Summary
finding that petition was time-barred, as petitioner had "incorrectly attempt[ed] to extend the automatic delay provided in the statute for completion of direct review to the collateral review of his motion for a new trial"
Summary of this case from Turner v. MassachusettsOpinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 06-11150-RWZ.
March 20, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
I. Background
Richard Seaver, a Massachusetts state prisoner, seeks a writ of habeas corpus to vacate a guilty plea he entered in 1960. As discussed below, his petition is time-barred and therefore must be dismissed.
A. Procedural History
On November 30, 1960, petitioner pled guilty to the second degree murder of his mother and was sentenced to a term of 30 years to life in state prison. On April 24, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for a new trial in Middlesex Superior Court, alleging that his plea should be vacated because (1) he did not receive a juvenile transfer hearing required by state law prior to his plea, and (2) he received ineffective assistance from his court-appointed counsel who, he alleges, coerced him into pleading guilty and also failed to raise the juvenile transfer hearing issue. This motion was denied on January 20, 2004, and petitioner filed a prompt appeal of the denial on February 17, 2004. The appeal was stayed in August 2004 while his counsel filed a motion for reconsideration in the trial court. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on March 24, 2005, and the appellate court affirmed both the denial of the motion for a new trial and the denial of the motion for reconsideration on March 8, 2006. In affirming the denials, the appellate court held plaintiff was not entitled to a transfer hearing under Massachusetts law at the relevant times because he was eighteen years old at the time of the offense, and that the record before the motion judge and on appeal did not support the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Commonwealth v. Seaver, 842 N.E.2d 10, (Mass.App.Ct. 2006) (unpublished). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") denied petitioner's application for leave to obtain further appellate review ("ALOFAR") on May 1, 2006.
In Massachusetts, a prisoner may move for a new trial at any time, as of right. Mass. R. Crim. P. 30.
Petitioner was 18 years old at the time of the murder and under the supervision of the state Division of Youth Services.
Petitioner, appearing pro se, then filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on July 3, 2006, based on the same grounds he raised in his motion for a new trial. Respondent submitted a motion to dismiss the petition on August 30, 2006, because, he says, the statute of limitations has run.
II. Discussion
A. Limitations on Habeas Petitions
As a state prisoner, petitioner is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). AEDPA establishes a one-year statute of limitations for habeas petitions filed by state prisoners:
Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of —
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The First Circuit has joined its sister circuits in holding that for defendants whose convictions became final prior to AEDPA, there is a one-year grace period running from April 24, 1996, the effective date of AEDPA, to file a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 180 F.3d 349, 354 (1st Cir. 1999) (applying one-year AEDPA grace period to § 2255 habeas petition); Gaskins v. Duval, 183 F.3d 8, 9 (1st Cir. 1999) (extending holding inRogers to habeas petition filed under § 2254); see also Cordle v. Guarino, 428 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of habeas petition where state motion for new trial was filed after expiration of AEDPA grace period). The limitations period in AEDPA is strictly enforced. See, e.g.,Lattimore v. Dubois, 311 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding a habeas petition filed one day after the expiration of the April 24, 1997 grace period barred by AEDPA); David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 344 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding petition filed 399 days after AEDPA's enactment time-barred); Neverson v. Farquharson, 366 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding limitations period was not tolled while first habeas petition, ultimately dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies, was pending in federal court).
B. Petitioner's Petition Was Filed After Grace Period Expired
In the instant case, petitioner pled guilty in 1960 to second degree murder. Thus, his conviction became final before April 24, 1996, the effective date of AEDPA. See United States v. Hines, 802 F. Supp. 559, 571 (D. Mass. 1992) ("Under Massachusetts law, a `conviction' is an adjudication of guilt either by way of the entry of a formal guilty plea or an admission to sufficient facts or after a finding of guilt by jury verdict."); Commonwealth v. Balliro, 769 N.E. 2d 1258, 1262 (Mass. 2002) ("An accepted guilty plea differs from an admission or extra-judicial confession in that it is itself a conviction; nothing more is required except for the court to give judgment and sentence."); see also David, 318 F.3d at 345 (refusing to read an additional fixed tolling period into AEDPA subsection concerning collateral review to create equity where petitioner pled guilty and thus did not get benefit of language providing for tolling after conviction until expiration of time for seeking further review). Thus, his grace period for filing a habeas petition expired on April 24, 1997. The fact that he filed a motion for a new trial after this date cannot undo the expiration of the limitations period. See Cordle, 428 F.3d at 48 n. 4 (noting that a Massachusetts motion for a new trial brought after limitations period has expired does reset limitations clock).
Plaintiff's brief is somewhat unclear on what basis he challenges this analysis. He appears to argue that his conviction was not "legally valid," therefore the limitation period described by AEDPA did not begin until the SJC denied his ALOFAR in May 2006. (Docket #10, 10-11.) This argument fails to recognize that the limitations period described by the statute begins on "the date on which the judgment became final." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Thus, whether the conviction is "legal" or not (the subject of direct and collateral review) is not relevant to when the limitations period begins. Petitioner's claim that the limitations period did not commence until May 1, 2006, incorrectly attempts to extend the automatic delay provided in the statute for completion of direct review to the collateral review of his motion for a new trial. As discussed supra, by pleading guilty, petitioner's conviction became final prior to April 24, 1996, and he became subject to the one-year grace period ending on April 24, 1997. The First Circuit addressed this argument in Cordle and rejected it, analyzing the motion for a new trial as "post-conviction or other collateral review" under § 2244(d)(2), not as direct review under § 2244(d)(1)(A). Cordle, 428 F.3d at 48 n. 4; see also David, 318 F.3d at 345; In re McCastle, 514 N.E.2d 1307, 1308 (Mass. 1987) (describing the Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 motion for a new trial as "consolidat[ing] two formerly separate [state collateral] remedies, writ of error and habeas corpus"). C. AEDPA Does Not Violate the Suspension Clause
Petitioner also appears to suggest that the holding in Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003), creates a newly recognized rule of constitutional law made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review and thus extends the limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). (Docket #10, 10-15.) Massaro, however, is a procedural ruling, holding that a defendant may raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a collateral proceeding, even if defendant failed to raise the claim on direct appeal when represented by new counsel. This holding raises no constitutional issues and is based solely on practical considerations. See Massaro, 528 U.S. at 504 ("The procedural-default rule is neither a statutory nor a constitutional requirement, but it is a doctrine adhered to by the courts to conserve judicial resources and to respect the law's important interest in the finality of judgments."). Therefore, even if the rule had been made retroactive, which it was not, it would not extend petitioner's AEDPA limitations period.
Petitioner's argument that dismissal of his claim violates the Suspension Clause of the Constitution is similarly without merit. (Docket #10, 18-19.) It is well settled that the limitations period in AEDPA does not suspend the writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., David, 318 F.3d at 346-47 (holding that application of AEDPA limitations period to deny substantive review even of petition claiming "actual innocence" did not make the writ inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of applicant's detention and therefore does not violate the Constitution); Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that dismissal of habeas petition filed after one-year AEDPA statute of limitations does not violate the Suspension Clause); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996) (holding that AEDPA's restrictions on second and successive habeas petitions do not amount to a suspension of the writ).
The Suspension Clause provides: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
III. Conclusion
Because petitioner's judgment became final before the effective date of AEDPA, his one-year grace period to file a petition expired on April 24, 1997. Petitioner did not begin his collateral attack on his guilty plea until six years later, on April 24, 2003, therefore his habeas petition is time-barred by statute.
Even if petitioner was not time-barred by AEDPA, it is unlikely his petition could succeed on the merits. His first ground, the juvenile transfer hearing, is a matter of interpretation of a state law, and the Massachusetts Appeals Court held that he was not entitled to a hearing under that law. Seaver, 842 N.E.2d at 10. Because this does not appear to be a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, it would not merit habeas relief. In his second ground, petitioner claims he received inadequate assistance of counsel because he "was coerced [by counsel] into pleading guilty or he would receive the death penalty." (Docket #1, 2.) However, this assertion on its face appears to fit one of the factors of Strickland v. Washington "that the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy" which must be overcome by petitioner to show ineffective assistance. 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
Accordingly, petitioner's petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus (Docket #1) is DENIED.