Opinion
Civ. 1:21-CV-1137
07-14-2021
DAQUAN SEABROOK, Plaintiff, v. TROOPER ANTWJUAN COX, et al., Defendants.
Rambo Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge
I. Factual Background
This case comes before us for a legally mandated screening review of the plaintiff's complaint. (Doc. 1.) The plaintiff, Daquan Seabrook, is currently a state inmate. Seabrook has also been sentenced to 10 years imprisonment following his conviction in federal court on heroin trafficking charges related to Seabrook's role in illicit drug distribution in Franklin County, Pennsylvania. United States v. Seabrook, 1:19-CR-191.
In his pro se complaint, Seabrook alleges that Trooper Antwjuan Cox of the Franklin County Drug Task Force, and Detective James Iverson of the Chambersburg Police Department have defamed his character and harassed Seabrook and his family. (Id.) It is evident that this alleged defamation and harassment took place in the course of investigations of drug trafficking by Seabrook and others. (Id.) After asserting that remarks by these investigators in the course of their criminal investigations were defamatory and verbally harassing, Seabrook alleges that this conduct violated his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id.) On the basis of these averments, Seabrook seeks wide-ranging relief including $5,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages and permanent and preliminary injunctions forbidding the defendants from making defamatory or harassing remarks about the plaintiff and his family. Indeed, Seabrook asks that we order these law enforcement officers “not to contact plaintiff or any of plaintiff's family.” (Id., ¶ 13).
Along with this complaint Seabrook has now filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 7). We will direct that the lodged complaint be filed on the docket for screening purposes only and will conditionally GRANT the plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. However, as discussed below, in its current form this complaint is procedurally and substantively flawed in a number of respects. Accordingly, we recommend that this complaint be dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints-Standard of Review
This Court has an on-going statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, we are obliged to review the complaint to determine whether any claims are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)] and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not “assume that a ... plaintiff can prove facts that the ... plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id. at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
Two years after Fowler, the Third Circuit further observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955).
This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, [ ] “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.'”Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id.Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what a complaint should say and provides that:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff's complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.
Judged against these legal guideposts, this complaint is fatally flawed in a number of respects as set forth below. Accordingly, it is recommended that this complaint be dismissed.
B. Seabrook May Not Premise Constitutional Claims Upon Alleged Verbal Harassment or Defamation.
At the outset, the plaintiff may not premise a constitutional claim on alleged verbal harassment, as he apparently attempts to do in this complaint. This claim warrants only brief consideration since: “It is well settled that verbal harassment of a prisoner, although deplorable, does not violate the Eighth Amendment.” Robinson v. Taylor, 204 Fed.Appx. 155, 156 (3d Cir. 2006). See, e.g., Rister v. Lamas, 4:CV-10-1574, 2011 WL 2471486 (M.D. Pa. June 21, 2011); Patterson v. Bradford, CIV. 10-5043 NLH, 2011 WL 1983357 (D.N.J. May 20, 2011); Williams v. Bradford, CIV. 10-5120 JBS, 2011 WL 1871437 (D.N.J. May 13, 2011); Ringgold v. Lamby, 565 F.Supp.2d 549, 553 (D. Del. 2008); Sharpe v. Costello, 1:06 CV 1493, 2007 WL 1098964 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2007). Thus to the extent that the plaintiff alleges that he and others were verbally harassed by the defendants, this verbal harassment allegation fails to state a constitutional claim. Mimms v. U.N.I.C.O.R., 386 Fed.Appx. 32, 35 (3d Cir. 2010) (verbal harassment of a prisoner, without more, does not violate the Eighth Amendment); Lindsey v. O'Connor, 327 Fed.Appx. 319, 321 (3d Cir. 2009) (verbal harassment of a prisoner, although distasteful, does not violate the Eighth Amendment).
Moreover, this court has also held that allegedly defamatory remarks, standing alone, also do not rise to the level of a constitutional infraction giving rise to federal civil rights liability. As this court has observed:
Slander and defamation are not actionable under a constitutional tort theory. Hernandez v. Joliet Police Dep't, 197 F.3d 256, 2622 (7th Cir.1999)(citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 702, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976)). There is “no constitutional doctrine converting every defamation by a public official into a deprivation of liberty ...” Paul, 424 U.S. at 702; see also DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Standing alone, simple verbal harassment does not ... deprive a prisoner of a protected liberty interest ...”).Akins v. Kasheta, No. CIV A 3:CV-06-1704, 2006 WL 2828821, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2006). Therefore, the “Plaintiff's defamation claim is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ” Jacobs v. Dist. Attorney's Off., No. 1:10-CV-02622, 2018 WL 1378629, at *12 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2018), and these allegations of verbal harassment and defamation fail to state a constitutional claim upon which relief may be granted.
C. Younger Abstention Applies Here and Bars Seabrook's Request for an Injunction Forbidding Police from Contacting Him or His Family.
Further, these pleadings also seemingly invite us to issue an injunction curtailing the investigative activities of local police. Specifically, Seabrook asks that we order these law enforcement officers “not to contact plaintiff or any of plaintiff's family.” (Id., ¶ 13). To the extent that Seabrook invites this court to enjoin police investigative activities, which may include contacts with a convicted drug trafficker like Seabrook or members of his family, this pro se pleading runs afoul of a settled tenet of federal law, the Younger abstention doctrine.
The Younger abstention doctrine is inspired by basic considerations of comity that are fundamental to our federal system of government. As defined by the courts: “Younger abstention is a legal doctrine granting federal courts discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a claim when resolution of that claim would interfere with an ongoing state proceeding.” Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) (“[W]e have concluded that the judgment of the District Court, enjoining appellant Younger from prosecuting under these California statutes, must be reversed as a violation of the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances”)).
