Opinion
No. 18-60034 BAP No. 17-1118 No. 18-60035 BAP No. 17-1123
11-16-2020
In re: FAREED SEPEHRY-FARD, Debtor. FAREED SEPEHRY-FARD, Appellant, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee for GreenPoint Mortgage Trust Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-AR2, Appellee. In re: FAREED SEPEHRY-FARD, Debtor. FAREED SEPEHRY-FARD, Appellant, v. U.S. BANK, N.A., Appellee.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MEMORANDUM Appeals from the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Brand, Taylor, and Faris, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
In these consolidated appeals, Fareed Sepehry-Fard appeals pro se from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's ("BAP") judgment dismissing in part, and affirming in part, the bankruptcy court's order granting U.S. Bank, National Association's ("U.S. Bank") motion for relief from the automatic stay. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo BAP decisions and apply the same standard of review that the BAP applied to the bankruptcy court's ruling. Boyajian v. New Falls Corp. (In re Boyajian), 564 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2009). We review de novo the question of mootness. Suter v. Goedert, 504 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.
The BAP properly dismissed as moot Sepehry-Fard's appeal of the bankruptcy court's ruling that the automatic stay terminated on March 31, 2017, because there was no longer any case or controversy after the bankruptcy case was dismissed and the dismissal became final. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B); Castaic Partners II, LLC v. Daca-Castaic, LLC (In re Castaic Partners II, LLC), 823 F.3d 966, 969 (9th Cir. 2016) ("In a bankruptcy appeal, when the underlying bankruptcy case is dismissed and that dismissal is allowed to become final, there is likely no longer any case or controversy . . . ."); Armel Laminates, Inc. v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Income Prop. Builders, Inc.), 699 F.2d 963, 964 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Once the bankruptcy was dismissed, a bankruptcy court no longer had power to order the stay or to award damages allegedly attributable to its vacation. A remand by us to the bankruptcy court would therefore be useless.").
The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by granting in rem relief to U.S. Bank because the record supports the finding that such relief was warranted. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4) (setting forth requirements for in rem relief); Arkison v. Griffin (In re Griffin), 719 F.3d 1126, 1128 (9th Cir. 2013) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that "a party seeking stay relief need only establish that it has a colorable claim to the property at issue").
We reject as without merit Sepehry-Fard's contentions that the BAP or the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter or personal jurisdiction.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending motions and requests, including all requests set forth in the consolidated opening brief, are denied.
AFFIRMED.