Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-3951.
August 27, 2004
MEMORANDUM
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Charles Scott, seeks a Temporary Restraining Order or a Preliminary Injunction enjoining all proceedings in state court, including ejectment. Because this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this matter, Plaintiff's Motion is denied.
II. Factual Background
On January 18, 2002, Mortgage Electronic Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), filed a mortgage foreclosure action in the Philadelphia Common Pleas Court against Charles Scott for failure to pay the mortgage on his property. Hill v. Scott, No. 001729, Jan. 2002 Term (Pa. Ct. C.P., Phila. Cnty, 2002). On January 31, 2002, MERS filed an Affidavit of Return Service of the Complaint indicating that Mr. Scott was "not found." Accordingly, on April 10, 2002, MERS filed a Petition for Alternative Service, permitting service to be made on Mr. Scott by first class mail, certified return receipt requested, and posting the mortgaged premises. Pa. R.C.P. 403 (2004). The Honorable Albert J. Snite granted the Petition on April 26, 2002. See April 26, 2002, Order of Snite, J., granting Petition for Alternative Service. On May 6, 2002, MERS filed Affidavits of Service indicating that Mr. Scott had been served pursuant to the terms of Judge Snite's Order. (August 26, 2004 N.T. at 7-8.)
On June 13, 2002, MERS filed a Praecipe for Entry of Default Judgment along with a Writ of Execution. The property was sold to Thomas Hill at a Sheriff's Sale on September 10, 2002. Mr. Hill then filed an ejectment action against Mr. Scott on October 11, 2002. Mr. Scott contends that he received none of these pleadings, orders, or notices. (August 26, 2004 N.T. at 8.) MERS presented to this Court sworn affidavits of service, and certified mail receipts indicating that MERS served Mr. Scott with all papers in accordance with Judge Snite's Order. Mr. Scott contends that "[m]ortgagee falsified [the] Affidavit[s] of Service," and that "[t]he mortgagee, the Sheriff, and Thomas Hill conspired and sold [his] property without any required notice at the court level and at the Sheriff Sale level." (Pl. Compl. ¶¶ 27, A.) Mr. Scott contends that the first time he learned of the state court proceedings was on October 21, 2002, when he contacted Mr. Hill and offered to repurchase the property. (Pl. Compl. ¶ 21.) Mr. Hill refused Mr. Scott's offer. (August 26, 2004 N.T. at 6, 7.)
On November 13, 2002, Mr. Scott, acting pro se, filed a Petition to Set Aside Sheriff's Sale, alleging that his due process rights under the 14th Amendment were violated because service of process was defective, that he did not have notice of the foreclosure proceedings, and that he had offered to buy back the property. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Scott, No. 001729, Jan. 2002 Term (Pa. Ct. C.P., Phila. Cnty, 2002). The Honorable Esther Sylvester of the Philadelphia Common Pleas Court issued an Order denying the Petition to Set Aside Sheriff's Sale on January 22, 2003. See January 22, 2003, Order of Sylvester, J., denying Petition to Set Aside Sheriff's Sale.
In response, on April 24, 2003, Mr. Scott filed a Petition to Open Judgment in the Philadelphia Common Pleas Court. On May 15, 2003, MERS filed a Response to this petition, and on June 10, 2003, Mr. Scott filed another Motion to Set Aside Sheriff's Sale. On July 14, 2003, Judge Sylvester granted Mr. Scott's Petition to Open Default Judgment. See July 14, 2003, Order of Sylvester, J., granting Petition to Open Default Judgment. On September 3, 2003, Judge Sylvester granted MERS's request for reconsideration and reinstated the default judgment against Mr. Scott. See September 3, 2003, Order of Sylvester, J., granting Motion for Reconsideration. Mr. Scott claims that he never received notice of the Motion for Reconsideration; he discovered that it had been granted only when he was served with Mr. Hill's Motion for Summary Judgment in a separate suit for ejectment that Mr. Hill had filed in October 2002. In resisting the ejectment action, Mr. Scott again argued that his 14th Amendment due process rights had been violated. See (Memorandum of Law in Support of Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff's Civil Action Complaint at 1-2) Hill v. Scott, No. 935, Oct. Term 2002 (Pa. Ct. C.P., Phila Cnty., 2002) (Memorandum of Law in Support of Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff's Civil Action Complaint at 1-2).
On February 3, 2004, Mr. Scott filed a Motion to Strike the September 3, 2003 Order in the foreclosure action. The Motion to Strike was denied on April 23, 2004. See September 3, 2003, Order of Sylvester, J., denying Motion to Strike. On February 25, 2004, the Honorable Annette Rizzo granted Mr. Hill's Motion for Summary Judgment in the ejectment action. See February 25, 2004, Order of Rizzo, J., granting Motion for Summary Judgment. (August 26, 2004 N.T. at 6.)
