Opinion
335 CA 21-01596
06-30-2023
Jean SENYCIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Philip VOSSELER, et al., Defendants, Gregory Nagy and Gren Nagy, Defendants-Respondents. (Appeal No. 1.)
CAMPBELL & ASSOCIATES, HAMBURG (JASON M. TELAAK OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT. LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL R. ARCHILLA, BUFFALO (JEFFREY C. SENDZIAK OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
CAMPBELL & ASSOCIATES, HAMBURG (JASON M. TELAAK OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.
LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL R. ARCHILLA, BUFFALO (JEFFREY C. SENDZIAK OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., LINDLEY, CURRAN, MONTOUR, AND OGDEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries she sustained in a multi-vehicle collision. Plaintiff was the front-seat passenger in a motor vehicle operated by defendant Gregory Nagy (Nagy) and owned by defendant Gren Nagy (collectively, Nagy defendants). In November 2014, Nagy was driving the vehicle across Grand Island during a snowfall. As Nagy crested the north Grand Island Bridge, he observed multiple vehicles stopped ahead in the right lane; Nagy maneuvered his vehicle into the left lane, where it struck the guardrail and came to a stop. Nagy's vehicle was pinned against the guardrail by a tractor trailer, and was then struck from behind after a vehicle operated by defendant Philip Vosseler failed to stop and a chain-reaction accident occurred involving two vehicles that had come to a stop between Vosseler's car and Nagy's. At the conclusion of her proof at trial, plaintiff moved for a directed verdict on the ground that Nagy and Vosseler were not paying attention or driving at a reasonable speed under the conditions. Supreme Court denied the motion and the jury returned a verdict finding that neither Nagy nor Vosseler had acted negligently. Plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence, but the court denied that motion as well.
In appeal No. 1, plaintiff appeals from a judgment that, inter alia, dismissed the complaint against the Nagy defendants, upon the jury verdict. In appeal No. 2, plaintiff appeals from a judgment that, inter alia, dismissed the complaint against Vosseler, upon the jury verdict. In each appeal, plaintiff contends that the court committed reversible error in denying her motion for a directed verdict, in denying her motion to set aside the verdict, and in failing to instruct the jury on Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 (e). We reject plaintiff's contentions.
"[A] directed verdict is appropriate where the ... court finds that, upon the evidence presented, there is no rational process by which the fact trier could base a finding in favor of the nonmoving party" ( A & M Global Mgt. Corp. v. Northtown Urology Assoc., P.C. , 115 A.D.3d 1283, 1287, 983 N.Y.S.2d 368 [4th Dept. 2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]). In determining whether to grant such a motion, "the trial court must afford the party opposing the motion every inference which may properly be drawn from the facts presented, and the facts must be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmovant" ( id. ). In appeal No. 1, affording the Nagy defendants every inference that may properly be drawn from the evidence presented and considering the evidence in a light most favorable to them, we conclude that there is a rational process by which the jury could have found that Nagy did not act negligently.
In appeal No. 2, plaintiff contends that the court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict with respect to Vosseler. "[T]he rearmost driver in a chain-reaction collision bears a presumption of responsibility ..., and ... a rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence with respect to the operator of the moving vehicle, and imposes a duty on the operator of the moving vehicle to come forward with an adequate, [nonnegligent] explanation for the accident" ( Gustke v. Nickerson , 159 A.D.3d 1573, 1574-1575, 72 N.Y.S.3d 733 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied in part & dismissed in part 32 N.Y.3d 1048, 88 N.Y.S.3d 403, 113 N.E.3d 459 [2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Zanghi v. Doerfler , 158 A.D.3d 1275, 1276, 70 N.Y.S.3d 716 [4th Dept. 2018] ). Here, Vosseler proffered a nonnegligent explanation for the accident (cf. Topczij v. Clark , 28 A.D.3d 1139, 1139-1140, 814 N.Y.S.2d 425 [4th Dept. 2006] ; see generally Miller v. Steinberg , 164 A.D.3d 492, 493, 82 N.Y.S.3d 597 [2d Dept. 2018] ; Orcel v. Haber , 140 A.D.3d 937, 937-938, 33 N.Y.S.3d 429 [2d Dept. 2016] ) and we conclude that there is a rational process by which the jury could have found that Vosseler did not act negligently.
A motion to set aside a verdict rendered in favor of a defendant as against the weight of the evidence (see CPLR 4404 [a] ) may be granted "only when the evidence so preponderated in favor of the plaintiff that [the verdict] could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence" ( Tozan v. Engert , 188 A.D.3d 1659, 1660, 135 N.Y.S.3d 725 [4th Dept. 2020] ; see Lolik v. Big V Supermarkets, Inc. , 86 N.Y.2d 744, 746, 631 N.Y.S.2d 122, 655 N.E.2d 163 [1995] ). With respect to appeal No. 1, in light of the conflicting testimony regarding the speed of Nagy's vehicle, it cannot be said that the evidence so preponderated in favor of plaintiff that the jury's verdict could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Long v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth. , 81 A.D.3d 1391, 1392, 917 N.Y.S.2d 463 [4th Dept. 2011] ; see generally Berner v. Little , 137 A.D.3d 1675, 1676, 28 N.Y.S.3d 519 [4th Dept. 2016] ). Similarly, with respect to appeal No. 2, we conclude that the jury's finding that Vosseler was not negligent was "not palpably irrational or wrong" ( Clark v. Loftus , 162 A.D.3d 1643, 1644, 79 N.Y.S.3d 785 [4th Dept. 2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Lesio v. Attardi , 121 A.D.3d 1527, 1528, 993 N.Y.S.2d 810 [4th Dept. 2014] ).
Further, even assuming, arguendo, that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 (e), any error was harmless inasmuch as "a substantial right of a party [was] not prejudiced" ( CPLR 2002 ; see Nestorowich v. Ricotta , 97 N.Y.2d 393, 400-401, 740 N.Y.S.2d 668, 767 N.E.2d 125 [2002] ; Solecki v. Oakwood Cemetery Assn. , 192 A.D.3d 1606, 1607, 140 N.Y.S.3d 815 [4th Dept. 2021] ; Murdoch v. Niagara Falls Bridge Commn. , 81 A.D.3d 1456, 1457-1458, 917 N.Y.S.2d 501 [4th Dept. 2011], lv denied 17 N.Y.3d 702, 2011 WL 2237281 [2011] ). In addition to charging the jury on Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 (a), the court charged the jury regarding negligence, foreseeability, and the general duties of motorists to one another, including the duty to operate a motor vehicle "with reasonable care, having regard to the actual and potential hazards existing from the weather, road traffic and other conditions," as well as the "duty to maintain a reasonably safe rate of speed." Accordingly, " ‘the charge as a whole adequately explain[ed] [applicable] negligence principles’ such that we are ‘confident in concluding that [any error] ... did not affect the jury's verdict’ " ( Solecki , 192 A.D.3d at 1607, 140 N.Y.S.3d 815, quoting Reis v. Volvo Cars of N. Am. , 24 N.Y.3d 35, 43, 993 N.Y.S.2d 672, 18 N.E.3d 383 [2014], rearg denied 24 N.Y.3d 949, 994 N.Y.S.2d 49, 18 N.E.3d 750 [2014] ).