Opinion
(3605)
Argued May 6, 1986 —
Decision released June 24, 1986
Appeal from a decision by the named defendant granting an application filed by the defendants Michael Algiere et al. for the removal of a certain liquor license, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven and tried to the court, Foti, J.; judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiffs appealed to this court. No error.
W. Paul Flynn, with whom was Howard A. Lawrence, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Robert F. Vacchelli, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Joseph I. Lieberman, attorney general, and Richard M. Sheridan, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (named defendant).
Stuart A. Margolis, for the appellees (defendants Michael Algiere et al.).
In this appeal, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' administrative appeal from the action of the named defendant, the state department of liquor control. That action authorized the removal of a liquor license from Darien to East Haven. The principal claim of the plaintiffs is that General Statutes 30-52 bars the removal authorized here.
In Breen v. Department of Liquor Control, 2 Conn. App. 628, 481 A.2d 755 (1984) (Breen I), this court read General Statutes 30-52 in accordance with the construction urged by the plaintiffs in this case. Thereafter, however, the Supreme Court granted certification to appeal from our decision and reversed our judgment in response to a motion filed on the ground that Public Acts 1985, No. 85-361, which became effective on June 27, 1985, rendered the issues moot. See Breen v. Department of Liquor Control, 5 Conn. App. 432, 499 A.2d 432 (1985) (Breen II). That public act clarified that the intent of General Statutes 30-52 was to permit, under certain circumstances, the removal of a liquor license from one town to another, and it specifically validated any prior action of the department authorizing such a removal. It is clear that the Supreme Court's action as reported in Breen II controls this case. We have considered the arguments of the plaintiffs attempting to distinguish this case from Breen II, and find them to be without merit.