioner's counsel discussed potential defenses with petitioner prior to trial, and that petitioner understood the potential consequences of his chosen defense strategy. Tr. at 29-33. Adoption of an unorthodox defense strategy, for example waiving all defenses, does not establish a lack of criminal responsibility. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 422 Mass. 420, 425-426 (1996) (finding that defendant's self-identified "illogical response to the issuance of a protective order" failed to implicate "a lack of criminal responsibility at the time of the crimes"). Defendant's choices "relating to his defense" must be accorded utmost respect in protecting individual autonomy.Commonwealth v. Federici, 427 Mass. 740, 744 (1998). See also, Tr. at 29. In light of the presumption of reasonable professional judgment and the absence of any affirmative evidence to the contrary, petitioner's claim for ineffective assistance is not compelling.
Accordingly, respondent's motion is allowed. Judgment may be entered dismissing the petition.