Opinion
07-22-00118-CR
01-30-2023
BRANDAN RAY SEGUINE, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
Do not publish
On Appeal from the 78th District Court Wichita County, Texas Trial Court No. DC78-CR2021-1449, Honorable Meredith Kennedy, Presiding
Pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court's docket equalization efforts, this case was transferred to this Court from the Second Court of Appeals. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 73.001. In the event of any conflict, we apply the transferor court's case law. Tex.R.App.P. 41.3.
Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Judy C. Parker Justice.
Appellant, Brandan Ray Seguine, was indicted for possessing between one and four grams of methamphetamine, a third-degree felony. Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the methamphetamine that was obtained during a traffic stop. After Appellant's motion was denied, he pleaded guilty while reserving his right to appeal the trial court's suppression ruling. The trial court assessed a punishment of four years' confinement in prison. In his sole issue, Appellant contends the officer unnecessarily prolonged his traffic stop to investigate a drug offense when there was no reasonable suspicion to do so. We affirm the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to suppress.
Background
At a pre-trial hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Electra police officer David Ohm pertaining to the events relevant to Appellant's motion to suppress. The State also introduced the in-car video from the officer's patrol car which captured the stop and subsequent arrest.
Around 3:00 p.m. on March 2, 2019, Officer Ohm was dispatched to investigate a criminal trespass at a location known to law enforcement as a drug house, that is, a house used to cook methamphetamine. Officer Ohm learned from the dispatcher that Appellant was one of the suspects and Roseanna Borders was the other suspect. From his prior experience, the officer knew that Appellant was a methamphetamine user and had been recently arrested for "manufacture/delivery" of methamphetamine. The officer had stopped Appellant multiple times. When the officer arrived at the location of the reported trespass, he spoke with Toni Strickland, who lived across the street. Strickland stated that the homeowner was not there because he was in jail. She saw Appellant and Borders pull up in a vehicle, go into the house, grab "some things," and leave. Strickland provided a description of Appellant's vehicle.
While patrolling the area, Officer Ohm spotted Appellant's vehicle near the scene of the reported trespass. After conducting a records check, the officer learned that Appellant's driver's license was invalid. The officer followed Appellant and initiated a traffic stop. When he activated the lights on his patrol car, Appellant did not stop immediately. Instead, Appellant continued to drive slowly. Appellant stopped at a stop sign, turned left, and continued to drive. Officer Ohm noticed that Appellant was looking at him in his mirror, so he "bumped" his siren. Appellant drove another quarter of a block before pulling over. Officer Ohm testified that Appellant had ample time to stop and pull over before Appellant encountered the stop sign.
After the officer approached Appellant's vehicle, he observed that Appellant was shaking even though Appellant had his heater on and remained in the vehicle. When the officer asked Appellant why he was shaking, Appellant said that he was cold. The temperature was "kind of cool, but it wasn't cold-cold." According to Officer Ohm, Appellant had never shaken or looked nervous during their previous encounters; in contrast, on those occasions, Appellant had acted like a "smart aleck." When the officer asked Appellant why he was driving with an invalid license, Appellant said he was unaware that it was invalid. The officer asked Appellant to step outside the vehicle and, when he complied, he locked and shut the door. Officer Ohm testified that this behavior was odd because Appellant had "never locked a vehicle that I've asked him to get out of."
When Appellant stated he did not have anything illegal in his vehicle, the officer asked him for consent to search the vehicle and his person. Appellant granted consent to search the vehicle but denied consent to search his person. Officer Ohm questioned Appellant about the criminal trespass and Appellant acknowledged that he and Borders had been at the house the subject of the trespass. During his questioning, Officer Ohm instructed Appellant several times to stay off his cell phone, but Appellant continued to use it. A few minutes after giving consent to search the vehicle, Appellant withdrew his consent and Officer Ohm arranged to have a canine officer come to the scene. The dash cam video shows less than seven minutes had elapsed from the time that Officer Ohm initiated the traffic stop to the time that he requested a canine unit. At that point, Officer Ohm had not written a ticket or decided what he was going to do about Appellant's invalid driver's license. Further, he was still conducting an investigation regarding the criminal trespass.
