Opinion
Civil Action No. 96-2107 (NHP).
January 7, 1999
Yuri B. Zelinsky, Esq., William H. Huffman, III, Esq., SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Washington, DC., Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Michael A. Chagares, Assistant, U.S. Attorney, FAITH S. HOCHBERG, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newark, N.J.
Aaron S. Dyer, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, Los Angeles, CA,
Mr. Stephen J. Regen, Tarzana, CA.
Mr. Ronald H. Michel, Pacific Palisades, CA.
Kelly W. Bixby, Esq., Los Angeles, CA, Eastern Coordinated Financial Services, Inc. c/o Frank Cardell, Montclair, N.J.
Ms. Bellette Hofmann, New York, NY.
Mr. Joseph Gelinski, Ridgewood, N.J.
Donald A. Lev, Esq., Encino, CA.
Norman I. Klein, Esq., CARLET, GARRISON KLEIN, Clifton, N.J.
Mr. Frank E. Cardell, Montclair, N.J.
Mr. Bruce Schroeder Mahwah, N.J., Future Vision Direct Marketing, Inc. C/o Bruce Schroeder, President, Mahwah, N.J.
Mr. James Barschow, Eatontown, N.J.
LETTER OPINION ORIGINAL ON FILE WITH CLERK OF THE COURT
Dear Litigants:
This matter comes before the Court on the appeal of defendant, Stephen J. Regan, from Magistrate Judge Ronald J. Hedges' Order dated October 21, 1998 in connection with a motion to determine the sufficiency of answers to requests for admissions responded to by plaintiff, Securities and Exchange Commission. This matter was decided without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons set forth herein, the Order is hereby AFFIRMED.
DISCUSSION
The Order from which defendant Stephen J. Regan ("defendant") appeals denied defendant's motion to determine the sufficiency of answers to requests for admissions responded to by plaintiff, Securities and Exchange Commission ("plaintiff"), based on the Magistrate Judge's analysis of the facts and the applicable law.The standard of review by which the Court is bound in this appeal is set forth in Local Rule 72.1(c)(1)(A). That rule provides that in reviewing a magistrate judge's determination in a non-dispositive matter, the District Court "shall consider the appeal and/or cross-appeal and set aside any portion of the Magistrate Judge's order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Local Rule 72.1(c)(1)(A); see also Fed.R.Civ.P . 72(a) ("The district judge to whom the case is assigned shall consider such objections and shall modify or set aside any portion of the magistrate judge's order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.").
Correction or modification is appropriate only when the magistrate judge's determination meets one of the aforementioned criteria. See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 868 (1989); Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3d Cir. 1992). A magistrate judge's conclusions are clearly erroneous when, "although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." South Seas Catamaran, Inc. v. The Motor Vessel "Leeway", 120 F.R.D. 17, 21 (D.N.J. 1988), aff'd, 993 F.2d 878 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948)). A finding is contrary to law if the magistrate judge has misinterpreted or misapplied applicable law.
Several courts have concluded that a magistrate judge's determination of issues within his or her purview are due great deference by the reviewing court, and should only be reversed or modified if found to be an abuse of discretion. See Detention Sys., Inc. v. Pittway Corp., 96 F.R.D. 152, 154 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); Empire Volkswagen, Inc. v. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 95 F.R.D. 398, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Thus, an appellant should direct the reviewing court to instances in which the magistrate judge has crossed these boundaries of error, discretion, and/or misapplication of law. See Arakelian v. National Western Life Ins. Co., 126 F.R.D. 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 1989) (refusing to "second-guess a magistrate's discretionary decision unless it is clear that error has been committed").
Magistrate Judge Hedges did not misapply the law or make any erroneous determinations and, in fact, Judge Hedges' decision to deny defendant's motion to determine the sufficiency of plaintiff's answers to defendant's requests for admissions was correct. Judge Hedges specifically explained that plaintiff fulfilled the requirements of Rule 36(a) because plaintiff demonstrated that it "had insufficient knowledge to either admit or deny many of the requests because it was not provided with all of the necessary information." See Letter Opinion dated October 21, 1998; see also Small-Cap Fund, Inc. v. Oppenheimer Fund Co., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 38, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Most pointedly, at the time that defendant propounded the first set of requests for admissions, plaintiff had not yet deposed defendant, deposed any co-defendant or conducted any discovery from third parties. Furthermore, discovery did not provide useful information upon which plaintiff could rely because defendant asserted the privilege against self-incrimination and refused to answer plaintiff's substantive questions that were posed at the deposition. Thus, Judge Hedges correctly found that plaintiff was correct in asserting that the requests were premature and that the relevant knowledge may be gained through future discovery. Therefore, this Court hereby AFFIRMS the October 21, 1998 Order of Magistrate Judge Hedges.
This Court also acknowledges that defendant did not confer with plaintiff before filing the subject discovery motion as he was required to do pursuant to Local Civil Rule 37.1(b).
An appropriate Order accompanies this opinion.