Opinion
Civil Action No. 6:19-384-RMG-KFM
11-25-2019
Gary Steven Scott, Plaintiff, v. Warden Scott Lewis, Associate Warden Williams, Major Earley, Lieutenant Palmer, Lt. Scyphers, Lieutenant Lockhart, and Lieutenant Jones, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the court on the defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 41). The plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brought this action pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, alleging the defendants violated his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under Section 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff is a prisoner in the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC"), confined at Lieber Correctional Institution. The defendants are officers and employees of SCDC. In his complaint (doc. 1), the plaintiff alleges that on May 11, 2016, while housed at SCDC's Perry Correctional Institution ("Perry"), he was transported in restraints to and from Kirkland Correctional Institution ("Kirkland") via an SCDC bus for a urology appointment (id., p. 6). The trip to Kirkland took nearly four hours because the bus made two stops at other SCDC prisons along the way. The plaintiff alleges that despite telling Lt. Scyphers that he had an over-active bladder and an enlarged prostate, he was denied permission to leave the bus at both stops to use the restroom. He alleges that Lt. Scyphers cited Warden Scott's order that all prisoners remain on the bus during the trip as the basis for his denial of the plaintiff's requests (id., p. 7). He alleges he was in agonizing pain from holding his urine, and that he eventually wet himself (id.). After seeing the urologist at Kirkland, the plaintiff was again restrained and transported back to Perry, again with two stops and no restroom privileges. On the way back, the plaintiff claims that Lt. Scyphers called him a snitch in front of other prisoners on the bus, and the plaintiff admittedly became "belligerent" (id., p. 8). Because of this conduct, Lt. Scyphers contacted Perry staff, who met the bus upon arrival and had the plaintiff "step out of line" (id., p. 9). The plaintiff told Associate Warden ("A/W") Williams, Major Earley, and Captain Palmer about his dissatisfaction with the bus trip and his inability to use the restroom along the way (id., p. 9-10). He also later filed a grievance, but it was rejected as untimely (id., p. 11).
The date of the incident appears to be different in records submitted by the plaintiff (see docs. 62-1), but the exact date is not important for purposes of this analysis.
Defendant Earley is the Associate Warden of Operations and will hereinafter be referred to as "A/W Earley" (doc. 41-5, Earley aff. ¶ 1).
With this background, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment and SCDC policy by using mechanical restraints for him throughout the bus ride and by not allowing him to exit the bus to use the restroom, which he deems acts of excessive force. He further alleges that holding his urine caused him unnecessary pain and that his medical condition was "aggravated" by the conditions of his transport (id., p. 14). He also alleges that additional SCDC policies require that the defendants report and document this incident, which they did not do (id.).
The defendants filed an answer denying they violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights (doc. 24). On June 7, 2019, they filed the summary judgment motion now at issue (doc. 41). By order filed the same day, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the plaintiff was advised of the motion for summary judgment procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to the defendants' motion (doc. 42). The plaintiff filed a response in opposition to summary judgment on August 5, 2019 (doc. 62), to which the defendants filed a reply on August 13, 2019 (doc. 64). In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants argue that only Lt. Scyphers was on the bus with the plaintiff, and none of the other named defendants knew about the incident until the plaintiff complained later. Further, Lt. Scypher attests that he does not recall the plaintiff requesting to use the bathroom while on the bus and that he has a portable urinal bottle available, which was not requested by the plaintiff. He also states that the plaintiff's clothes were dry upon arrival at Kirkland and upon return to Perry (DOC. 41-6, Scypher aff. ¶¶ 5-13). In response, the plaintiff repeats his allegations, and states that he was not offered the portable urinal bottle during the bus ride (doc. 62). He also provides a Perry medical summary entry, noting his request that future transports be made by van rather than bus due to medical necessity (doc. 62-1). In their reply, the defendants argue that the plaintiff has failed to respond with evidence to support his original allegations or to contradict the affidavits of Lt. Scyphers and the other officers (doc. 64).
The plaintiff alleged that "Officer Brown" was also on the bus, but Officer Brown was dismissed from the case for the plaintiff's lack of service (doc. 69).
APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment: "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). As to the first of these determinations, a fact is deemed "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings; rather, he must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. Defendants Lewis , Williams , Earley , Palmer , Lockhart , and Jones
The defendants argue that the plaintiff's claims against Warden Lewis, A/W Williams, A/W Earley, Capt. Palmer, Lt. Lockhart, and Lt. Jones should be dismissed because the plaintiff names Lt. Scyphers as the only defendant on the bus with him, and he fails to allege any specific conduct or personal participation by the remaining defendants (doc. 41-2 at 2). In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that Warden Lewis ordered that no prisoners could leave the bus (doc. 1, p. 6). He also alleges that, after returning to Perry, he reported the matter to A/W Williams, A/W Earley, and Capt. Palmer (id., p. 9), and also to Lt. Lockhart and Lt. Jones (id., p. 16). In his complaint and his response to summary judgment, the plaintiff asserts that the defendants violated certain SCDC policies concerning the prohibition and reporting of excessive force by (1) transporting him on the bus in mechanical security constraints, and (2) not later documenting the application of restraints as excessive force (id., p. 12).
First, as addressed below, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any part of the incident amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation. Further, none of these allegations are sufficient to hold these defendants liable under Section 1983, as they had no personal involvement or interaction with the plaintiff on the bus. Additionally, "to the extent Plaintiff's claim is that [these SCDC defendants] failed to follow [SCDC] policies and procedures ..., this assertion ... fails to set forth a claim of constitutional magnitude, as the failure of a prison official to follow prison procedures does not, standing alone, amount to a constitutional violation. Johnson v. Ozmint, 567 F. Supp. 2d 806, 823 (D.S.C. 2008) (citing Keeler v. Pea, 782 F. Supp. 42, 44 (D.S.C. 1992) (violations of prison policies which fail to reach the level of a constitutional violation are not actionable under § 1983)). Lastly, to the extent the plaintiff seeks to hold these defendants liable in their supervisory capacities at Perry, the plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal because the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior are generally not applicable to Section 1983 suits. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 ("Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution."); Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (noting that "Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability" (emphasis in original)). Indeed, to allege a plausible claim requires a showing that the supervisor (1) had actual or constructive knowledge that his/her subordinates engaged in conduct posing a pervasive or unreasonable risk of constitutional injury; (2) the supervisor's response to the knowledge was "so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices;" and (3) an affirmative causal link between the inaction by the supervisor and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Green v. Beck, 539 F. App'x 78, 80 (4th Cir. 2013). The plaintiff has made no such showing here. Accordingly, these defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
Under the Eighth Amendment, prisoners have the right to receive adequate medical care while incarcerated. See Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 236 (4th Cir. 2016). When a prison official demonstrates "deliberate indifference" to an inmate's serious medical needs, a constitutional violation occurs under the Eighth Amendment. See id.; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101-06 (1976). To state a claim under Section 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a prisoner must show that he had a serious medical need and that officials knowingly disregarded that need and the substantial risk it posed. King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 218-20 (4th Cir. 2016); Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 209-11 (4th Cir. 2017). A "serious medical need" is a condition "diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Heyer, 849 F.3d at 210 (citation omitted). An official acts with deliberate indifference if he had actual knowledge of the prisoner's serious medical needs and the related risks, but nevertheless disregarded them. See Scinto, 841 F.3d at 225-26.
The plaintiff has not demonstrated that he had a serious medical need during or as a result of this incident to which the defendants were deliberately indifferent. As an initial matter, the plaintiff describes experiencing pain from holding his urine, but he further alleges that he in fact relieved himself during the trip, and he does not allege that the pain continued. Moreover, he has presented nothing but his own speculation and conclusions that holding his urine caused any "aggravating" effects. In support of this claim, the plaintiff filed his medical summary entry (doc. 62-1, p. 1), but it contains no mention by the medical staff that his over-active bladder and enlarged prostate were aggravated by the incident. While the entry recites that the plaintiff sought "medical necessity" grounds for van transportation (rather than by bus), no such finding by the medical staff was made. As the plaintiff has failed to show that he had a serious medical need to which the defendants were deliberately indifferent, this claim should be dismissed.