While waiting for the canine officer, Officer Ohm decided to place Appellant in the patrol car. He asked his partner, Officer Norris, to perform a pat-down frisk of Appellant for weapons. As he did so, Officer Norris found a multitool and something large in Appellant's right pocket. Officer Norris asked Appellant what was in his pocket and Appellant replied, "a wad." Officer Norris asked him, "[A] wad of what?" Appellant said, "just a wad." Appellant stuck his hands into his pockets and pushed the wad down farther. As Officer Norris placed the multitool on the hood of the patrol car, Appellant pushed off of Officer Ohm and ran. Officer Ohm grabbed Appellant and Officer Norris used a Taser to subdue Appellant.
Officer Ohm testified that the entire encounter, from the time of the traffic stop until Appellant began running, lasted approximately fourteen minutes. The officer admitted that fourteen minutes was a sufficient amount of time for an officer conducting a traffic stop to run warrants, check for insurance, and issue a citation.
The officers handcuffed Appellant, retrieved the wad from his pocket, and found that it contained methamphetamine. After Appellant received Miranda warnings, he stated that he had gotten the drugs from "somebody else's belongings" that were located within the house.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498-99, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
At a pre-trial hearing, Appellant filed a motion to suppress in which he argued that the arresting officer caused the detention to last longer than necessary to accomplish the purpose of the stop, and, as a result, the contraband discovered during a pat-down of his clothing should be suppressed. The trial court denied the motion and stated on the record that the officer was a credible witness, and the traffic stop had not been unreasonably delayed given that "there was a pending drug investigation" that had begun.
Appellant pleaded guilty and signed a judicial confession. The trial court convicted him and sentenced him to four years' confinement in prison. Appellant reserved the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. He timely filed this appeal.
In his sole issue, Appellant contends that officers unnecessarily prolonged his detention during a traffic stop for an invalid driver's license to investigate a drug offense when there was no reasonable suspicion to do so.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence using a bifurcated standard. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In reviewing the trial court's decision, we do not engage in our own factual review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We give almost total deference to the trial court's rulings on questions of historical fact and application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673. But when application-of-law-to-fact questions do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, we review the trial court's rulings on those questions de novo. Id.
When, as here, there are no explicit fact findings and neither party timely requested findings and conclusions from the trial court, we imply the necessary fact findings that would support the trial court's ruling if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's rulings, supports those findings. State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 25. We then review the trial court's legal ruling de novo unless the implied fact findings supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Applicable Law
A traffic stop and any ensuing detention must be supported by reasonable suspicion. Ramirez-Tamayo v. State, 537 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). "Reasonable suspicion" to detain a person exists when a police officer has "specific articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably to conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity." Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). A reasonable suspicion is more than a mere hunch; the standard requires considerably less proof of wrongdoing than a preponderance of the evidence, and less than is necessary for probable cause. See Johnson v. State, 622 S.W.3d 378, 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). The existence of reasonable suspicion is determined by considering the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 385; see also Lambeth v. State, 221 S.W.3d 831, 837 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2007) (op. on reh'g en banc). When determining whether reasonable suspicion to conduct a detention exists, we disregard the subjective motives of the arresting officer and instead determine whether there was an objectively justifiable basis for the detention. See Ramirez-Tamayo, 537 S.W.3d at 36.
Appellant does not challenge the propriety of the traffic stop.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "[a] seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation." Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic citation, an officer's mission during a traffic stop includes "ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop." Id. at 355. Such inquiries typically involve determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, running a records check on the driver's license, and inspecting the vehicle's registration and proof of insurance. See id. An officer may not prolong the stop, however, absent reasonable suspicion of some other criminal activity that would justify continuing the detention. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355-56 (holding that reasonable suspicion is needed to continue an otherwise completed traffic stop to conduct a canine sniff); see also State v. Martinez, 638 S.W.3d 740, 750-51 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2021, no pet.) (recognizing that reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity independent of a traffic violation can justify a prolonged detention). In evaluating the acceptable duration of a temporary detention, case law imposes no rigid time limitation; common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985).
Analysis
In this case, Appellant concedes that the officer conducted a reasonable detention under Terry when he stopped Appellant for driving without a valid driver's license. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 521.457 (providing that person commits offense if he "operates a motor vehicle" while his license is cancelled, suspended, revoked, or expired); Hoyt v. State, No. 03-15-00228-CR, 2016 Tex.App. LEXIS 8765, at *6 (Tex. App.-Austin Aug. 12, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Appellant's complaint is that the officer unnecessarily prolonged his detention to investigate a drug offense.