Mr. Scott appealed both decisions — (1) granting MERS's Motion for Reconsideration and (2) granting Mr. Hill's Motion for Summary Judgment — by filing a Notice of Appeal in the Pennsylvania Superior Court on May 24, 2004. See Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Scott, No. 001729, Jan. 2002 Term (Pa. Ct. C.P., Phila. Cnty, 2002); see also Hill v. Scott, No. 935, Oct. Term 2002 (Pa. Ct. C.P., Phila Cnty., 2002).
Mr. Scott has also attempted to stay ejectment by filing a Motion to Stay the Writ of Possession. Judge Rizzo denied Mr. Scott's motion on June 18, 2004. See June 18, 2004, Order of Rizzo, J., denying Motion to Stay Ejectment. Up to this point, Mr. Scott had proceeded pro se. He then retained counsel, who sought a stay of the ejectment pending Mr. Scott's appeal in the Superior Court. On July 29, 2004, the Superior Court stayed execution of the Writ of Possession for 30 days. See Hill v. Scott, No. 1070, EDA 2004 (Pa.Sup.Ct., Phila. Cnty, 2004). On August 8, 2004, the Superior Court vacated the stay. Mr. Scott's brief on the merits of his appeal is due to be filed in the Superior Court on September 2, 2004. (August 27, 2004 N.T. at ___.) The parties agree that the Sheriff intends to take possession of the disputed premises on August 30, 2004.
On August 20, 2004, Mr. Scott, again acting pro se, filed a Complaint in this Court, raising the same 14th Amendment contentions he raised in the state courts: that the failure properly to serve him with the pleadings and notices described above violated his due process rights under the Federal Constitution and 42 U.S.C §§ 1983 and 1985. He asks this Court for injunctive relief to stay the Sheriff from executing the Writ of Possession. Because Mr. Scott pled that the Sheriff did not intend to act on the Writ until September 30, 2004, he did not seek an immediate hearing on his request for injunctive relief. On August 26, 2004, however, Mr. Scott acknowledged that he was in error, that the Sheriff's Office intended to act on August 30, 2004, and that he desired an immediate hearing. (August 26, 2004 N.T. at 5, 31.) The Court granted that request, conducting a hearing that same day, August 26, 2004.
At the hearing, Mr. Scott indicated that he was represented by counsel in the ongoing state court proceedings, but had elected to represent himself before this Court. (August 26, 2004 N.T. at 2.) After hearing from Mr. Scott and counsel for the defendants, the Court continued the matter until the morning of August 27, 2004, so Mr. Scott could consult with his lawyer. (August 26, 2004 N.T. at 38.)
On August 27, 2004, Mr. Scott appeared with counsel. Mr. Scott's counsel did not dispute that Mr. Scott had raised before the Common Pleas Court the same due process claims he seeks to raise in this Court. (August 27, 2004 N.T. at ___.) Counsel argued that Mr. Scott may have appealed "the wrong order" to the Superior Court, and so may have failed to preserve his due process claims in that appeal. Counsel agreed that Mr. Scott is still free to raise the due process claims in Superior Court by seeking reconsideration of that court's August 8, 2004 Order or by petitioning to appeal the "correct" Common Pleas Court Order nunc pro tunc. At the conclusion of the hearing, this Court denied injunctive relief, concluding that it was compelled to abstain in light of the ongoing state court proceedings. III. Discussion
Mr. Scott asks this Court to enjoin ongoing state court litigation in which he has raised the same due process claims he raises here. This Court is without jurisdiction to consider Mr. Scott's request for injunctive relief. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 27 L.Ed. 2d 669, 91 S.Ct. 746 (1971).
The Younger abstention doctrine is intended to minimize federal court interference with ongoing state court proceedings.Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521, 73 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1982);Gwynedd Properties, Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Township, 970 F.2d 1195, 1200 (3d Cir. 1992). This Court is bound to abstain where: "(1) there are ongoing state proceedings involving the would-be federal plaintiffs that are judicial in nature, (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests, and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims." Middlesex County, 457 U.S. at 432; Gwynedd Properties, 970 F.2d at 1200.
This is precisely the situation that obtains here. First, there are prior pending state court proceedings that directly relate to the dispute Mr. Scott has brought to this Court. Second, Pennsylvania has an important interest in resolving ejectment and foreclosure disputes. See Prindable v. Ass'n of Apt. Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1262 (D. Haw. 2003) (finding foreclosure and ejectment proceedings important state interests under the Younger doctrine). Third, Mr. Scott had an adequate opportunity to raise his due process claims in state court, and, in fact did so. Although counsel suggests that Mr. Scott, acting pro se, may have waived the due process claims on appeal, he does not dispute that he had full opportunity to raise the claims and that he may yet do so again by seeking reconsideration or taking a new appeal nunc pro tunc.
In these circumstances, Younger and its progeny obligate this Court to abstain. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15, 95 L.Ed. 2d 1, 107 S.Ct. 1519 (1987) (stating thatYounger abstention is favored even after the plaintiffs failed to raise their federal claims in the ongoing state proceedings). Accordingly, Mr. Scott's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order is denied.
An appropriate Order follows.