This doctrine, which is informed by principles of comity, is also guided by these same principles in its application. As the Third Circuit has observed:
“A federal district court has discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a particular claim where resolution of that claim in federal court would offend principles of comity by interfering with an ongoing state proceeding.” Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971)). As noted earlier, the Younger doctrine allows a district court to abstain, but that discretion can properly be exercised only when (1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims. Matusow v. Trans-County Title Agency, LLC, 545 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2008).Kendall, 572 F.3d at 131.
Once these three legal requirements for Younger abstention are met, the decision to abstain rests in the sound discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Lui v. Comm'n on Adult Entm't Establishments, 369 F.3d 319, 325 (3d Cir. 2004). Moreover, applying these standards, federal courts frequently abstain from hearing requests for injunctive relief which necessarily interfere with on-going state criminal cases. Id.; Zahl v. Harper, 282 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2002).
In this case, the plaintiff's pro se complaint reveals that all of the legal prerequisites for Younger abstention are present here. First, it is evident that there may be state investigations pending related to associates of Seabrook who have contacted by police. Second, it is also apparent that, should these investigations result in criminal charges, those proceedings will afford the plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to litigate some of the issues raised in this lawsuit in the state case. See Sullivan v. Linebaugh, 362 Fed.Appx. 248, 249-50 (3d Cir. 2010). Finally, it is clear that the state proceedings implicate important state interests, since these matters involve state criminal law enforcement, an issue of paramount importance to the state. See, e.g., Lui, 369 F.3d 319; Zahl, 282 F.3d 204.
Since the legal requirements for Younger abstention are fully met here, the decision to abstain from addressing these requests for injunctive relief rests in the sound discretion of this Court. Lui, 369 F.3d at 325. Given the important state interest in enforcement of its criminal laws, we believe that the proper exercise of this discretion weighs in favor of abstention and dismissal of these requests for injunctive relief. Lui, 369 F.3d 319; Zahl, 282 F.3d 204.
D. Seabrook May Not Sue a Local Police Department.
In addition, to the extent that the complaint brings a claim against the Chambersburg Police Department, we note that this police department is not a proper institutional defendant in this action since police departments serve only as an administrative arm of a municipality, and it is a municipality through which any liability must flow to the police department. Indeed, it has been repeatedly held that a police department is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983 and therefore is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action. Blackwell v. Middletown Borough Police Dep't, 1:12-CV-825, 2012 WL 6012568 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 1:12-CV-825, 2012 WL 6002689 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2012); see Golya v. Golya, 2007 WL 2301085, at *9-10 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2007) (explaining that courts within the Third Circuit have concluded that a police department is merely a sub-unit of the local government and is not amenable to suit under § 1983); Wivell v. Liberty Township Police Dept., 2007 WL 2155540, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2007) (explaining that police department not subject to suit in a § 1983 action); Mitros v. Cooke, 170 F.Supp.2d 504, 507 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (noting that city police department is a sub-unit of the city government that is merely a vehicle through which the city fulfills its policing functions, and is not a separate entity for purposes of suit); Tobin v. Badamo, 3:00CV783, 2000 WL 1880262 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2000) (municipal police department is not a proper party to a section 1983 action because it is merely a subunit of the city and not a separate corporate entity); McMahon v. Westtown-East Goshen Police Dept., No. Civ.A. 98-3919, 1999 WL 236565, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 1999) (citing Johnson v. City of Erie, 834 F.Supp. 873, 878-79 (W.D. Pa. 1993); Agresta v. City of Philadelphia, 694 F.Supp. 117, 119 (E.D. Pa. 1988)); Johnson v. City of Erie, Pa., 834 F.Supp. 873, 879 (W.D. Pa. 1993).
In light of this consistent case law rejecting efforts to name local departments as institutional defendants in § 1983 actions, it is recommended that any claims against this institutional defendant also be dismissed.
E. The Plaintiff's Claim for a Specific Amount of Unliquidated Damages is Improper.
Further, we note that the plaintiff's demand for specified compensatory and punitive damages from the defendants totaling $5,000,000 is inappropriate. Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes a duty on the Court to review pleadings and provides that the Court may upon its own initiative at any time order stricken from any pleading any immaterial matter. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Decisions regarding whether claims may be stricken from a complaint are properly presented to a United States Magistrate Judge for determination in the first instance. Singh v. Superintending School Committee of the City of Portland, 593 F.Supp. 1315 (D. Me. 1984). In this case, it appears that the plaintiff's claim for a specified amount of unliquidated damages violates Local Rule 8.1 which provides, in part, that:
The demand for judgment required in any pleading in any civil action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(3) may set forth generally that the party claiming damages is entitled to monetary relief but shall not claim any
specific sum where unliquidated damages are involved. The short plain statement of jurisdiction, required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1), shall set forth any amounts needed to invoke the jurisdiction of the court but no other.Local Rule 8.1 (emphasis added). Since this prayer for relief violates Local Rule 8.1 by specifying a particular amount of unliquidated damages, it is further recommended that this specific dollar claim be stricken from the complaint. See Hayward v. Monroe Cty. Corr. Facility, No. 3:18-CV-610, 2019 WL 407473, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2019), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Haywood v. Martynowicz, No. 3:18-CV-00610, 2019 WL 398557 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2019); Holmes v. Eck, No. 3:16-CV-644, 2016 WL 1729489, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:16CV644, 2016 WL 1756907 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2016).
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed.
The plaintiff is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.