Opinion
Civil No. 1:12-CV-285
02-14-2012
ROGER SEDLAK, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
(Judge Jones)
( ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Statement of Facts and of the Case
In this case, Roger Sedlak, federal prisoner, has filed a pleading captioned as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc.1) With respect to this petition, the pertinent facts are as follows: On March 4, 2009, Sedlak was indicted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. United States v. Sedlak, Cr. No. 1:09-CR-79 (Doc. 1) In June of 2010, Sedlak pleaded guilty to four counts of this indictment, following protracted pre-trial proceedings. United States v. Sedlak, Cr. No. 1:09-CR-79 (Docs. 208-210) Further protracted sentencing proceedings then ensued over the following 13 months. Ultimately, on July 11, 2011, Sedlak was sentenced to 121 months imprisonment following his conviction on these federal charges. United States v. Sedlak, Cr. No. 3:09-CR-79 (Doc. 285.) Sedlak is currently appealing this conviction and sentence. (Doc. 286)
While this appeal was pending, on February 13, 2012, Sedlak filed this habeas corpus petition, challenging various aspects of the criminal proceedings in this case. (Doc.1) While Sedlak has filed this habeas corpus petition, and apparently has a direct appeal also pending from his conviction, there is no indication that Sedlak has ever sought proper relief from the sentencing court through a motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. §2255. Given the curious procedural posture of this case, where there is a direct appeal pending but Sedlak has not sought relief under 28 U.S.C. §2255, our screening review of this case leaves us convinced that this matter is not appropriately brought as a habeas petition, but rather should be addressed either on direct appeal or as a motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. §2255. Therefore, we recommend that this petition be dismissed or transferred for consideration as a motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
II. Discussion
A. This Petition Should Either Be Dismissed or Transferred and Treated As a Motion to Vacate Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. §2255
In this case, we find that the petitioner has not made out a valid case for pursuing habeas relief in lieu of a motion to vacate sentence filed with the sentencing judge under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. This showing is a prerequisite for a successful habeas petition in this particular factual context. Therefore, since the petitioner has not made a showing justifying habeas relief at this time, this petition is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Rule 4 applies to § 2241 petitions under Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts). See, e.g., Patton v. Fenton, 491 F. Supp. 156, 158-59 (M.D. Pa. 1979) (explaining that Rule 4 is "applicable to Section 2241 petitions through Rule 1(b)").
Rule 4 provides in pertinent part: "If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner." Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Summary dismissal of this habeas petition, which seeks to vacate or correct a federal prisoner's sentence, would be appropriate here since it is well-settled that: "[T]he usual avenue for federal prisoners seeking to challenge the legality of their confinement," is by way of a motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1997). See also United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that § 2255 provides federal prisoners a means by which to bring collateral attacks challenging the validity of their judgment and sentence); Snead v. Warden, F.C.I. Allenwood, 110 F. Supp. 2d 350, 352 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (finding that challenges to a federal sentence should be brought in a motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255). Indeed, it is now clearly established that Section 2255 specifically provides the remedy to federally-sentenced prisoners that is the equivalent to the relief historically available under the habeas writ. See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962) (stating, "it conclusively appears from the historic context in which § 2255 was enacted that the legislation was intended simply to provide in the sentencing court a remedy exactly commensurate with that which had previously been available by habeas corpus in the court of the district where the prisoner was confined").
Therefore, as a general rule, a § 2255 motion which is filed in the court of conviction "supersedes habeas corpus and provides the exclusive remedy" to one in custody pursuant to a federal conviction. Strollo v. Alldredge, 463 F.2d 1194, 1195 (3d Cir. 1972). Indeed it is clear that "Section 2241 'is not an additional, alternative or supplemental remedy to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.'" Gomez v. Miner, No. 3:CV-06-1552, 2006 WL 2471586, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2006) (quoting Myers v. Booker, 232 F.3d 902 (10th Cir. 2000)) Instead, Section 2255 motions are now the exclusive means by which a federal prisoner can challenge a conviction or sentence that allegedly is in violation of the Constitution or federal laws or that is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974). Thus, federal inmates who wish to challenge the lawfulness of their convictions or sentences must typically file motions under § 2255 in the court of conviction.
This general rule admits of only one, narrowly-tailored, exception. A defendant is permitted to pursue relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in lieu of a motion under §2255, only where she shows that the remedy under § 2255 would be "inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); see also United States v. Brooks, 230 F.3d 643, 647 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing availability of § 2241 in cases where petitioners have no other means of having claims heard). This exception is narrowly tailored. The inadequacy or ineffectiveness must be "a limitation of scope or procedure . . . prevent[ing] a § 2255 proceeding from affording . . . a full hearing and adjudication of [a] wrongful detention claim." Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Cradle v. United States, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam)). "It is the inefficacy of the remedy, not the personal inability to use it, that is determinative." Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538-39 (citing Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). Accordingly, "[s]ection 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely because the sentencing court does not grant relief, the one-year statute of limitations has expired, or the petitioner is unable to meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of the amended § 2255." Cradle, 290 F.3d at 539. Furthermore, if a petitioner improperly challenges a federal conviction or sentence under § 2241, the petition may be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Application of Galante, 437 F.2d 1164, 1165 (3d Cir. 1971).