Conditions of Confinement / Excessive Force
To the extent the plaintiff attempts to bring conditions of confinement and/or excessive force claims against the defendants, his allegations are insufficient to state a claim and are subject to summary dismissal. The Eighth Amendment expressly prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment regarding the conditions of his confinement, a prisoner must prove that he was deprived of a basic human need and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that deprivation. See Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993). The first prong of the Strickler analysis requires an objective showing that the deprivation was sufficiently serious, while the second prong is a subjective test requiring evidence that prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Regarding claims of excessive force, the "core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). In determining whether prison officials acted maliciously and sadistically, courts should balance several factors including: (1) the need for the application of force, (2) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, (3) the extent of any reasonably perceived threat that the application of force was intended to quell; and (4) any efforts to temper the severity of a forceful response. Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 239 (4th Cir. 2008).
Viewed objectively, whether in the context of his conditions of confinement while being transported or as matter of the level of force applied, the plaintiff's claim is meritless. The United States Supreme Court has observed that the Eighth Amendment does not require that prisoners "be housed in a manner most pleasing to them." Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. 1312, 1315-16 (1981). "Prison conditions may be harsh and uncomfortable without violating the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment." Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 642 (7th Cir. 1997). A prisoner being restrained while transported outside of prison is not unreasonable under the circumstances presented here, nor is the refusal by officials to allow the plaintiff off the bus for restroom stops, particularly when a portable urinal bottle was available onboard, as attested to by Lt. Scyphers. Even if it were unavailable or not offered to the plaintiff as he maintains in his response, this sole deprivation does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. "Courts have generally found ... that a temporary deprivation of bathroom facilities does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation." Hooks v. Chapman, C/A No. 0:12-2416-GRA-PJG, 2012 WL 6674494, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 30, 2012), R&R adopted by 2012 WL 6674491 (D.S.C. Dec. 21, 2012) (citing cases). See Mohammed v. Beaver, C/A No. 5:18-cv-165-FDW, 2018 WL 6268214, at *7 (W.D. N.C. Nov. 30, 2018) (summarily dismissing prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim that he was denied a urinal on one medical trip, which caused him to urinate on himself, as the allegations were not sufficiently serious to have denied him the minimum necessities of life); DePaola v. Ray, C/A No. 7:12cv00139, 2013 WL 4451236, at *29-30 (W.D. Va. July 22, 2013) (finding that the denial of bathroom facilities for approximately five hours while sitting in a transport van did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation) (citations omitted), R&R adopted as modified by 2013 WL 4453422 (W.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2013). Likewise, the plaintiff's allegation that he urinated on himself during the bus ride is "merely an isolated incident and not actionable via the Eighth Amendment." See Draper v. W. Va. Reg'l Jail, C/A No. 7:09-CV-00189, 2009 WL 2232453, at *2 (W.D.Va July 24, 2009).
As for the subjective element, the plaintiff has utterly failed to show that Lt. Scyphers or any of the other defendants acted maliciously or sadistically to cause harm. Indeed, the plaintiff alleges that Lt. Scyphers denied him off-bus restroom privileges based on the orders of Warden Lewis; no allegations are made that Lt. Scyphers (or Warden Lewis) was motivated in his actions by cruelty. Accordingly, the plaintiff's claims here cannot survive summary judgment.
Failure to Respond to Grievance
In his complaint, the plaintiff states that after the bus trip, he filed an informal resolution form with A/W Earley, but it "came up missing," and his grievance was later considered time-barred by the Grievance Branch Chief (doc. 1, p. 20). To the extent the plaintiff contends that this administrative mishandling of his grievance rises to the level of a constitutional violation, he is mistaken. "Malfeasance associated with the inmate grievance process only amounts to a constitutional violation where that conduct compromises an individual's right of access to the courts." Wilder v. McCabe, C.A. No. 3:12-CV-364-RMG, 2013 WL 300825, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 25, 2013) (citations omitted). The plaintiff has not been denied access to this court, and the merits of his claims are being considered. Accordingly, this claim fails.
Qualified Immunity
The defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities (doc. 47-1 at 10-13). The undersigned agrees. Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damage suits as long as the conduct in question does not "violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Thus, qualified immunity is lost if an official violates a constitutional or statutory right of a plaintiff that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that an objectively reasonable official in the official's position would have known of the right. Id.
To determine whether qualified immunity applies, a district court must determine a plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all and whether the particular right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655-56 (2014) (per curiam); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). "The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Here, as discussed above, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. Therefore, the undersigned finds the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Now, therefore, based upon the foregoing,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 41) be granted. The attention of the parties is directed to the notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Kevin F. McDonald
United States Magistrate Judge November 25, 2019
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).