Opinion
No. 3-302 / 02-1498
Filed August 27, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert A. Hutchison, Judge.
Petitioners appeal from the district court's ruling on judicial review affirming the decision of the workers' compensation commissioner. AFFIRMED.
Richard Book of Huber, Book Cortese, Happe Lanz, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellants.
Jason Neifert of Max Schott Associates, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Hecht and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Sears Roebuck and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (collectively "petitioners") appeal from the district court's ruling on judicial review affirming the workers' compensation commissioner's finding that Verna Humburg is permanently and totally disabled as a result of a work injury. The petitioners contend the district court erroneously concluded the agency's decision was supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Sears Roebuck employed Humburg from 1990 until she resigned her position as a sales associate in June of 1999. On December 2, 1998, Humburg suffered a work-related injury when a heavy paint-mixing machine fell over and struck her in the head, shoulder blades, and lower back. The machine pinned Humburg to the sales desk in front of her. Dr. Derby, Humburg's chiropractor, treated her for cervical and lumbar pain following her injury at work. Dr. Derby had previously treated Humburg for cervical, thoracic, and lumbar pain after Humburg injured herself lifting a television in 1986.
Dr. Derby released Humburg to return to work on December 7, 1998. Humburg returned to her job on December 10, but was able to tolerate only about an hour at work before pain forced her to go home. Humburg continued to receive follow-up care from Dr. Derby. On December 18, Sears sent Humburg to see Dr. White and Dr. Minervini at the Concentra Medical Center. Humburg was assessed with a contusion and musculoskeletal strain of the back. The doctors referred her to Dr. Nelson, prescribed physical therapy and medication, and imposed significant work restrictions. Dr. Nelson, an orthopedic surgeon, diagnosed Humburg with low back strain and neck pain. He continued her work restrictions but anticipated that she would be able to fully perform her employment duties within three to four weeks.
Dr. Minervini released Humburg to full duty during February of 1999; however, her back continued to flare up at work and she was placed on light duty on several occasions during the next several months. Humburg's continuing difficulty with her back led Dr. Minervini to prescribe another round of physical therapy commencing June 7, 1999. On June 28, 1999, Minervini issued Humburg a full work release.
Humburg returned to work in the hardware and paint department at Sears but sought assistance from co-workers with lifting responsibilities. Apparently frustrated that she was unable to perform her job duties, Humburg resigned her position as a sales clerk. She then worked briefly at Wal-Mart but quit after a month and a half because she was unable to stand for her entire shift and perform the necessary lift requirements. After a brief stint working as a telephone dispatcher and seasonal clerk, Humburg applied for work at Sears but was not hired. She has not worked since the holiday season of 1999-2000.
In early 2000, Humburg applied for and later received Social Security Disability. The date of onset of her disability was determined to be February 2000. The disability commissioner determined Humburg had pain in multiple joints since 1998. However, he also concluded that her records revealed she would have been able to perform her sales clerk duties until February of 2000 when her obesity became disabling.
In March 2000, Dr. Heiss, a clinical psychologist, reviewed Humburg's history, interviewed her, and evaluated her psychological status. Dr. Heiss concluded Humburg's social and cognitive functioning capabilities were sufficient to sustain employment; however, she also found that Humburg was burdened with a personality disorder accompanied by dependent and histrionic traits. Dr. Heiss recognized Humburg's pain disorder but was unable to determine the extent to which psychological factors contributed to her physical complaints.
In June 2000, Dr. Ban, a certified disability examiner, evaluated Humburg's condition. He diagnosed her with a pain disorder associated with psychological factors from depression and her general medical condition, chronic lumbar pain. In his evaluation, Dr. Ban noted that Humburg was intolerant of the work environment primarily because of these complaints. Dr. Ban assessed Humburg with a five percent whole person impairment for her back injury and a twenty-five percent whole person impairment for her Chronic Pain Syndrome.
In December 2000, Dr. Gallagher, a psychiatrist, evaluated Humburg at the employer's direction. Dr. Gallagher agreed that Humburg suffered from a chronic pain disorder due to her general medical condition and psychological factors. He also found evidence of a long-standing depression disorder unrelated to the work injury. Due to her prior back related problems, Dr. Gallagher had difficulty in determining the causal connection between the December 1998 injury and her current complaints. He recommended treatments which he believed would lessen her pain complaints.
On January 11, 2001, Dr. Carlstrom, a neurosurgeon, evaluated Humburg's condition. His evaluation revealed a normal range of motion for her back but a great deal of pain in her right leg, particularly with weight bearing. He found no evidence of impairment based on the injury to her back and found the leg pain unrelated to the work injury.
Based on the evidence summarized above, a deputy workers' compensation commissioner concluded Humburg was entitled to benefits for a permanent and total disability. The deputy's decision was affirmed on intra-agency appeal except for the commencement date of benefits. The petitioners then sought judicial review and the district court affirmed the agency's decision. This appeal followed.
II. Scope of Review.
Our review of agency action under Iowa Code chapter 17A is for correction of errors of law, not de novo. Bernau v. Iowa Dep't. of Transp., 580 N.W.2d 757, 763 (Iowa 1998). We apply the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act to the agency action to determine if our conclusions are the same as those reached by the district court. See Heartland Express, Inc. v. Terry, 631 N.W.2d 260, 265 (Iowa 2001). We may reverse, modify, or remand to the commissioner for further proceedings if the agency's action was affected by an error of law, or if it is not supported by substantial evidence when the record is viewed as a whole. Quaker Oates Co. v. Ciha, 552 N.W.2d 143, 150 (Iowa 1996).
We will reverse an agency's findings only if, after reviewing the record as a whole, we determine that substantial evidence does not support them. Terwilliger v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 529 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Iowa 1995). Evidence is substantial if a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach the conclusion at issue. Bearce v. FMC Corp. 465 N.W.2d 531, 534 (Iowa 1991). The fact that different inferences could be drawn from the same record does not diminish the soundness of the deputy commissioner's findings and conclusions "when that record is viewed as a whole." See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(3) (2001). The ultimate question is not whether the evidence supports a different finding but whether it supports the findings the commissioner actually made. Terwilliger, 529 N.W.2d at 271.
"Our policy is to liberally construe workers' compensation statutes in favor of the employee." Myers v. F.C.A. Services, Inc., 592 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Iowa 1999); Stumpff v. Second Injury Fund, 543 N.W.2d 904, 905 (Iowa 1996).
III. Discussion.
There is credible evidence in the record supporting the deputy commissioner's conclusion that Humburg is no longer able to engage in employment for which she is suited. Humburg's current condition makes even light duty sales clerk work impossible. The fighting issue on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the finding that Humburg's December 1998 injury at work was a proximate cause of her current condition.
The burden of proof was on Humburg to prove her work injury was a proximate cause of the health impairment on which she bases her claim; a possibility is insufficient; a probability is necessary. Sondag v. Ferris Hardware, 220 N.W.2d 903, 905 (Iowa 1974). However, "[a] cause is proximate if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the result." Blacksmith v. All-American, Inc., 290 N.W.2d 348, 354 (Iowa 1980). To be compensable, the work injury only needs to be one cause; it does not have to be the only cause. Id. Whether an injury or disease has a direct causal connection with the employment or arose independently thereof is essentially within the domain of expert testimony. Bodish v. Fischer, Inc., 257 Iowa 516, 521, 133 N.W.2d 867, 870 (Iowa 1965).
The deputy commissioner based his decision on the views of Drs. Heiss, Ban, and Gallagher. Dr. Gallagher concluded that Humburg's physical complaints were due to a combination of her December 1998 injury and earlier injuries. After Dr. Heiss evaluated Humburg, she recognized Humburg's pain disorder but was unable to determine the extent psychological factors contributed to her physical complaints. Dr. Ban concluded Humburg was "intolerant of the work environment" primarily because of her pain disorder associated with both psychological factors from depression and her general medical condition including chronic lumbar pain. He opined, "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty . . . that the incident of 12/2/98 was a causative or material and permanent factor in aggravating, accelerating, or lighting up her current condition . . . and ongoing symptoms."
Sears argues in part that there is not substantial evidence in the record to support the deputy commissioner's conclusions because the record reveals the deputy was mistaken about the timing of examinations by Dr. Ban and Dr. Carlstrom. The district court considered this argument and concluded the fact the deputy may have been mistaken about the relative timing of the examinations does not mean that the deputy was unjustified in giving more weight to the opinions of Dr. Ban. We agree with this assessment.
While there is evidence in the record that could support a finding in the petitioners' favor as to causation, there is also substantial evidence which supports the commissioner's finding of a causal connection between Humburg's injury at work and her disability. As we have previously noted, the question is not whether the evidence supports a finding different from the agency's, but whether the evidence supports the finding the agency actually made. 2800 Corp. v. Fernandez, 528 N.W.2d 124, 126 (Iowa 1995) ("[a]n agency's decision does not lack substantial evidence because inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the same evidence"). The agency, not the court, weighs the evidence, and we are obliged to broadly and liberally apply those findings to uphold rather than defeat the agency's decision. Ward v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 304 N.W.2d 236, 237 (Iowa 1981). We conclude substantial evidence supports the agency's finding as to causation. We have considered all the issues presented and conclude the decision of the district court should be affirmed.