In this case, the representations that the petitioner makes in this petition do not demonstrate that he is entitled to resort to seeking habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on the grounds that a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 would be ineffective or inadequate. None of the petitioner's claims fall within the narrow exception outlined in Dorsainvil, in which § 2241 relief could be available in lieu of a motion under 28 U.S.C. §2255. In Dorsainvil, the Third Circuit held that § 2241 relief was available only in very narrow instances to a petitioner who had no earlier opportunity to challenge his conviction for conduct that an intervening change in substantive law made no longer criminal. Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251.
Sedlak's petition simply does not demonstrate that this narrow exception has any legitimate application to the instant proceedings. Quite the contrary, Sedlak's petition seems to largely premise this attack on his conviction and sentence upon the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, coupled with complaints regarding the sentencing process employed by the district court. (Doc. 1) Yet, cases construing Dorsainvil, and interpreting the interplay between the relief provided to federal prisoners under §2255, and the remedy conferred by the writ of habeas corpus under §2241, agree that "Section 2241 is not available for [a federal prisoner's] ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as he has not demonstrated that Section 2255 is an 'inadequate or ineffective remedy.'" Piggee v. Bledsoe, 2011 WL 179688, *2 (3d Cir. Jan. 20, 2011). See, e.g., Marmolejos v. Holder, 358 F. App'x 289 (3d Cir. 2009); Carter v. White, 50 F. App'x 96 (3d Cir. 2002). Instead, such ineffectiveness claims are precisely the type of federal prisoner petition which must be addressed by the court of conviction under 28 U.S.C. §2255. Id. Similarly, courts, including this Court, have repeatedly rebuffed efforts by prisoners to use § 2241 to by-pass the requirements of § 2255 based upon claims which relate solely to the application of some sentencing enhancement. See, e.g., Montes v. Holt, 179 F.App'x 824 (3d Cir. 2006); Sines v. Wilner, No. 09-1240, 2009 WL 2365406 (D. Colo. July 31, 2009); Kennedy v. Miner, No. 06-314, 2006 WL 2645148 (M.D.Pa. Sept. 14, 2006).
Thus, Sedlak's current habeas petition-which appears to seek relief in this district based upon alleged ineffective assistance of counsel-seems explicitly premised on a notion of judge-shopping, a desire to re-litigate similar claims before different jurists. Such a claim is plainly inadequate as an excuse for foregoing the proper course of litigating collateral challenges to a petitioner's federal conviction through a §2255 motion filed with the sentencing judge, and therefore this request must be rejected by this court. Manna v. Schultz, 591 F.3d 664 (3d. Cir. 2010).
Recognizing that this matter is not appropriately brought before this Court as a habeas petition, we acknowledge that the petition could be dismissed in its entirety. In addition, we note that the petition could also be treated as a §2255 motion, and transferred to the sentencing judge for further consideration, so the District Court which presided over the conviction and sentencing of Sedlak may also consider this latest petition. Federal habeas corpus proceedings are essentially civil proceedings, and as such are governed by the statutes and rules which apply generally to civil litigation. Thus, such petitions are also subject to the general rules governing civil litigation, including 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which states as follows: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." Adhering to this familiar principle, in the past when courts in this district have been confronted by habeas petitions, like the petition lodged here, which challenge aspects of a conviction and sentence imposed by another federal district judge, they have often relied upon §1404 to order the transfer of the petition to the sentencing court for its consideration. Stover v. Sniezek, No. 1:10-CV-1213, 2010 WL 3220318, *4 (M.D.Pa. Aug. 12 2010)(Jones, J.); see, e.g., See Argentina v. Sniezek, Civil No. 4:09-CV-0382, 2010 WL 2632561, *2 (M.D.Pa. Jun.28, 2010) (Jones, J.); Gardner v. Williamson, Civil No. 3:07-CV-1788, 2008 WL 1752229, *4 (M.D.Pa. April 14, 2008) (Munley, J.).
In this case, the prerequisites for a transfer of this matter are fully satisfied since such a transfer would promote the interests of justice. As we have previously noted when transferring other similar petitions to the sentencing court: "[The sentencing] court . . . has access to the evidence that led the court to make its sentencing . . .determination and can best access any witnesses necessary to investigate the case. [Therefore], [t]he interests of judicial efficiency and economy would best be served by transferring the case to the [sentencing court]." Gardner v. Williamson, supra, 2008 WL 1752229, at *4. Finally, we note that an order transferring this case to the sentencing judge as a §2255 motion also protects the petitioner's rights as a pro se litigant. Such a transfer order avoids any unintended prejudice to the petitioner which might flow from a dismissal of this action. See Burnett v. New York Cent. R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 430 (1965). Moreover, addressing the petition in this fashion would not constitute a ruling on the merits of the petitioner's claims, thus assuring that the petitioner can have his case heard on its merits in the most appropriate forum.
In sum, Sedlak invites this Court under the guise of a habeas petition to consider a question that is properly brought before another judge either on his pending direct appeal, or through a motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. §2255. We should decline this invitation, given that Sedlak has made no showing that § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his conviction and sentence. Consequently, this Court should either dismiss this petition or transfer this petition to the sentencing judge so that court may address this matter as a motion under 28 U.S.C. §2255.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED, that this case be dismissed or transferred to the sentencing judge in the underlying case for further proceedings as a motion under 28 U.S.C. §2255.
Petitioner is placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall
witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 14th day of February 2012.
S/Martin C . Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge