Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 16-00056-BAJ-RLB
02-04-2016
DERRICK SCOTT v. KEVIN JONES, ET AL.
RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court is a motion for Permanent Preliminary Injunction/TRO in Support of Plaintiff 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Under the PLRA Three Strikes Statute Exception (Doc. 2) filed by Plaintiff Derrick Scott ("Plaintiff"). An inmate at Louisiana State Penitentiary ("LSP"), Plaintiff, in short, seeks a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction against LSP employees Kevin Jones, Amanda Cruz, Jimmy Smith, and Unknown Slater (collectively. "Defendants"). For the reasons explained herein, Plaintiff's motion is DENIED.
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I. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
A party requesting the issuance of a temporary restraining order must establish (1) a substantial likelihood that the movant will prevail on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that irreparable harm will result if the injunction is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm to the defendant; and (4) that the granting of the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest. Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
In the instant motion, Plaintiff asserts that "he has been subject to several physical attacks taken upon his body already" and alleges that "he [is] living in 'imminent' danger of more brutal physical attacks being taken upon his body as long as he continue [sic] to remain house [sic] at [Louisiana State Penitentiary]." (Doc. 2 at p. 8). Plaintiff repeats these general allegations throughout his six page motion, but fails to so much as assert that any of the above-mentioned elements are met. Accordingly, Plaintiff's requested TRO is DENIED.
Plaintiff's motion appears to conflate the "imminent danger of serious physical injury" exception to 28 U.S.C. 1915(g)'s "three strikes rule" with the second element necessary to obtain a TRO. Compare 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), and Adepegba v. Harnmons, 101 F.3d 383. 385 (5th Cir. 1996), with Clark. 812 F.2d at 993.
II. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
"A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy; it is never awarded as of right." Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[t]he decision to grant a request for preliminary injunction is to be treated as the exception rather than the rule"). The decision whether to grant or deny a request for a preliminary injunction is within the sound discretion of the Court. See Allied Mktg. Grp., Inc., 878 F.2d at 809.
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must establish the same four elements as that of a TRO. Compare Clark, 812 F.2d at 993 (listing the four elements necessary to grant a TRO), with Walgreen Co. v. Hood, 275 F.3d 475, 477 (5th Cir. 2001) (listing the four elements necessary to grant a preliminary injunction). As the court previously held, see supra at pp 1-2. Plaintiff has failed to establish any of these elements. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for Permanent Preliminary Injunction/TRO in Support of Plaintiff 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Under the PLRA Three Strikes Statute Exception (Doc. 2) is DENIED.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above-captioned matter is referred to the Magistrate Judge to determine whether Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1) should be allowed to proceed pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 4th day of February, 2016.
/s/ _________
BRIAN A. JACKSON, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA