Sedlock v. Shelton Board of Education

Full title: LORRAINE SEDLOCK v. SHELTON BOARD OF EDUCATION

Court: Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford

Date published: Mar 5, 2009

2009 Ct. Sup. 4451 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2009)

Opinion

No. CV 06-4021061-S

March 5, 2009

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

JOHN J. LANGENBACH, Judge Trial Referee.

The plaintiff Lorraine Sedlock, commenced this action on February 7, 2006, against the defendants, the Shelton board of education, the city of Shelton, the state board of education and the state teachers' retirement board. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on May 8, 2006 and filed a second revised complaint with six counts on July 10, 2006, which is the operative pleading for the present motion.

Counts one through four sound in claims for damages under General Statutes § 4-197, count five alleges tortious violation of public policy and count six alleges negligence. The court, Rittenband, J.T.R., granted a motion to strike counts one through four on July 12, 2007 as to all of the defendants. Subsequently, the state board of education filed a motion to dismiss count five, the only count remaining against it. On November 21, 2008, the court, Langenbach, J., granted the motion, on the basis of sovereign immunity and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Counts five and six remain as to the moving party, the Shelton board of education.

In her complaint, the plaintiff alleges that she was employed as a substitute teacher in Shelton between 1976 and 1981 and was hired under contract from 1981 to 2003. The plaintiff further alleges that the state teachers' retirement board (retirement board) would not allow her "to purchase . . . time toward her retirement" for the period she worked as a substitute teacher because she could not provide the "relevant and necessary personal data records . . . for the period of time covering 1976 through 1981."

The defendant brought the current motion to dismiss on November 26, 2008, arguing that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, relying on the November 21, 2008 decision and the "law of the case" doctrine. On January 12, 2009, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss, arguing that she was not required to appeal the decision of the retirement board before instituting the current action for damages against the Shelton board of education, as doing so would have been "futile and useless." Finally, the plaintiff argues that the law of the case doctrine permits, but does not require, the court to follow earlier decisions made in the case.

"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beecher v. Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut, 282 Conn. 130, 134, 918 A.2d 880 (2007).

"[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n. 12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). "The burden rests with the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor . . . clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Goodyear v. Discala, 269 Conn. 507, 511, 849 A.2d 791 (2004).

"Under our exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action that seeks a remedy that could be provided through an administrative proceeding, unless and until that remedy has been sought in the administrative forum . . . In the absence of exhaustion of that remedy, the action must be dismissed . . . We have recognized that a party aggrieved by a decision of an administrative agency may be excused from exhaustion of administrative remedies if: recourse to the administrative remedy would be futile or inadequate . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) D'Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610, 616, 872 A.2d 408 (2005). "The doctrine of exhaustion is grounded in a policy of fostering an orderly process of administrative adjudication and judicial review in which a reviewing court will have the benefit of the agency's findings and conclusions." Concerned Citizens of Sterling v. Sterling, 204 Conn. 551, 557, 529 A.2d 666 (1987).

General Statutes § 10-183y provides in relevant part: "Any member may appeal to the Teachers' Retirement Board for reconsideration of a decision of the board affecting such member . . . The board shall render a written decision within sixty days of receipt of such request for reconsideration." The plaintiff's argument that such appeal would have been futile, thereby excusing her from exhausting the administrative process, can be broken down into two parts. First, the plaintiff argues that the remedy available though her appeal to the retirement board would not be adequate to address her tort claims against the defendant. Second, the plaintiff argues that the decision of the retirement board "would remain unchanged in light of the fact that the records in the plaintiff's file were incomplete for the time period in question . . ." Each argument will be addressed in turn.

In the complaint, the plaintiff asserts a claim for compensatory and consequential damages, costs and attorneys fees. In her pretrial memorandum, the plaintiff measures her damages based on the potential benefits she would have received if given full credit for the years she was a substitute teacher, minus the costs to her to purchase the credits for those years from the retirement board. The defendant argues that because the relief requested by the plaintiff could have been provided through an appeal to the retirement board, the administrative remedy would have fully and adequately compensated the plaintiff.

"[W]e have grudgingly carved several exceptions from the exhaustion doctrine including one where the administrative remedy is inadequate or futile." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Labbe v. Pension Commission, 229 Conn. 801, 812, 643 A.2d 1268 (1994). "An administrative remedy is futile or inadequate if the agency is without the authority to grant the requested relief." Cannata v. Department of Environmental Protection, 215 Conn. 616, 628, 577 A.2d 1017 (1990).

The plaintiff relies on Ernst v. Malkin, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 90 0113447 (January 5, 1993, Sylvester, J.) [8 Conn. L. Rptr. 718], in which the plaintiffs brought a negligence action against the chief building officer of Stamford, seeking money damages and other appropriate relief. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, as the statute relied on by the defendant was not applicable to the claims made by the plaintiffs. Id. The court went beyond that determination, however, stating that "[t]he statute does not confer on either entity the power to find a building official personally liable for the negligent issuance of a certificate of occupancy . . . Further, these entities cannot render an award for damages for such negligence." Id. Ernst is distinguishable from the present case. The retirement board, while it cannot hold the defendant liable for negligence, could have completely compensated the plaintiff for her claimed damages. It could have provided an adequate remedy to the claims made by the plaintiff if the retirement board determined that it would accept her documentation and credit her with the years of substitute teaching service. Indeed, the court went on to state that "[t]his is not to say that one may bypass the administrative remedy simply by claiming money damages or other relief not available in such a proceeding." Id. Unlike the plaintiffs in Ernst, a finding by the retirement board in the present case that the plaintiff could be credited for her time as a substitute would have made her whole and would not have forced her to bring any further action in the Superior Court.

In Neiman v. Yale University, 270 Conn. 244, 851 A.2d 1165 (2004), the court dismissed the claim because the plaintiff failed to exhaust remedies available to her under the grievance procedures of the employee handbook after her allegedly wrongful termination. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that she did not need to exhaust the grievance procedures because she sought damages for negligence, which would not be available under the grievance procedure. The court explained that, had the correct procedures been followed, the plaintiff "would have received immediate consideration and review of the very issue . . . that the plaintiff raises in this action . . . It is not the plaintiff's preference for a particular remedy that determines whether the remedy . . . is adequate . . . and an administrative remedy, in order to be adequate, need not comport with the plaintiffs' opinion of what a perfect remedy would be . . .

"[H]ad the plaintiff availed herself of the of the internal grievance procedures at Yale, she might not have incurred the damages for which she now seeks compensation." Neiman v. Yale University, supra, 270 Conn. 260.

Similar situations have arisen in the context of discrimination complaints and the commission on human rights and opportunities. In Murphy v. Young, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV 93 0244076 (November 22, 1995, Silbert, J.), the court ruled that though the plaintiff was requesting relief unavailable through the commission, punitive damages, she was nonetheless required to exhaust her administrative remedies. The Murphy court explained that "[t]he exhaustion requirement would be totally meaningless if all a plaintiff had to do to avoid the statutorily prescribed process was to add to its prayer for relief a remedy not available to it through [the commission]." Id.

In the present case, the plaintiff is requesting damages that are unavailable through the retirement board in name only; fundamentally, her claim for compensatory and consequential damages is based on what she would have received had she been credited for her years as a substitute teacher. Indeed, like the plaintiff in Neiman v. Yale University, supra, 270 Conn. 244, the plaintiff would have avoided the alleged injury altogether if the appeal had gone in her favor. The retirement board, had she successfully appealed its decision, could have rectified this injury fully. To allow the plaintiff to avoid the statutorily prescribed process by claiming damages for negligence would render the exhaustion requirement meaningless. Murphy v. Young, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 93 0244076.

The plaintiff alleges that she received a letter from the retirement board informing her that it would only consider information contained in her personnel file when determining whether to give her credit for time worked. The plaintiff argues that the defendant informed her that the payroll records for the time in question were incomplete and, therefore, the retirement board would not have ruled any differently had she appealed. This argument is unavailing; the plaintiff has failed to show that it would have been futile to exhaust the remedy available to her under General Statutes § 10-183y.

"Although a party is not required to exhaust an administrative remedy that is futile or inadequate, we have never held that the mere possibility that an administrative agency may deny a party the specific relief requested is a ground for an exception to the exhaustion requirement . . . Rather, we have held that, [i]t is futile to seek a remedy only when such action could not result in a favorable decision and invariably would result in further judicial proceedings . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fish Unlimited v. Northeast Utilities Service Co., 254 Conn. 1, 19, 756 A.2d 262 (2000); see also Housing Authority v. Papandrea, 222 Conn. 414, 432, 610 A.2d 637 (1992) (although the decision maker indicated he would rule against the plaintiff, the court still required exhaustion of administrative appeals); La Croix v. Board of Education, 199 Conn. 70, 84-85, 505 A.2d 1233 (1986) ("the statutory remedies are not rendered futile by the plaintiff's conclusory assertion that requesting and attending a hearing before the . . . board would have been pointless in the face of the board's earlier decision to terminate his employment").

In the present case, the plaintiff states in her memorandum the mere conclusion that the retirement board would not reconsider its decision regarding the adequacy of the plaintiff's documentation of her time as a substitute teacher. The plaintiff supports her contention that the retirement board would not have decided in her favor on appeal only by pointing to the initial adverse decision. She has not put forth any arguments or evidence to show that appealing the retirement board's decision would invariably lead to further judicial proceedings. The plaintiff failed to exhaust the statutorily prescribed remedy under § 10-183y and does not meet the narrow futility exception to the exhaustion doctrine. Therefore, the motion to dismiss must be granted.

So ordered