Opinion
A165191
04-26-2023
SEAN N. SEBRING, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COLDWELL BANKER MENDO REALTY et al., Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Mendocino County Superior Super. Ct. No. SCUKCVG1972931)
BROWN, P. J.
After a five-day bench trial, the trial court entered judgment against plaintiff Sean N. Sebring and in favor of defendants Coldwell Banker Mendo Realty, John Lazaro, Ken Marshall, Tara Moratti, Heliodora Farias, Rogelio F. Rangel, Lance Woods, and Tri-County Certified Inspections, Inc., pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8. Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment based on multiple contentions unsupported by cogent argument and citations to the record. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff purchased the property located at 17801 North Highway 101, Willits, California, (the property) from Rogelio F. Rangel and Heliodora Farias on July 17, 2017. Defendants are the real estate brokers and agents who represented the parties in the sale. Prior to the close of escrow, plaintiff was provided opportunities to inspect the property. A county-certified inspection of the property was performed on May 16, 2017. Plaintiff received a copy of the report and signed it on May 25, 2017.
In the complaint, the named defendants were "MRIS, Inc." dba Coldwell Banker Mendo Realty, John Lazaro, Ken Marshall, Tara Moratti, Heliodora Farias, Rogelio F. Rangel, Lance Woods, and Tri-County Certified Inspections, Inc. Farias and Rangel have not filed briefs on appeal.
Plaintiff filed suit against defendants on July 16, 2019, alleging that defendants had failed to disclose a host of material defects that plaintiff claims to have discovered after the close of escrow.
The five-day bench trial took place from February 14, 2022, to February 24, 2022. On February 23, 2022, defendants filed motions for judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8. The trial court provided plaintiff an opportunity to oppose defendants' motions. Following oral argument by all parties, the trial court granted defendants' motions for judgment. The trial court asked defendants to prepare a proposed order consistent with its oral ruling, including the court's stated reasons for its decision. Defendants submitted a proposed order to the trial court; the court signed the order on March 16, 2022, and filed it on March 17, 2022.
Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
As best as we can discern, plaintiff offers four arguments in support of his appeal: the judgment (1) violates due process; (2) is void because of alterations the trial court made the proposed judgment; (3) was entered without subject matter jurisdiction; and (4) constitutes a miscarriage of justice. We review the grant of a motion for judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8 for substantial evidence. (County of Contra Costa v. Humore (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1335, 1343.) To the extent plaintiff raises due process claims, we review constitutional claims de novo. (In re Allison J. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.)
Plaintiff proceeds pro se in this appeal, requiring us to construe his submission liberally. (Erickson v. Pardus (2007) 551 U.S. 89, 94.) The United States Supreme Court, however, has "never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel." (McNeil v. United States (1993) 508 U.S. 106, 113; see also Cahill v. San Diego Gas &Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.) Plaintiff bears the burden of showing reversible error on appeal. (Tudor Ranches, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1433.) Furthermore, "[n]o judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted . . . for any error . . . unless, after an examination of the entire cause . . . the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice." (Cal. Const., Art. VI, § 13.) We find a miscarriage of justice only upon a finding that "it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error." (Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800 (Cassim).)
A. Governing Legal Principles
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits any State from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV.) The threshold inquiry is whether the government deprived the claimant of an interest in liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. (Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 332.) If we find that there has been a deprivation, we then evaluate "whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient." (Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson (1989) 490 U.S. 454, 460.) In evaluating what process is due, we balance "the private interest," "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards," and "the Government's interest." (Mathews, at p. 335.) The touchstone of adequate procedural due process is reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. (Cardinal Care Management, LLC v. Afable (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1022 (Cardinal Care).)
The Fourteenth Amendment protects against a deprivation of substantive due process. "A substantive due process violation requires some form of outrageous or egregious conduct constituting 'a true abuse of power.'" (Las Lomas Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 CA4 837, 856.) The violation must be more than "ordinary government error." (Galland v. City of Clovis (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1003, 1032.)
To the extent plaintiff asserts that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to try this case, our Supreme Court defines subject matter jurisdiction as "the power of the court over a cause of action or to act in a particular way." (Greener v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1028, 1035.) A lack of subject matter jurisdiction is an absence of authority over the dispute. (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288.) In general, our Constitution provides the superior courts with broad authority. (Cal. Const. Art. VI, § 10; see also Donaldson v. National Marine Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 503, 512.)
B. Analysis
Plaintiff appears to begin by asserting that the trial court's entry of judgment was improperly or materially altered such that it resulted in a Fourteenth Amendment violation. But plaintiff fails to articulate how the trial court deprived him of life, liberty, or property in its adjudication of this case. The essential elements of procedural due process are notice and a hearing. (See Cardinal Care, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 1013.) Here, after several days of trial at which plaintiff appeared and presented evidence, defendants filed motions for judgment on February 23, 2022. The trial court accepted the motions and provided plaintiff time to respond. Plaintiff attended the February 24, 2022 hearing in person where he had the opportunity to object to the trial court's oral ruling. Therefore, plaintiff had notice and a fair opportunity to object at the hearing, satisfying the requirements of procedural due process.
Plaintiff's substantive due process argument likewise fails. The judgment satisfies substantive due process requirements because the trial was lawfully adjudicated and the judgment is consistent with the trial court's findings. Plaintiff erroneously asserts that the trial court impermissibly accepted and entered defendants' "[PROPOSED] JUDGMENT," contending that the proposed judgment constitutes ex parte communication that is inconsistent with the oral order issued at the February 24 hearing. However, plaintiff's argument overlooks rule 3.1312 of our Rules of Court, which requires the prevailing party to present "a proposed order for approval as conforming to the court's order." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.) Aside from crossing out the word "PROPOSED" on the first page of the document and the date on the last page of the judgment, there were no material alterations to the document. And a comparison of the judgment with the trial transcript demonstrates that they are consistent with one another.
Nor has plaintiff established a miscarriage of justice. To meet his burden, plaintiff would have to show that "it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [him] would have been reached in the absence of the error." (Cassim, supra, 33 Cal.4th at 800.) Specifically, plaintiff claims that the judgment is invalid because the judgment uses "Superior Court for the State of California - County of Mendocino" as opposed to "Superior Court of the State of California." But the use of "for" rather than "of" in the caption of the judgment does not divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, as plaintiff asserts, nor does it constitute an error reasonably likely to change the outcome of this case. Plaintiff does not contest that he and defendants reside in Mendocino County or that the property and documents for the sale of the property were executed in Mendocino County. The trial court thus had subject matter jurisdiction over all parties throughout this case.
Plaintiff additionally asserts that MRIS, Inc. dba Coldwell Banker Mendo Realty was not a proper defendant in this case and that any judgment entered against that defendant is invalid. But MRIS, Inc. dba Coldwell Banker Mendo Realty is a proper party to this litigation, as evidenced by the filing of an answer on that defendant's behalf on October 9, 2018. Moreover, the trial court addressed the issue of incorrectly identified parties at trial, declining to enter default judgments against entities named in the complaint that were not involved in the transaction at issue.
In sum, the trial court properly entered judgment in favor of defendants, consistent with its findings and evaluation of the evidence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: STREETER, J.
WHITMAN, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.