Opinion
April 26, 1971
In an action to recover damages for wrongful death, (1) defendants appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, entered February 3, 1970, against them upon a jury verdict of $240,000 for plaintiff; and (2) defendants Port of New York Authority and John F. Collins also appeal from an order of the same court dated March 16, 1970 which denied their motion to set aside the verdict and the judgment and for a new trial. Appeal from order dismissed, without costs. No appeal lies from an order denying a motion to set aside a verdict and for a new trial made solely on the trial minutes. Judgment reversed, on the law and in the interests of justice, and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event. The questions of fact have not been considered. Plaintiff's intestate, who collapsed and fell while hurrying up a ramp at Kennedy Airport, was being transported to a hospital in a Port Authority ambulance when it was involved in a collision with an automobile owned and operated by defendant Brooks. The principal question at the trial as to liability was whether, as plaintiff claims, her intestate died of a neck fracture caused by the collision or whether, as the Port Authority claims, he died in the ambulance prior to the collision either because of heart failure or because his neck was fractured during attempts to revive him in the ambulance. The resolution of this question depended largely, if not entirely, upon conflicting medical testimony. During the defense cross-examination of plaintiff's medical expert, who had performed the autopsy and signed the death certificate which stated the cause of death as fracture of the cervical spine with contusion of the cervical spinal cord, plaintiff's counsel advised the court that he had another doctor to call as a witness and this doctor had an appointment one hour and five minutes later. The court told the cross-examiner he had five minutes more, saying, "You have had over an hour and a quarter. That is enough." When the five minutes were up the court terminated the cross-examination and refused to hear any offer of proof from defense counsel as to additional matters he wished to cover on further cross-examination. The extent of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court, which may exercise a reasonable discretion in determining when the subject is exhausted (see Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691, 694). By prematurely terminating cross-examination and refusing to let defense counsel say what additional matters he wished to cover on further cross-examination, the trial court effectively cut off in limine all inquiry on such subjects, which the record shows were material and relevant. In view of the closeness of the issue as to liability, we consider this reversible error. We find additional error in the trial court's charge that if defendant Brooks had passed a red light he should have been given a police summons for so doing; the testimony shows that Brooks said he had a green light in his favor and was given a summons for failing to yield to the ambulance. In the interests of justice there should be a new trial. In any event, the verdict is grossly excessive. Rabin, P.J., Munder, Martuscello, Gulotta and Benjamin, JJ., concur.