Officer Ohm testified that he initially detained Appellant because Appellant was driving with an invalid driver's license. The officer explained that he had been dispatched to investigate a criminal trespass at a known drug house and the suspects were identified as Appellant and another person. A witness informed the officer that Appellant had "grabbed" some things from the house and gave a description of Appellant's vehicle. The traffic stop occurred in close proximity to the criminal trespass.
When testifying to the events that occurred after he activated his emergency lights, the officer recounted that Appellant did not immediately pull over. Rather, Appellant continued driving half a block towards a stop sign, stopped, turned left, and continued to drive slowly. Appellant stopped briefly then drove another ten feet before finally coming to a stop. As the officer approached Appellant's vehicle, he saw Appellant shaking and nervous. According to the officer, on prior occasions when he stopped Appellant, Appellant usually acted like a "smart aleck." When the officer asked Appellant to exit the vehicle, Appellant complied but locked the door before shutting it. The officer characterized this behavior as odd compared to other times he had interacted with Appellant. After exiting his vehicle, Appellant initially consented to a search of the vehicle, but not his person. After answering the officer's questions about the criminal trespass, Appellant changed his mind about the officer searching the vehicle. During this exchange, Appellant made and received a call on his cell phone despite the officer repeatedly ordering him not to use his phone. The officer called for a canine unit to perform an open-air sniff of the vehicle. While awaiting the canine unit, an officer conducted a pat-down search of Appellant. During the pat-down search, Appellant fled. The entire encounter, from the time of the initial stop until Appellant fled, lasted approximately fourteen minutes.
The trial court heard testimony from Officer Ohm of the following circumstances raising reasonable suspicion to conduct a drug investigation: the officer knew from prior experience that Appellant was a methamphetamine user with a recent arrest for "manufacture/distribut[ion]" of methamphetamine; a few minutes before the stop, Appellant had been seen at a known drug house where he had "grabbed some things"; the officer observed Appellant near the scene of the drug house and initiated a traffic stop; Appellant was reluctant to yield to the traffic stop; Appellant was shaking and nervous throughout the traffic stop; Appellant locked his door upon exiting the vehicle; Appellant equivocated regarding his consent to search the vehicle; and Appellant persisted in using his cell phone after being ordered not to do so.
Based on the specific, articulated facts discussed above, when viewed collectively, Officer Ohm could reasonably have suspected that other criminal activity, independent of Appellant's observed traffic violation, had occurred or was afoot. As such, we hold that a sufficient basis for reasonable suspicion existed for the officer to investigate Appellant for a drug offense. See Richardson v. State, 402 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref'd) ("Additional facts and information discovered by an officer during a lawful detention may form the basis for a reasonable suspicion that another offense has been or is being committed."); Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 674-75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (holding that, even though a person's withdrawal of consent to search cannot be the "prominent factor" in determining reasonable suspicion, it can be a factor in the determination when combined with other suspicious factors); Hamal v. State, 390 S.W.3d 302, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (holding that a person's nervousness, including shaking hands, and criminal history of recent drug offenses can establish reasonable suspicion when viewed together with other factors); Martinez v. State, No. 02-13-00610-CR, 2015 Tex.App. LEXIS 817, at *15 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Jan. 29, 2015 pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that a prolonged detention was justified by signs of nervousness, such as shaking hands and locking car after giving consent to search).
Further, we would not characterize Appellant's detention as prolonged. Our review of the record supports an implicit finding that Officer Ohm diligently pursued his investigation to confirm or dispel his suspicions about Appellant's possession of drugs. Accordingly, this action did not unnecessarily prolong the stop. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686; Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 770-71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We conclude that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion to suppress. We overrule Appellant's issue.
The dash cam video shows that less than seven minutes had elapsed from the time that Officer Ohm initiated the traffic stop to the time that he requested a canine unit. The total lapsed time between the traffic stop and Appellant's attempt to flee was approximately fourteen minutes.
Conclusion
Having overruled Appellant's sole issue, we affirm the trial court's judgment.